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PRACTICED AT THE ART OF DECEPTION: THE FAILURE OF
COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON RECOVERY UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
BY
∗

MICHAEL C. BLUMM, ERICA J. THORSON,∗∗ AND JOSHUA D. SMITH∗∗∗

The saga of Columbia Basin salmon recovery is one of the
foremost natural resource restoration efforts in the United States over
the last quarter-century. Although development of the world’s largest
integrated hydroelectric system crippled the Columbia’s salmon runs,
Congress declared in 1980 that salmon and hydropower were to
become “co-equals” in the management of Columbia Basin dams.
However, that declaration did not prevent the listing of most Columbia
Basin salmon runs under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Widely perceived as a draconian, economically insensitive statute,
the ESA has proved extremely pliable in the case of Columbia Basin
salmon. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the agency charged with implementing the statute in the case
of salmon, consistently chose to exercise its discretion largely to
preserve status quo hydropower and navigation operations. While this
rather remarkable development has apparently escaped the attention of
congressional reformers attempting to make the ESA more
economically accountable, it has not escaped the attention of many in
the Pacific Northwest. As a result, a series of lawsuits over the last
decade has challenged NOAA’s ESA implementation.
The suits have, for the most part, borne fruit. NOAA’s two most
recent biological opinions have been struck down, and the federal
district court has indicated that without a drastic change in course,
salmon recovery is headed for a “train wreck.” Thus, the Columbia
Basin salmon story appears about to embark on a new era of active
judicial oversight. This Article explains how and why this development
came to be, and charges that NOAA and the federal agencies operating
Columbia Basin dams have engaged in longstanding deceptive practices
∗
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in an attempt to mislead the public and Congress into thinking that
meaningful salmon restoration is underway, when in fact it has never
been seriously attempted.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For at least a quarter century, national policy has been to restore the
Columbia Basin’s salmon runs.1 Once the world’s largest, the Columbia’s
salmon runs were decimated first by over-fishing and later by water project
development, which transformed the basin into the largest interconnected
hydroelectric system in the world and created a seaport in Idaho, some 465
miles inland.2
After unsuccessfully experimenting with massive reliance on hatcheries
to substitute for salmon habitat lost to water project development,3 Congress
ordered modifications in the operations of Columbia Basin dams in an
innovative 1980 statute, the Northwest Power Act.4 Although the drafters of
that statute were quite optimistic that those operational changes and other

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the term “salmon” encompasses both Columbia Basin salmon
and steelhead. Salmon and steelhead are not identical species. All species of Columbia Basin
salmon and steelhead, however, are members of the same genus, Oncorhynchus, and are
considered salmonids. While steelhead (O. mykiss) is actually a trout, scientists include
steelhead among the salmonids because it is, like salmon, an anadromous fish (i.e., migrates
from the sea to fresh water to spawn). Steelhead, unlike salmon, do not necessarily die after
they spawn. Although there are only five species of salmon in the Pacific Northwest according
to the traditional Linnean system—pink salmon (O. gorbuscha), chum (O. keta), sockeye (O.
nerka), coho (O. kisutch), and chinook (O. tshawytscha)—there is considerable variability
between members of the same species, depending on where and when they spawn and migrate.
These differences between members of the same species led to a formal classification of
salmonids in the United States that goes beyond the traditional Linnean system to define
distinct groups of populations as evolutionary significant units (ESUs). There are between 50
and 55 distinct salmonid ESUs that inhabit the waterways of the American West. Phillip S. Levin
& Michael H. Schiewe, Preserving Salmon Biodiversity, AMERICAN SCIENTIST ONLINE, May-June
2001, http://www.americanscientist.org/template/AssetDetail/assetid/14347/page/2#22500 (last
visited July 16, 2006).
2 See generally MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY
OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 5–14 (2002) [hereinafter SACRIFICING THE SALMON]
(tracing the history of the Columbia Basin and the dams).
3 See generally id.
4 See 16 U.S.C. § 839b (2000) (establishing regional entity for managing the river basin).
See generally SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 129–60 (discussing the Northwest Power
Act).
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modifications to the dams would reverse the salmon’s decline,5 the measures
instituted under the 1980 statute were unable to prevent the listing of several
salmon species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the early 1990s.6
The ESA era ushered in by the listings began with great anxiety among
the electricity, navigation, and other river-dependent industries that socalled draconian ESA measures would elevate salmon protection over
hydropower generation or barge transport of agricultural goods. But over a
dozen years after the initial listings, the issuance of several biological
opinions (BiOps)—designed to avoid jeopardy to listed salmon—produced
no such reallocation of Columbia Basin hydrosystem priorities.
Actually, a good case can be made that the salmon listings have done
much more to demonstrate the economic sensitivity of ESA implementation
than to restore salmon spawning in the Columbia Basin.7 This surprising
result has been reinforced by developments in the twenty-first century.
Notably, during the 2001 West Coast electricity crisis, hydrosystem8
5 The Northwest Power Act promised that fish and wildlife would be treated “on a par”
with other uses in the Columbia River, and a “coequal partner” with hydropower. See H.R. REP.
NO. 96-976, at 49, 56–57 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989, 6015. The Act sought to
produce parity between fish and wildlife restoration and hydropower by altering hydroelectric
operations, such as improving flows and installing fish bypass systems at mainstem dams, and
calling for the creation of an interstate agency—the Northwest Power Planning Council—to
implement a system-wide approach to salmon restoration. Id.; Northwest Power Planning Act,
16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i)–(ii) (2000). Despite the Act’s ambitious call for “equal footing”
between hydropower and fish, Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984), Columbia Basin salmon
populations continue to decline. See Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the
Parity Promise: Hydropower, Salmon and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL.
L. 657, 661–62 (1991) [hereinafter Unraveling Parity] (arguing that the failure of the Northwest
Power Act to halt the decline of Columbia Basin salmon was due to the Northwest Power
Planning Council’s failure to defer to the biological expertise of the region’s federal and state
fishery agencies and Indian tribes on issues of stream flows and spill).
6 See Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619, 58,623 (Nov. 20, 1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222 (2005))
(concluding “Snake River sockeye salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka) is a ‘species’ under the ESA
and should be listed as endangered under the ESA”); Endangered and Threatened Species;
Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon Threatened Status for
Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653, 14,653–54 (Apr. 22, 1992) (codified at 50
C.F.R. § 227 (2005)) (“Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus
tshawytscha) and Snake River fall chinook salmon are ‘species’ under the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 . . . and should be listed as threatened”); see also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra
note 2, at 173–217 (discussing the ESA salmon listings in the Columbia Basin as well as other
ESA issues).
7 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 213–17 (describing effect of salmon listing
on implementation of the ESA).
8 The term “hydrosystem” is synonymous with the Federal Columbia River Power System
(FCRPS). Comprised of 14 sets of dams, powerhouses, and associated reservoirs, the FCRPS is
operated primarily for flood control, navigation, hydropower generation, and irrigation by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), the Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA), and the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBOR). NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
NW. REGION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 1-1 to 1-3 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 BIOP]. The facilities that
constitute the FCRPS include Dworshak, Lower Granite, Little Goose, Lower Monumental, and
Ice Harbor dams, powerplants, and reservoirs in the Lower Snake River Basin; Albeni Falls,
Hungry Horse, Libby, Grand Coulee, and Chief Joseph dams, powerplants, and reservoirs in the
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operators completely abandoned salmon-protective operations.9 In fact, the
Bush Administration’s entire approach to Columbia Basin salmon has been
dominated by deception. For example, when a federal judge rejected a
Clinton Administration BiOp on hydrosystem operations in 2003 because its
provisions were not “reasonably certain” to be implemented,10 the Bush
Administration seized the opportunity to completely revise the standards
BiOps must satisfy under the ESA.11 The result produced a new BiOp in late
2004, in which the Bush Administration attempted to reverse an earlier
conclusion that Columbia Basin hydrosystem operations jeopardized listed
salmon runs—a brazen attempt to ratify the operational status quo for at
least five additional years.12
This attempt to repudiate the need for changed dam operations
followed on the heels of the hydrosystem operators’ efforts to effectively
abandon improvements in river migration conditions for salmon during the
summer of 2004.13 Both of the attempts to eliminate hydrosystem operations
benefiting salmon failed to survive judicial scrutiny, however. Consequently,
the reviewing court rejected the spill proposal and the 2004 BiOp, and during
both the 2005 and 2006 salmon migration seasons ordered spills of water at a
number of Columbia Basin dams in order to facilitate salmon passage, spills
the dam operators attempted to eliminate.14 As of this writing, with the
district court willing to assume an active role in Columbia Basin operations,
with appeals of that court’s decisions pending before the Ninth Circuit, and
with no reversal of the decline in spawning salmon populations in sight, the
situation seems especially precarious. A Ninth Circuit reversal of the district
court’s decisions, or a change of heart by the district court, could effectively
restore the status quo ante, which would enable the federal agencies
operating and regulating the Columbia Basin hydrosystem to resume their
practice of deceiving the public into thinking that they were making a
meaningful attempt to restore spawning salmon populations, when in fact
they were doing no such thing.

Upper Columbia River Basin; and McNary, John Day, The Dalles, and Bonneville dams,
powerplants, and reservoirs in the Lower Columbia River Basin. Id. at 1-3. The Corps has
responsibility for operation and management of the dams operated primarily for hydroelectric
production, flood control, and navigation. Id.; see also infra notes 397–414 and accompanying
text. The USBOR has operational control over projects developed for irrigation. 2000 BIOP,
supra, at 1-1. The BPA plays a crucial role in the dam operations through its authority to market
electricity under the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 and its duty to protect and enhance fish and
wildlife in the Columbia Basin under the Northwest Power Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 832–832l (2000); 16
U.S.C. § 839 (2000).
9 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Daniel J. Rohlf, The BPA Salmon/Power Crisis: A Way Out,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,726 (2001) [hereinafter BPA Salmon Crisis] (discussing the 2001 West Coast
electricity crisis and BPA’s role in it, including invoking waivers of salmon protections in the
2000 BiOp).
10 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196,
1213–14 (D. Or. 2003). The case is discussed infra notes 294–313 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 358–75 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 343 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 318–30 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 479–90 and accompanying text.
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This Article examines these and other recent developments in the
Columbia Basin salmon saga, focusing on the deceptive proposals by the
hydrosystem operators and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA),15 the agency charged with ESA implementation, as
well as the recent revival of active and skeptical judicial review. Part II
begins by explaining the complex relationship between the Columbia Basin’s
hydropower and its salmon. Part III compares the BiOps NOAA prepared on
Columbia Basin hydrosystem operations through 2000, including the
litigation they engendered. Part IV considers the 2004 proposal to terminate
salmon spills and the court decision that prevented it. Part V discusses the
Bush Administration’s 2004 BiOp, which would have redefined the key
concept of “jeopardy” in such a way as to eliminate the need to take
meaningful remedial action, while Part VI examines its judicial rejection.
Part VII explores some of the events since the district court struck down the
2004 BiOp, including the court’s injunctions and the attempted dismantling
of an agency which reported on the success of the relief the court ordered.
The Article concludes that while the ESA has proved to be no more capable
of reversing the decline of Columbia Basin salmon than did the Northwest
Power Act, the advent of judicial skepticism offers some hope for more than
mere paper promises about Columbia Basin salmon restoration in the future.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HYDROPOWER AND SALMON
Between the 1930s and the 1970s, hydropower development
reconstructed the mighty flows of the Columbia River and its principal
tributary, the Snake River.16 By the middle of the 1970s, the completion of
the four dams on the Lower Snake River—Ice Harbor, Lower Monumental,
Little Goose, and Lower Granite—created a series of deep, slackwater pools
that transformed Lewiston, Idaho into a deepwater port.17
In the rush to develop the Columbia Basin, the federal government did
not entirely ignore the plight of salmon, however.18 In 1945, when Congress

15 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is a sub-agency of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NMFS has now changed its name to NOAA Fisheries. See
NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 n.2 (explaining the name change). To avoid confusion,
this Article refers to NMFS (NOAA Fisheries) as NOAA throughout.
16 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 87 (noting FCRPS projects were authorized
for flood control, navigation, and irrigation, in addition to hydropower).
17 The Corps’ early plans for development of the Columbia Basin focused on the Columbia
River, but, due to strong lobbying from shipping and agricultural interests, the Corps began to
endorse the development of the Lower Snake River. See Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho’s
Salmon: A History of Failure and a Dubious Future, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 672 (1991–1992)
[hereinafter Saving Idaho’s Salmon] (noting that the Corps recommended Lower Snake River
development despite its estimate that operation of the dams would return only 15% of their
cost).
18 In 1937, Congress directed the Commissioner of Fisheries to study the effects of the
Bonneville Dam on salmon and to propose measures “to attain the full conservation of [the
salmon] and the preservation of the fishing industry.” S. DOC. NO. 75-87, at 1 (1st Sess. 1937)
(quoting S. Res. 113, 75th Cong. (1937)). The report anticipated many of the problems that
continue to plague Columbia Basin salmon, including juvenile bypass, unscreened irrigation
pumps, uncertain hatchery technology, and nonselective ocean harvests. See id. (containing the
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authorized the McNary Dam—in the same statute that sanctioned the Lower
Snake Dams—it pledged that “adequate provision shall be made for the
protection of anadromous fishes by affording them free access to their
natural spawning grounds.”19 Despite this directive suggesting that salmon
conservation was a federal priority, hydropower operations have always
remained the dominant use of the rivers in the Columbia Basin,20 even
though in 1980 Congress passed the Northwest Power Act (NPA), which
called for “parity” between salmon conservation and hydropower
production.21 A dozen years after enactment of the NPA, the listing of salmon
under the ESA eclipsed the NPA as the primary tool for salmon
conservation. The ESA did not, however, stem the decline of the Columbia
Basin salmon populations—largely because NOAA has continued to
preserve the hydropower status quo over the survival and recovery needs of
salmon.22 This section examines the relationship between hydropower and
salmon in the Columbia Basin, first by tracing the evolution of Columbia
Basin salmon law, then by examining the current sorry state of the salmon
runs and their perilous migration corridor.

A. The Legal Framework: The Northwest Power Act and the Endangered
Species Act
Congress first expressed concern about the potential effects of
Columbia River hydropower operations on salmon as long ago as 1937, when
it enacted the Bonneville Power Act.23 But it was not until the passage of the
NPA in 1980 that Congress seriously attempted to protect and restore the
Columbia Basin’s salmon runs. The NPA directed the Northwest Power
Planning Council (Council) to create a program to “protect, mitigate, and
enhance” damaged salmon runs “to the extent affected by the development
Commission of Fisheries report).
19 River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch.19, § 2, 59 Stat. 10, 22 (authorizing the McNary Dam,
situated just below the confluence of the Columbia and Snake Rivers). Section 2 of the same
statute also authorized the four Lower Snake River dams, albeit vaguely. Id. at 21 (calling for
“such dams as are necessary” for navigation and irrigation). In the years following this
authorization, the Corps revamped its plan for the Columbia Basin, calling for “[c]onservation of
salmon . . . to the maximum practical extent.” H.R. DOC. NO. 81-531, at 41–42 (2d Sess. 1950)
(also proposing “[m]inimum interference . . . with fish and wildlife habitat”).
20 See generally Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific

Northwest’s Anadromous Fish Resources For a Peaceful Coexistence With the Federal
Columbia River Power System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211 (1981) [hereinafter Hydropower v. Salmon]
(examining conflict between hydropower and salmon).
21 Northwest Power Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839–839h (2000). See generally Michael C.
Blumm & Brad L. Johnson, Promising a Process for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981)
(discussing the Act in an article published soon after Congress passed the legislation).
22 See generally Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species
Act: Lessons from the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999) [hereinafter Salmon and the
ESA] (examining ESA salmon listings and their aftermath).
23 Bonneville Power Act, Pub. L. No. 75-329, 50 Stat. 731 (1937) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 832–8321); see supra note 18 (describing the study commissioned to examine the
effects of Bonneville Dam on salmon). For a history of the dam-building era, see SACRIFICING
THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 87–108.
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and operation” of the hydropower system.24 The ensuing program—the
Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program—was once touted by the Council
as “the most ambitious effort in the world to save a biological resource,”25
and aimed to achieve parity between salmon and hydropower.26 Despite
years of efforts to fulfill this promise, however, the program failed to restore
the Columbia Basin’s decimated salmon runs.27
Although Congress passed the modern ESA in 1973, after hydropower
had imperiled the Columbia Basin’s salmon runs for most of the twentieth
century, the ESA did not become the central player in salmon legal
protection until the 1990s.28 Citizens began the ESA era by invoking the
public petitioning process for listings after the NPA failed to achieve its
objective of putting salmon on par with hydropower.29 In 1991, NOAA listed

24

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A), (h)(10)(A) (2000).
NW. POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1987 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5
(1987). The NPPC promulgated the first Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program in 1982. See
generally NW. POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1982 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE
PROGRAM (1982) (detailing program intended to mitigate the ill effects of Columbia River Basin
hydropower dams on fish and wildlife); See generally Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the
Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L.
277 (1984) (arguing the program could be substantially improved).
26 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-976 pt. 1, at 49, 56–57 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989,
6015 (envisioning that fish and wildlife would be “coequal partners” with hydropower
production in the operation of the dams and “on a par” with other project purposes); see also
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 129 (describing the origins of the NPA).
27 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 129 (“After two decades of implementation,
this parity goal remains elusive, as hydroelectric operators continue to resist restructuring
system operations.”).
28 NOAA Fisheries and United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) actually had begun a
review of whether or not upriver salmon populations warranted listings under the ESA in 1978.
See Upper Columbia River Basin Populations of Salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) and Steelhead
(Salmo gairdneri), 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628, 45,628 (Oct. 3, 1978) (stating that the NOAA and FWS
were reviewing the status of Columbia River Basin populations of Pacific Salmon). But passage
of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Act forestalled any ESA
listings. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text; Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at
526 (stating that NOAA and FWS postponed a comprehensive status review in the wake of the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Act).
29 The Shoshone-Bannock Tribe petitioned NOAA Fisheries to list Snake River sockeye in
1990. Listing Endangered and Threatened Species: Petition to List Sockeye Salmon in the Snake
River, 55 Fed. Reg. 22,942 (June 5, 1990); see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 175
(discussing the petition filed in November 1991 by the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe, concerning
Snake River sockeye). The public petitioning process is an undervalued aspect of ESA
implementation. See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 586–87 (discussing the importance
of citizen petitions); see also Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, The Endangered Species
Act, and the Institutional Challenged of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.
J. 50, 58 (2001) (arguing that listings of “species lacking charisma or standing in the way of
development” are most often initiated by citizen petition).
Following the tribal petition, a coalition of environmental groups petitioned for listings of
the Snake River spring, summer, and fall chinook and Lower Columbia River coho. Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species: Petitions to List Snake River Spring, Summer, and Fall
Chinook Salmon, and Lower Columbia River Coho Salmon, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (Sept. 11, 1990).
The petitioners included Oregon Trout, Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the Oregon
and Idaho chapters of the American Fisheries Society, American Rivers, and Oregon Natural
Resources Council. See Unraveling Parity, supra note 5, at 714 n.316.
On the failure of the NPA, see id. at 713–14 (observing that “[a] decade of attempting to
25
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the Snake River sockeye as endangered, and the next year listed two species
of Snake River chinook as threatened.30 By 2005, NOAA had listed thirteen
Columbia Basin salmon runs under the ESA.31
The ESA protects listed threatened and endangered species,32 defining
“species” to include distinct population segments (DPSs).33 But the statute
fails to define DPS, a phrase with no independent scientific meaning.
Because salmon populations consist of both natural and hatchery-derived
fish, NOAA invented the term “evolutionarily significant unit” (ESU) to
define a salmon DPS.34 Hatchery fish may be part of an ESU, but the agency
largely excluded hatchery fish from the initial salmon listings.35 A court
decision forced NOAA to reconfigure its ESUs to include more hatchery fish,
however.36 But, somewhat surprisingly, this has not produced a major

design and implement [the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program] has failed to
reverse the serious decline of wild stocks throughout the region”). See also SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 2, at 173 (noting among the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Plan’s
deficiencies “imperfect design, poor enforcement, and lack of authority over harvest
management, hatchery operations, and habitat-damaging activities”).
30 NOAA Fisheries listed the Snake River sockeye as endangered in 1991. Endangered
Status for Snake River Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (Nov. 20, 1991). NOAA Fisheries
grouped the Snake River spring and summer chinook into a single “evolutionarily significant
unit” (ESU) and listed it, along with Snake River fall chinook, as threatened in 1992. See
Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for
Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653, 14,654 (Apr. 22, 1992) (codified at 50
C.F.R. § 223.102) (suggesting that genetic and life history similarities warranted listing the
spring and summer runs together).
31 For a general discussion of the listings of Columbia Basin salmon, see Michael Blumm,
Columbia River Basin, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 63, 155–60 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2005).
See also infra notes 36–37 (discussing the controversy over the listing of Oregon coastal coho,
which included hatchery fish).
32 Species may be listed as either endangered or threatened. An “endangered” species “is
[one] in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000). A “threatened” species is one that is “likely to
become . . . endangered.” Id. § 1532(20). The decision whether to list a species is based on five
factors: 1) habitat loss or modification, 2) overharvesting, 3) disease or predation, 4) inadequate
regulatory protection, and 5) other natural or manmade factors. Id. § 1533(a).
33 The ESA defines “species” as “any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct
population segment of any species of vertebrae fish or wildlife which interbreeds when
mature.” Id. § 1532(16).
34 A salmon population is defined as an “evolutionarily significant unit” (ESU) if it meets
two criteria: first, the population must be “substantially reproductively isolated from other
nonspecific populations”; second, it must represent an “important component in the
evolutionary legacy of the species.” Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the
Endangered Species Act to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991). See
generally Daniel J. Rohlf, There’s Something Fishy Going on Here: A Critique of the National
Marine Fisheries Service’s Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L.
617 (1994) (criticizing the ESU policy).
35 Under the longstanding pre-2005 policy, NOAA Fisheries included hatchery fish in a
listing only when they were “essential for recovery,” meaning that hatchery fish constituted a
“substantial portion of the genetic diversity remaining in the species.” Interim Policy on
Artificial Propagation of Pacific Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,573,
17,575 (Apr. 5, 1993).
36 A coalition of agricultural, forestry, and development interests challenged the 1998 listing
of the Oregon Coast coho ESU, arguing that because NOAA Fisheries included hatchery coho in
the ESU, but not the hatchery fish in the listing, the agency made an impermissible distinction
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change in the landscape of the application of the ESA in the Columbia
Basin.37
A species’s listing implicates the ESA’s protections, including bans on
sales, imports, exports, and “takes” of endangered species and, in some
circumstances, threatened species.38 Section 7 of the ESA also prohibits
federal agencies from proceeding with an action that is likely to jeopardize a
listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat.39 To decide whether an

under the ESA. See Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161 (D. Or. 2001)
(outlining the plaintiffs’ claim that the ESA does not allow listings below the DPS level). Judge
Michael Hogan agreed with the plaintiffs. See id. at 1162 (determining that NOAA Fisheries
made improper distinctions between natural and hatchery fish). NOAA Fisheries therefore
promulgated a new policy requiring that if NOAA Fisheries included hatchery fish in an ESU,
the agency must also include them in a listing of that ESU. Policy on the Consideration of
Hatchery-Origin Fish in Endangered Species Act Listing Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,204,
37,215 (June 28, 2005).
37 Although inclusion of hatchery fish boosts a population’s numbers, under NOAA
Fisheries’ 2005 policy, when making listing decisions, the agency will consider the effects
hatchery fish have on an ESU, and how hatchery fish affect each of four characteristics,
including 1) abundance, 2) productivity, 3) genetic diversity, and 4) spatial distribution. Id.
NOAA’s reevaluation of Columbia Basin salmon listings under this new standard has produced
only one change to date: Lower Columbia River coho moved from a mere candidate for listing
to having endangered status. Final Listing Determinations for 16 Evolutionarily Significant Units
of West Coast Salmon, and Final 4(d) Protective Regulations for Threatened Salmon ESUs, 70
Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,193 (June 28, 2005). NOAA Fisheries did extend the deadline for final listing
determinations on the Oregon Coastal coho and Columbia Basin steelhead. See 6-month
Extension of the Final Listing Determination for Oregon Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of
Coho Salmon, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,217 (June 28, 2005) (extending deadline to review Oregon’s
assessment of the coastal coho’s viability); 6-month Extension of the Final Listing
Determinations for 10 Evolutionarily Significant Units of West Coast Oncorhynchus mykiss, 70
Fed. Reg. 37,219 (June 28, 2005) (delaying a decision on a proposal to downlist Upper Columbia
River steelhead from endangered to threatened to review new scientific information and resolve
a conflict regarding anadromous and resident steelhead populations).
The biggest change occasioned by the court-induced review of listing policy occurred on
January 19, 2006, when NOAA Fisheries withdrew its proposed rule to list the Oregon coastal
coho as threatened. See Withdrawals of Proposals to List and Designate Critical Habitat for the
Oregon Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon, 71 Fed. Reg. 3033, (Jan. 19, 2006)
(reasoning that, despite concerns expressed by its own scientists that ocean conditions could
produce a dramatic decline during the next few years, the best available information
demonstrated that the coastal coho is not likely to become endangered); see also Blumm, supra
note 31, at 160 (suggesting that development interests desired widespread delistings in NOAA
Fisheries 2005 policy, while wild fish proponents objected to the listing of any hatchery fish,
and that both were disappointed in the result). There is little doubt that more litigation over
NOAA’s listing policy will be forthcoming.
38 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(A)–(D) (2000). Prohibitions
against “taking” threatened species may be proscribed by the so-called 4(d) rules when the
listing agency deems the provisions “necessary and advisable.” Id. § 1533(d). For a description
of the 4(d) rules applicable to salmon, see Blumm, supra note 31, at 167–69. A “take” means “to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage
in any such conduct.” Id. § 1532(19). The ESA regulations define “harm” to include “significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. §
17.3(c)(3) (2005). In Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687 (1995), the Supreme Court upheld the regulatory definition of “harm.”
39 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000) (describing “agency action” as “any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by . . . [a federal] agency”). The ESA does not define “jeopardy,” but the
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action is likely to jeopardize a listed species, the federal “action” agency
must first determine, once it discovers the presence of a listed species in the
area of the proposed action, whether its proposed action might affect the
species.40 If the action agency determines that there is a possible effect, it
must prepare a biological assessment evaluating the proposed action’s likely
effects.41
The action agency must initiate a formal consultation with the
appropriate agency to determine whether the proposed action is likely to
jeopardize the species or result in adverse critical habitat modification only
if the biological assessment indicates that the proposal is likely to affect
adversely either the listed species or its critical habitat.42 Otherwise, the
action may proceed without formal consultation.43 This determination is
made public as a biological opinion (BiOp), in which NOAA or the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) explains the analytical basis of its
determination and suggests reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) as
mitigation measures if the action would otherwise result in jeopardy or
adverse critical habitat modification.44
The Columbia Basin hydropower operations have been the subject of
numerous BiOps over the last dozen years. After section B of this Part
describes the current status of Columbia Basin salmon, and section C
highlights the harm the hydropower system causes migrating juvenile
salmon and possible mitigation measures for such harm, Part III of the
Article examines these BiOps through a historical lens, comparing the
essential elements of each to those of prior BiOps.

B. Current Status of the Columbia River Basin’s Listed Salmon Runs
At the time NOAA published its 2004 BiOp, twelve Columbia Basin
salmon species were listed under the ESA.45 Most of these species were
ESA regulations define “jeopardize” to mean “to engage in an action that reasonably would be
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of
that species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
40 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2000). This determination must be made on “the best scientific
and commercial data available.” Id. See generally Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and
Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004)
(discussing use of commercial and scientific data under the ESA).
41 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2000) (stating that the action agency has 180 days to complete
its biological assessment).
42 Id. § 1536(a); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2005) (formal consultation regulations).
43 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a) (2005) (stating that an action may proceed without formal
consultation only if it will not have an adverse impact on either species or its critical habitat).
44 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(3)(A) (2000); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g) (2005) (describing
consultation agency’s obligations).
45 The listed salmon were 1) Snake River spring/summer chinook, 2) Snake River fall
chinook, 3) Upper Columbia River spring chinook, 4) Upper Willamette River chinook, 5) Lower
Columbia River chinook, 6) Snake River steelhead, 7) Upper Columbia River steelhead, 8)
Middle Columbia River steelhead, 9) Upper Willamette River steelhead, 10) Lower Columbia
River steelhead, 11) Columbia River chum, and 12) Snake River sockeye. NAT’L OCEAN &
ATMOSPHERE ADMIN., DIV. OF FISHERIES, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—SECTION 7 CONSULTATION
BIOLOGICAL OPINION: CONSULTATION ON REMAND FOR OPERATION OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER POWER
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listed as threatened; only two were listed as endangered—the Snake River
sockeye and the Upper Columbia River spring chinook.46 This section
summarizes the status of these salmon runs at the time of the 2004 BiOp.

1. Snake River Runs
Current Snake River salmon runs are a mere shadow of their former
abundance and vigor. The Hells Canyon Dam complex, completed in 1967,
and the four Lower Snake River dams, the last of which was completed in
1975, have had a devastating impact on Snake River chinook species,
effectively eliminating nearly 50% of their historical spawning habitat.47 The
historic total adult Snake River spring/summer chinook production probably
exceeded 1.5 million per year, but the average return between 1997 and 2001
was roughly 3,700, a decline of nearly 98.8%.48
The years 2002 and 2003 witnessed record high returns, but hatchery
fish comprised 69% of the returns.49 Further, NOAA attributed much of the
increase to favorable ocean cycles.50 Nonetheless, in 2004, a federal
Biological Review Team (BRT) concluded that the Snake River
spring/summer chinook run was “likely to become endangered in the
foreseeable future.”51
Although no historic estimates of Snake River fall chinook exist, the
species’ returns from 1985 to 1993 were precariously low, ranging from 114

SYSTEM AND 19 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA BASIN 4-1 to 4-2 (Nov. 30,
2004) [hereinafter 2004 BIOP] (revised and reissued pursuant to court order, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n
v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Civ. No. CV 01-640-RE, 2005 WL 3576843 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005)).
13 are now listed. See supra notes 36–37.
46 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-1 to 4-2.
47 See id. at 4-3, 4-6 (noting that Snake River spring/summer chinook have been extirpated
above the Hells Canyon Dam complex, which eliminated access to 211 miles of historic
spawning ground for the Snake River fall chinook). Snake River fall chinook currently have
access to only about 22% of historical spawning habitat. Id. at 4-6.
48 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS III), No. CV 01-640-RE,
CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *23 (D. Or. May 26, 2005).
49
50

Id.

2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-5; see Proposed Listing Determinations for 27 ESUs of
West Coast Salmonids, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,102, 33,114 (June 14, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Listing
of 27 ESUs] (stating that salmon population increases are mostly due to favorable ocean
conditions). Beginning around 1998, ocean temperatures cooled, and studies show that cooler
ocean temperatures correlate with higher salmon abundances. Id. The geometric mean for
Snake River spring/summer chinook returns for the period 2001 to 2003 represented a 548%
increase over the base period of 1996 to 2000. Id. As opposed to an arithmetic mean, a
geometric mean is an average interpreted according to the product of a series of numbers.
Geometric means are useful for describing average growth rates and are also useful when a data
set is highly skewed. See Dictionary Laborlaw Talk.com, http://encyclopedia.laborlaw
talk.com/Mean (last visited July 15, 2006); see also Geometric Mean, http://www.cmh.edu/stats/
definitions/geometric.htm (last visited July 15, 2006).
51 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *23. The Biological Review Team (BRT) included
salmon biologists and other scientists from the NOAA Fisheries, FWS, and the United States
Geological Survey. Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,110. NOAA Fisheries
organized the team to comprehensively study and review the viability and extinction risk of
each of the 27 proposed listings of salmon ESUs on the West Coast. Id. at 33,140.
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to 732 fish.52 Like Snake River spring/summer chinook, Snake River fall
chinook experienced increased return rates during 2002 and 2003, but 64%
were hatchery fish.53 Moreover, since NOAA acknowledged that the
favorable ocean conditions of 2002–03 would not last, the Snake River fall
chinook run had a moderately high risk of becoming endangered.54
Snake River sockeye salmon face the most serious threat of extinction
of all listed salmon species. Historically, sockeye were abundant throughout
the Snake River Basin, spawning in numerous lakes.55 But today, Snake River
sockeye return only to Redfish Lake, and their numbers are alarmingly low.56
Since 1991, when the Snake River sockeye was first listed under the ESA,
only sixteen wild fish have returned to spawn in Redfish Lake.57 The species
is effectively on life support.
Like the Snake River chinook species, Snake River steelhead faced
major restrictions on its spawning habitat due to the completion of the Hells
Canyon Dam complex in the 1960s.58 Historic population data is scarce.
Although it is estimated that 40,000 to 60,000 adults may have returned to
spawn in the Clearwater River system in the pre-Hells Canyon Dam era, this
number may have included up to 86% hatchery fish.59 The natural spawner
returns for the period of 1996 to 2000 averaged only around 10,000 fish.60 The
years of 2001 to 2003 saw a return rate increase of 258%, but long-term
population growth estimates remained below the rates needed for a ratio of
one-to-one replacement, meaning that the population continued to decline.61

2. Columbia River Runs
Of all the Columbia Basin runs, none have fared worse than those of the
Upper Columbia River. The Grand Coulee Dam, completed in 1941, is a
major barrier to spawning habitat for salmon, excluding Upper Columbia
River runs from nearly fifty percent of their historic spawning grounds.62
Both Upper Columbia River spring chinook and steelhead continue to spawn
precariously in drainages between Rock Island Dam and Chief Joseph Dam
(immediately below Grand Coulee), the limit of upstream passage today.63 In

52
53
54

NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *24.
2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-7.
See id. at 4-6 (indicating that despite recent population increases, the ESU was still at

risk).
55 Id. at 4-22. Historic spawning lakes included Alturas, Pettit, Redfish, Stanley, and
Yellowbelly in the Sawtooth Valley and Wallowa, Payette, and Warm Lakes. Id.
56

Id.
Id. In 2000, over 250 adults returned, including artificially propagated fish, but the
numbers fell again in 2001 and 2002 when only 30 fish returned. Id. at 4-22 to 4-23.
58 Id. at 4-12.
59 NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *26 (D. Or. May
57

26, 2005).
60 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-14.
61 Id. at 4-13, 4-14.
62 Id. at 4-14.
63 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *26. Current populations of these species continue
to spawn in the Wenatchee, Methow, and Entiat Rivers. Id. Upper Columbia River steelhead
also spawn in the Okanogan River. Id.
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1998, however, fewer than one-hundred wild Upper Columbia River spring
chinook returned.64 Despite increasing returns during the period of 2001 to
2003, this species faces a high rate of extinction, primarily because hatchery
fish account for approximately seventy to ninety percent of the returns.65
The BRT concluded in 2004 that Upper Columbia River steelhead were in
danger of extinction because hatchery fish constituted a high percentage of
returning fish.66
All of the Lower Columbia River listed species—chinook, steelhead,
and coho—have sustained losses of thirty-five to forty percent of historic
habitat due to impassable dams.67 Additionally, hatchery fish comprise most
of these salmon populations.68 Although experiencing increases in
abundance of returning spawners around 2001, Lower Columbia River
chinook still face long-term risks due to inadequate replacement rates.69 Of
the twenty populations where natural production still occurs, only one has
an average spawner abundance in excess of one thousand fish.70
Lower Columbia River steelhead exhibit particularly small abundance
averages; in fact, not a single population demonstrated a recent five-year
mean abundance over 750 fish.71 Although some populations experienced
overall abundance increases during 2001, other populations showed
declines.72 As a result, a majority of the BRT concluded that Lower Columbia
River steelhead were at risk of becoming endangered in the foreseeable
future.73 Of the twenty-three historic populations of Lower Columbia River
coho, only two have any significant remaining natural productivity, and
those two show recent five-year mean spawner abundances of fewer than

64

Id.

65

2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-8 (suggesting that neither major habitat restoration efforts
nor other protective measures have substantially decreased the likelihood of extinction).
Returning spawners, including hatchery and natural-origin fish, increased by approximately
5,000 from the period of 1992 to 1996 to that of 1996 to 2001. Id. at 4-15. See also Proposed
Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,127 (reporting that “despite strong returns in 2001, both
recent five-year and long-term productivity trends remain below replacement”); id. at 33,140
(the average proportion of wild spawners declined by 10% during recent years).
66
67

Id.
See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-10, 4-19, 4-24 (explaining that the Lower Columbia

River chinook and steelhead each have lost approximately 35% of historic spawning habitat,
while the Lower Columbia coho has lost nearly 40%). Although historic abundance levels of the
Lower Columbia River chinook are sparse, cannery records indicate that these runs may have
peaked at nearly 4.6 million fish in 1883. NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *27.
68 See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-11, 4-19, 4-24 (noting concern among the BRT that
disproportionately high numbers of hatchery fish comprise returning spawners).
69 See Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,126 (indicating further that eight to
ten historic populations have already faced or are on the brink of extirpation).
70 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-10.
71 See Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,138 (suggesting that only half of all
historic populations now have any significant natural production).
72 See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-20 (estimating that, in the aggregate, only 4,429
spawners returned during 2001 compared to an average of 6,333 returning spawners between
1996 and 2000).
73 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *28.
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1,500 fish.74 For this reason, the BRT determined that the species was at risk
of extinction.75
Two other Columbia River runs—the middle Columbia River steelhead
and the Columbia River chum—convey much the same story as the other
listed salmon species: where they once were bountiful and inhabited many
different rivers and tributaries, they now consist of hatchery-inflated
populations with limited spawning habitat.76 NOAA estimated that nearly
ninety percent of historic Columbia River chum populations have become
extinct.77 Although Middle Columbia River steelhead returns increased by
nearly 10,000 fish between 1996–2000 and 2001–02,78 estimated returns of
Columbia River chum, even including hatchery chum, showed a sixteen
percent decline.79

3. Willamette River Runs
The Willamette River runs listed under the ESA consist of the Upper
Willamette River chinook and the Upper Willamette River steelhead. Both
species have experienced significant loss of spawning grounds due to the
thirty-seven dams that occupy their historic habitat.80 During the 1920s, adult
runs of the Upper Willamette River chinook may have included as many as
275,000 fish; however, recent estimates of twenty populations with spawning
production revealed an exceedence of 1,000 fish in only one population.81
Consequently, the BRT determined that natural populations of Upper
Willamette River chinook are “likely to become endangered within the
foreseeable future.”82

74 See Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,133 (describing the Sandy and
Clackamas River populations).
75 See NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *28 (indicating also that a substantial minority
of the BRT thought that the species was likely to become endangered).
76 See id. at *27 (explaining that Middle Columbia River steelhead once had a historical run
size of an estimated 300,000 fish but lost the Upper White Salmon and Upper Deschutes River
populations to dam blockages, and that the Columbia River chum were historically reported in
nearly every river in the Lower Columbia Basin). There are seven steelhead hatchery programs
supporting Middle Columbia River populations and three supporting Columbia River chum
populations. See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-17, 4-21 (noting, however, that the artificial
propagation programs did little to substantially reduce extinction risks).
77 Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,134.
78 See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 4-18 (reporting that the geometric mean between these
periods increased 143%, up from 7,228 fish in 1996 to 2000 to 17,553 between 2001 and 2002).
79 See id. at 4-22 (return fish during the period of 2001 to 2003 averaged about 1,776, while
returns between 1996 and 2000 averaged 2,114).
80 See Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,126, 33,138 (citing a loss of
spawning ground as significant factors in each of the species’ decline). See also NWF v. NMFS
III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *29 (observing that the multitude of dams in the Willamette River Basin
has blocked access to more than 700 kilometers of spawning streams and rivers, which amounts
to a 75% reduction in spawning habitat for Upper Willamette River chinook).
81 See NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *29 (noting that hatchery production accounts
for approximately 90% of spawners).
82 See Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,126 (stating that the minority
opinion was that the species was in danger of extinction).
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The BRT reached the same conclusion for Upper Willamette River
steelhead.83 The recent five-year mean abundance was low (5,819 adults),
long-term trends in abundance are negative for all populations in the ESU,
and approximately one-third of the ESU’s historical spawning habitat is now
blocked.84 The BRT was also concerned that the continued release of nonnative summer steelhead posed an ESU diversity risk.85

4. The Outlook
Although ocean conditions during 2000–2003 produced a boon in
salmon productivity, as evidenced by increases in returning spawner
numbers for almost all populations, all listed salmon runs in the Columbia
Basin face the likelihood of endangerment, if not extinction, within the
foreseeable future.86 Most current ESUs are heavily supported by hatchery
fish, and the effects of increased numbers of hatchery fish interspersed with
naturally reproducing stocks is unknown.87 The high returns reported at the
turn of the twenty-first century were the result of favorable ocean
conditions, not improvements in hydropower operations.
The following section describes the causes of declining Columbia Basin
salmon populations as well as the hydropower operational changes that
could mitigate some of the dams’ most devastating effects. Part III
demonstrates that, despite longstanding calls for improvements in
hydropower operations, NOAA has asked hydropower agencies to
implement few, if any, meaningful salmon protections. Later Parts illustrate
how salmon advocates have been forced to resort to litigation in an attempt
to force the agencies to supply the protection that the ESA promises but has
yet to deliver.

C. A Lethal River: Juvenile Migration
Long before adoption of the existing legal framework, the Columbia
Basin developed a network of hatcheries to bolster the numbers of salmon
available for harvesters, beginning in 1877.88 Throughout the twentieth
83 See id. at 33,138 (basing its determination on conclusions that hatchery fish did not
obviate the risks posed to productivity, spatial structure, or diversity).
84 See id. (concluding that no population had a recent five-year average abundance of more
than 750 spawners).
85
86

Id.

Voting tallies from the BRT’s assessment of listed salmon stocks in 2004 showed that a
majority of the BRT believed extinction was imminent for four of the ESUs, including Upper
Columbia River spring chinook, Upper Columbia River steelhead, Lower Columbia River coho,
and Snake River sockeye. See NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *23 (showing vote
distribution). For the remainder of the ESUs, the majority of the BRT determined all were likely
to become endangered within the foreseeable future. See id. The only ESU on which the vote
was nearly split was the Middle Columbia River steelhead, with 71 voting for likely to become
endangered, one voter believing that the ESU faced extinction, and 68 indicating they did not
think the ESU was likely to become endangered. Id.
87 See Proposed Listing of 27 ESUs, supra note 50, at 33,142 (describing uncertainty
concerning long-term impacts of increasing hatchery populations).
88 The first hatchery in the Columbia Basin was located on the Clackamas River by
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century, hatcheries remained the primary means of supplementing harvests;
they eventually became a narcotic by which hydropower could continue its
devastating effects on already depleted salmon runs.89
The promise of hatcheries proved elusive, primarily because hatchery
operators released smolts (juvenile salmon) into a lethal river, one rife with
salmon death traps, such as power turbines,90 high temperatures,91 and

Livingston Stone and constructed for Oregon cannery owners. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON,
supra note 2, at 109–11 (detailing the early history of hatcheries).
89 See id. at 109 (explaining continued reliance on hatcheries as a function of ensuring an
adequate harvest for Indian fishers while maintaining non-Indian harvests). Hatcheries have
also been designed as “mitigation” for the effects of Columbia Basin dams. Id.
90 The Northwest Power Planning Council stated the problem succinctly:
[R]esearch has shown that as juvenile salmon and steelhead are drawn through power
turbines, they are exposed to conditions which can cause injury and death in a variety of
ways. Changes in pressure within each turbine are the primary contributor to juvenile
mortality as the fish move from the top of the dam through the turbine intake and out a
tunnel at the base of the dam. The impact of the moving turbine blades and the shearing
action of water in the turbine can also cause injuries or death. In addition, juvenile
salmon and steelhead become stunned and disoriented after passing through the
turbines, thus increasing their vulnerability to predators, especially squawfish, which are
abundant at the base of each dam.
NW. POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1984 COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM § 401 (1982).
Juvenile salmon suffer mortality rates of 6 to 15% at each dam, resulting from turbine impacts.
See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 6-18.
91 See Craig N. Johnston, Salmon and Water Temperature: Taking Endangered Species
Seriously in Establishing Water Quality Standards, 33 ENVTL. L. 151, 153–54 (2003) (“High
temperatures can lead to a host of ill effects in salmon, including elevated risks of disease,
fatality, increased predation, and barriers to migration.”) (citations omitted). High temperatures
in the waterways of the Columbia Basin are directly attributable to the dams and reservoirs. As
the Environmental Protection Agency wrote in a guidance document related to water
temperature in the Pacific Northwest:
Dams and their reservoirs can affect thermal patterns in a number of ways. They can
increase maximum temperatures by holding waters in reservoirs to warm, especially in
shallow areas near shore. Reservoirs, due to their increased volume of water, are more
resistant to temperature change which results in diurnal temperature variation and
prolonged periods of warm water. For example, dams can delay the natural cooling that
takes place in late summer-early fall thereby harming later summer-fall migration runs.
Reservoirs also inundate alluvial river segments, thereby diminishing the groundwater
exchange between the river and the riverbed (i.e., hyporheic flow) that cools the river
and provides cold water refugia during the summer. Further, dams can significantly
reduce the river flow rate, thereby causing juvenile migrants to be exposed to high
temperatures for a much longer time than they would under a natural flow regime.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 10 GUIDANCE FOR PACIFIC NORTHWEST STATE AND TRIBAL
TEMPERATURE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 7 (2003). The EPA guidance document also noted that
dams can cause water temperatures to drop significantly, particularly when the bottom, cold
layer of water is released from a thermally stratified reservoir behind a dam. Id. High water
temperatures were factors in listing Lower Columbia River chinook, Snake River
spring/summer chinook, and Upper Willamette chinook. See Threatened Status for Snake River
Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653, 14,655–56 (Apr. 22, 1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §
223.102(a)(9) (2000)) (Snake River spring/summer chinook); Threatened Status for Three
Chinook Salmon Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs) in Washington and Oregon, and
Endangered Status for One Chinook Salmon ESU in Washington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,323
(Mar. 24, 1999) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.102(a)(5)–(6), 224.101(a) (2005)) (Lower Columbia
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massive slack-water pools,92 all of which produce high mortality rates.93 Two
basic means of reducing juvenile salmon mortalities as they migrate
downriver are: 1) removing smolts from the river and either barging or
trucking them to the estuary at the mouth of the Columbia River, or 2)
improving in-river passage to speed migration and divert juveniles from
dangerous dam machinations. 94

1. Out-of-River Migration: The Juvenile Transport Program
Throughout the course of recent salmon history, beginning as early as
1968, hydropower operators have favored the artificial transportation
program as the preferred means of fish passage.95 Transportation remains
the primary means of fish passage because it minimizes costs to the
hydropower system.96 The transportation program collects smolts at McNary
Dam on the Columbia River and at Lower Granite, Little Goose, and Lower
Monumental dams on the Lower Snake River, funnels the fish into either
barges or trucks, and transports them downriver below the dams to avoid

River chinook and Upper Willamette chinook).
92 The House Commerce Committee included the following in its 1980 report on the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, P.L. 96–501:
Smolts surviving passage through the turbines of one dam enter the large, slow-moving
reservoir of water formed by the next dam. The river no longer has the strong, swift
current needed to carry the smolts rapidly downstream and out to sea. It now takes
young fish more than twice as long to migrate downstream as it did before the dams
were built. The slower the downstream migration, the more smolts are lost to predators.
H.R. REP. NO. 96-976, pt. I, at 46 (1996), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989, 6012. See also THE
INDEP. SCIENTIFIC GROUP, RETURN TO THE RIVER 235 (2000) [hereinafter RETURN TO THE RIVER
2000] (describing the condition of the Columbia River as lacustrine, meaning more like a lake
than a river).
93 See infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. Hatchery fish also compete with naturally
spawning fish for food and habitat and cause adverse genetic effects in naturally spawning fish.
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 190 (noting NOAA Fisheries’ concern that
hatchery operations cause genetic introgression and competition for food and habitat).
94 One of the authors of this Article once noted that Columbia Basin salmon restoration
“has created the odd situation of sometimes trucking salmon on Interstate 84, the highway
paralleling the Columbia, while grain and other agricultural products float in barges on the
river.” See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 281.
95 See Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting
that artificial transportation began in 1968 as an experiment at Ice Harbor Dam); see also
JOSEPH E. TAYLOR III, MAKING SALMON: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST FISHERIES
CRISIS 245 (1999) (discussing the nearly four-decade history of artificial transportation).
96 See Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously: The

Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, Lowering
John Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1009 (1998)
[hereinafter The Case for Dam Breaching] (claiming that the transportation program is more
“politically palatable” than other fish passage alternatives, namely spill); see also Blumm, supra
note 31, at 121, 185 (observing that the transportation program does not result in lost
hydropower revenue). Spill, on the other hand, produces a direct loss of revenue of hydropower
operations because the water that would otherwise flow through turbines and generate power
is spilled over the dams. See infra notes 490 (describing BPA’s own estimation of its lost
revenue due to a mandatory spill order in 2005).

2006]

PRACTICED AT THE ART OF DECEPTION

727

the dams’ power turbines and the reservoirs’ slack water.97 Although the
transportation program prevents some direct juvenile salmon mortalities, it
produces indirect or delayed mortalities. Transportation seems to interfere
with homing behavior and causes adverse genetic selectivity.98 Moreover,
salmon experience stress when they are siphoned from the river, handled,
tagged, and stored in an artificial environment, increasing their vulnerability
to disease and predation.99 The combination of these effects appears to
result in so-called “delayed mortality,” raising questions about whether the
transportation program actually aids salmon recovery—that is, whether
transported fish return to their natal spawning grounds in greater numbers
than they would without the program.100
The potential for high rates of delayed mortality to juvenile salmon has
led numerous studies to question the biological integrity and efficacy of the
transportation program. As early as 1993, the states and tribes advocated
reduced reliance on the transportation program because they concluded that
the program would never adequately compensate for poor river conditions.101

97 See Michael C. Blumm & Melissa Powers, Avoiding Dam Breaching through Offsite
Mitigation: NMFS’s 2000 Biological Opinion on Columbia Basin Hydroelectric Operations, 32
ENVTL. L. 241, 258 (2002) [hereinafter Avoiding Dam Breaching] (listing collection dams); see
also Blumm, supra note 31, at 121 (describing the process of capturing salmon and depositing
them in Columbia River estuary). In American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 126

F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1997), the court explained the transportation process as follows:
[M]echanical bypass systems . . . divert a portion of the juvenile salmon away from the
power house turbines and into vertical gatewells. From the gatewells, the salmon pass
through small orifices into bypass channels which run the length of the power house.
The salmon then enter a primary dewatering facility, and then a high velocity pipe or
flume that carries them to the transportation facility where they are separated, sorted,
marked, and examined. The salmon then are held in raceways and from these raceways
they are loaded into tanker trucks or barges. The transportation barges are specially
equipped to circulate river water into the holding tank. It takes approximately forty
hours for a barge to travel to the release site below the Bonneville Dam. Once the salmon
are released, they continue their migration for another 140 miles to the Pacific Ocean.
98 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 283–84 (explaining the findings of an
independent peer review of the transportation program in 1994); see also The Case for Dam
Breaching, supra note 96, at 1010 (suggesting that improvements in the technology of the
transportation process would not overcome the inherent dangers to salmon populations
because transportation prevents salmon from “imprinting” the river, which allows them to
return to their natal streams to spawn).
99 SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 284; see also COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH
COMM’N, WY-KAN-USH-MI WA-KISH-WIT, SPIRIT OF THE SALMON: THE COLUMBIA RIVER ANADROMOUS
FISH RESTORATION PLAN OF THE NEZ PERCE, UMATILLA, WARM SPRINGS, AND YAKAMA TRIBES 5B-25
to 5B-26 (1995) [hereinafter TRIBAL RESTORATION PLAN] (describing the selective mortality
resulting from the transportation process).
100 See RETURN TO THE RIVER 2000, supra note 92, at 293 (noting that questions exist as to the
efficacy of transportation as a long-term recovery option). Past survival data showed that of
transported fish, less than 0.5% returned to spawn as adults in 1997 and 1998. See The Case for
Dam Breaching, supra note 96, at 1010 (indicating that 2% is often cited as necessary for
recovery).
101 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 282 (describing the Detailed Fishery
Operating Plan of 1993, which was the collaborative work of federal and state fishery agencies,
as well as treaty tribes). The states recommended transportation only in unusually low flow
conditions, while the tribes advocated total abdication of the program. Id. The tribes continued
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In 1994, the Independent Peer Review of Transportation, which included
NOAA scientists, recognized that the transportation program alone could not
eliminate the serious threats facing declining salmon populations.102 The
report concluded that a dearth of scientific data meant that the team could
not support the transportation program as a primary, or even supporting
means, of salmon recovery.103 Subsequent scientific studies have reached
similar conclusions,104 including the Independent Scientific Advisory Board
in 2000.105 But NOAA and Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) continue
to rely on transportation as a primary mitigation mechanism because it
protects the hydropower operational status quo and avoids power losses.
Since up to ninety-one percent of juveniles may face death as they
travel downriver,106 reducing this mortality rate is central to any serious
recovery strategy. Much of the controversy throughout the last fifteen years
of ESA implementation has centered on the adequacy of mitigation
measures contained in NOAA’s BiOps. Dam operators, favoring mitigation
that interferes minimally with power production, support barging and
trucking salmon and maintain that the efficacy of the transportation
program has not yet been undermined by clear scientific proof and
continuously declining salmon runs.107 This successful shifting of the burden
of proof to those advocating for salmon—in this case being forced to prove a
nearly impossible negative108—is commonplace in Columbia Basin
salmon/hydropower tradeoffs.

to eschew the transportation program, calling for its cessation in its restoration plan in 1995.
See TRIBAL RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 99, at 5B-29.
102 See The Case for Dam Breaching, supra note 96, at 1013–14 (summarizing the
Independent Peer Review of Transportation, which included scientists from NOAA Fisheries,
FWS, state fisheries agencies, and treaty tribes).
103 Id. at 1014.
104 See id. at 1015 (discussing the National Research Council report of 1995, which endorsed
natural river conditions over transportation program for the long-term); id. at 1016 (discussing
the 1995 tribal restoration plan’s recommendation of an immediate termination of the
transportation program); id. at 1018 (discussing RETURN TO THE RIVER 1996, which called for
restoration of river flows instead of transportation); id. at 1019 (discussing the 1998 Idaho
Department of Fish and Game report that concluded that continued reliance on transportation
would not recover salmon populations).
105 See RETURN TO THE RIVER 2000, supra note 92, at 299 (condemning future reliance on the
transport program as a means of achieving salmon recovery).
106 See Pac. Nw. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D. Or. 1993).
107 See infra notes 114–16, 125–28, 188–89 and accompanying text. In the 1995 BiOp—the
first BiOp to reach a jeopardy conclusion—the juvenile transportation program played a major
role in the RPA, although NOAA Fisheries purportedly adopted a “spread the risk” approach to
hydropower mitigation. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. For more on the 1995 BiOp’s
reliance on the transportation program, see infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. The
heavy reliance on the transportation program continued in the 2000 BiOp. See infra note 272
and accompanying text.
108 Even though proving a negative is nearly impossible scientifically, post-1995 reputable
scientific studies concluded that transportation was ineffective and should be terminated. See
RETURN TO THE RIVER 2000, supra note 92, at 299 (advocating only restricted reliance on the
transportation program); FISH PASSAGE CTR., COMPARATIVE SURVIVAL STUDY OF PIT-TAGGED
SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK AND PIT-TAGGED SUMMER STEELHEAD 52–54 (2005) (concluding that
generally the transportation program did not provide expected benefits because delayed
mortality rates were higher in transported fish than those that traveled in-river).
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Salmon advocates, states, tribes, and many scientists oppose the
transportation program, citing statistics indicating that artificial
transportation causes juveniles to incur higher mortality rates than would
improved in-river migration.109 Salmon advocates generally favor some
combination of flow improvements and spill.110 Many insist that the four
Lower Snake dams must be breached to ensure salmon recovery of the
Snake River runs.111

2. In-River Migration: Of a Faster River, Spills, and Dam Breaching
In-river passage improvement may consist of modifying dam
mechanics, increasing river flows, lowering reservoir levels, or allowing
more water to pass over or around the dams instead of through them (called
“spill”).112 Both the Council and NOAA have consistently recommended
improvements in dam mechanics, including installation of various
mechanical bypass systems.113 However, increasing river velocity via flow
109 See TRIBAL RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 99, at 5B-24 to 5B-31 (eschewing artificial
transport except in low flow years); INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC GROUP, RETURN TO THE RIVER 328
(1996) [hereinafter RETURN TO THE RIVER 1996] (transportation program is sufficient neither to
maintain nor to rebuild salmon populations); The Case for Dam Breaching, supra note 96, at
1019–22 (describing a 1998 Idaho Fish and Game report and an independent scientific report,
both concluding that a natural or normative river condition is a better alternative than the
transportation program); see also Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: An
Ecological Vision for the Recovery of the Columbia River Salmon, 28 ENVTL. L. 503, 504–18
(1998) (reprinting the executive summary of RETURN TO THE RIVER 1996).
110 See, e.g., The Case for Dam Breaching, supra note 96, at 1003 n.19 (detailing the history of
calls for reservoir drawdowns). See generally Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1398223, *1–2 (D. Or. June 10, 2005) [hereinafter NWF
v. NMFS III Injunction Order] (lawsuit for injunction, demanding spill and increased rate of flow
during summer migrations). For more on the spill injunction, see infra notes 478–89 and
accompanying text.
111 See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 248 (describing the beginnings of the dam
removal movement).
112 See Michael C. Blumm et al., Beyond the Parity Promise: Struggling to Save Columbia
Basin Salmon in the mid 1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21, 30 (1997) [hereinafter Beyond Parity] (describing
various means of improving in-river migration).
113 Generally, a mechanical bypass system is “[a] channel or conduit in a dam that provides a
route for fish to move through or around the dam without going through the turbine units.”
Glossary of Dam Related Terms, http://www.streamnet.org/pub-ed/ff/Glossary/glossarydam.
html (last visited Aug. 9, 2006). Mechanical bypass systems include 1) mechanical screen bypass
systems, 2) Diel passage, 3) surface bypass and sluiceways, and 4) removable spillway weirs.
Mechanical-screen-bypass systems describe submersible fish screens that are placed in turbine
intakes and redirect salmon to either a channel that leads to the river or to a holding facility
where fish are collected for the transportation program. See Blumm, supra note 31, at 150 n.535.
Diel passage means that fish are held until power production breaks, and the fish can move
more safely through the turbines. Id. Surface bypass or sluiceways are modified ice and trash
sluiceways that allow salmon to pass through into a plunge pool and then around the dam. Id. A
removable spillway weir passes fish over a raised spillway crest at the surface of the water,
through a channel in the dam, which works like a waterslide. Id. The 1982 Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program called for installation of mechanical bypass systems at five mid-Columbia
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-licensed dams. See Unraveling Parity, supra
note 5, at 677 (describing the 1982 Columbia Basin Program). The 1984 Amendments to the
program expanded reliance on mechanical bypass systems, calling for installation at several
other mainstem dams. See id. at 680 (noting that the Northwest Power Planning Council
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augmentation or reservoir drawdowns, spill, and dam breaching provide the
most effective—and most controversial—means of improving in-river
juvenile migration. The following section discusses each of these methods,
including their merit and NOAA’s reluctance to the use of each.

a. A Faster River
Increased river velocity is important because it speeds juvenile salmon
passage through reservoirs, and increased river flows correlate to colder
water temperatures, which, in turn, translates into higher rates of salmon
survival.114 Increasing flow velocity can occur two ways—either through flow
augmentation from stored water upriver or via reservoir drawdowns.

expected to achieve 90% juvenile survival rates at each dam with the new bypass mechanisms).
Subsequent amendments to the program continued to invoke dam operators to install bypass
mechanisms. See Saving Idaho’s Salmon, supra note 17, at 683 (noting that 1987 Amendments to
the program called for installation of mechanical bypass systems at mainstem dams lacking
such systems); see also NW. POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1994 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND
WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5.6 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 AMENDMENTS], available at
http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/1994/program.pdf (canvassing the history of mechanical
bypass systems). Despite these numerous requests for mechanical bypass installation,
undertaking the projects required adequate funding, and appropriations were often lacking. See
Unraveling Parity, supra note 5, at 695 (noting historical difficulty in obtaining congressional
appropriation but describing an $18.5 million appropriation passed in 1990 for bypass
installation at the Corps’ dams). Additionally, many of the requests for installation set deadlines
for completion of the projects far into the future. See 1994 AMENDMENTS, supra, at 5.6A.1 to
5.6A.12 (setting deadlines for installation ranging from 1998 to 2000). Later versions of the
program developed fish passage efficiency rates and left the choice of whether to rely on
mechanical bypass systems to achieve those rates to individual dam operators. See NW. POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, 20 YEARS OF PROGRESS: HYDROPOWER (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2003/2003-20/hydro.htm.
NOAA
Fisheries
has
also
incorporated mechanical bypass technology in its BiOps. See, e.g., 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 981 to 9-87. For data and analysis on the efficiency of these mechanical bypass methods, see
generally JOHN W. FERGUSON ET AL., NOAA TECH. MEMO. NMFS-NWFSC-64, PASSAGE OF ADULT
AND JUVENILE SALMOIDS THROUGH FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM DAMS (Mar. 2005).
114 Flow augmentation is significant to migrating smolts because it creates more natural,
faster-moving river conditions, hastening their downriver migration. See TRIBAL RESTORATION
PLAN, supra note 99, at 5B-27 (noting that adequate flows trigger a response in juvenile salmon,
inciting the urge to migrate). In addition, increased river flows can minimize predation and
reduce the risk of degraded water quality resulting from high temperatures and gas saturation.
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—SECTION 7 CONSULTATION, BIOLOGICAL
OPINION: REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON 1994–1998 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA
RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM IN 1995 AND FUTURE YEARS 38
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 BIOP]. Similarly, reservoir drawdowns increase the velocity through the
slack water behind a dam, but they do so without appropriating upriver water. Beyond Parity,
supra note 112, at 31. NOAA described the machinations of a drawdown as follows: “Like
running water through a small pipe, decreased cross-sectional area increases the speed at
which the same amount of water flows.” Id. at 31 n.44. Drawdowns are typically prescribed at
four different levels—minimum irrigation pool, minimum operating level, spillway-crest level,
and natural river level. Minimum irrigation pool describes a situation in which the water level is
at the level of the irrigation pumps: the lowest level at which irrigation pipes will continue to
function. Id. at 112 n.202. Minimum operating pool is the lowest level that allows navigational
locks to function; spillway crest level means that the water level of the reservoir is flush with
the top of the dam’s spillway. Id. at 112 nn.202–04.
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Although water will still flow through power turbines, flow augmentation
generally calls for increased flows during the spring, summer, and early fall,
when dam operators favor storing water for winter power production.115
Consequently, dam operators are reticent to adopt flow regimes tied to
salmon migration. In fact, the Columbia Basin hydropower BiOps have
secured only minimal flow augmentation, often subject to emergency
exceptions that can curtail implementation. 116
Similarly, reservoir drawdowns have been controversial,117 even though
drawdowns could significantly increase river velocity with less water.118
Earlier advocacy focused on implementation of seasonal drawdowns,119 but
since the 1996 release of the Harza Report, permanent reservoir drawdowns
became a more economically viable option, increasing calls for permanent
natural river drawdowns.120 But reducing the amount of water stored in a
reservoir could affect levees, embankments, docks, and irrigation pumps,
injuring irrigators, shippers, and others who rely on the lakes the reservoirs
create.121 As a result, significant drawdowns have not figured prominently in
NOAA’s BiOps.122 The region’s tribes and many scientists, however, have long
endorsed restoration of normative river conditions through permanent

115 The Council defined the conflict in terms of tradeoffs, stating, “[t]he timing of water
releases for flow augmentation, unfortunately, does not coincide with peak needs for electricity.
This conflict creates a tradeoff between power . . . and fish.” Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at
31 n.43 (quoting Northwest Power Planning Council, Draft Briefing Paper: Detailed Fishery
Operating Plan 6 (1994)).
116 See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
117 See Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 31 nn.45–47 (explaining that some analysts think
reservoir drawdowns improves smolt survival, while others cite a lack of scientific proof that
drawdowns are effective).
118 For example, the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority estimated that 30-foot
drawdowns with 85,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water in the river would result in the
same juvenile travel times as would regular reservoir levels with 140 kcfs of water. See Saving
Idaho’s Salmon, supra note 17, at 686 (citing Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority, The
Biological and Technical Justification for the Flow Proposal of the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Authority (1991)).
119 In 1991, Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus supported a proposal to draw down the Snake
River reservoirs 25 feet or more during the spring migration season. See Saving Idaho’s Salmon,
supra note 17, at 688 (describing one of the few influential results of the “Salmon Summit,” a
meeting held by representatives from Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Montana, aiming to
forestall ESA listings of Columbia Basin salmon).
120 The Corps commissioned Harza Northwest to report on the economic feasibility of
salmon restoration options. See The Case for Dam Breaching, supra note 96, at 1024. The report
concluded that permanent, natural river drawdowns were ten times less expensive to
implement than seasonal drawdowns. Id.
121 See Andrew S. Noonan, Just Water Over the Dam? A Look at the Endangered Species Act
and the Impact of Hydroelectric Facilities on Anadromous Fish Runs of the Northwest, 28
IDAHO L. REV. 781, 797 (1992) (comparing costs and benefits of reservoir drawdowns).
122 In its 1995 BiOp, NOAA Fisheries decided to study the feasibility of reservoir drawdowns,
recommending only conditional, minimal drawdowns of the four Lower Snake River reservoirs.
The 2000 BiOp retained nearly identical recommendations. See infra notes 271–77 and
accompanying text.
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reservoir drawdowns.123 They view drawdowns as a fair and reasonable
tradeoff between restoration of salmon runs and the interests of reservoir
users.124

b. Spill
Spill is a second means of improving in-river migration for juvenile
salmon because it aids juvenile salmon dam passage.125 Spill avoids running
water through turbines. Instead, dam operators open spillway gates, which
release large volumes of water, allowing smolts to pass around the dams
virtually unharmed.126 Spill provides the safest means of dam passage—at
least four times more effective than turbine passage.127 Despite the efficacy
of spill, dam operators have long resisted calls for spill because it reduces
the amount of power the river can generate.128
Migrating salmon need spill most during low flow periods, usually in the
summer and early fall, when virtually all streamflows pass through power
turbines. Unfortunately, that is also when Columbia Basin hydropower sales
to users in California and the Southwest are most lucrative.129 Rather than

123 See The Case for Dam Breaching, supra note 96, at 1012–13 (detailing numerous scientific
reports calling for reservoir drawdowns); see also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 282
(describing the 1993 Detailed Fishery Operating Plan, published by federal and state fishery
agencies and treaty tribes, which called for reservoir drawdowns to restore natural river
conditions); see also RETURN TO THE RIVER 1996, supra note 109, at 510 (calling for normative
river conditions); RETURN TO THE RIVER 2000, supra note 92, at 448 (reiterating need for a more
natural river).
124 See Blumm, supra note 31, at 124–25 (explaining the controversy over drawdowns).
125 Hydropower operators can sometimes implement spill in conjunction with flow
augmentation and reservoir drawdowns. See Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 33. If the
drawdown is to natural-river level, spill is impossible. Id. Two types of spill can occur: standard
spill and surface spill. Standard spill occurs approximately 50 feet below normal operating-pool
level, whereas surface spill occurs at the water level. RETURN TO THE RIVER 1996, supra note 109,
at 186–88. Surface spill is viewed as especially effective for dam bypass. Id.
126 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 3-5. NOAA Fisheries estimates that the mortality rate for
spills is between 0% and 2% and suggests that a majority of the mortality is the result of indirect
effects, such as predation and gas saturation resulting from turbidity. Id. at 6-17.
127 Id. at 6-16.
128 The 1995 and 2000 BiOps resulted in limited spill regimes, but soon after NOAA Fisheries
released its 2000 BiOp, BPA declared a power “emergency,” effectively eviscerating any RPA
spill requirements. See BPA Salmon Crisis, supra note 9, at 10,726. Dam operators have since
continued in their attempt to evade mandatory spill. For example, in 2004, while the 2000 BiOp
was still operational, the Corps and BPA proposed to curtail their summer spill regimes, seeking
to end the program earlier than called for in the 2000 RPA. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS II), No. CV 01-6940-RE, 2004 WL 1698050, at *1–2 (D. Or.
July 29, 2004) (describing 2004 decision to halt spill at The Dalles and Bonneville dams during
the month of August and at Ice Harbor and John Day dams during the last week of August). In
2005, relying on the no-jeopardy determination of the 2004 BiOp, the Corps and BPA failed to
schedule any spill at all during the summer migration. See NWF v. NMFS III Injunction Order,
No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1398223, at *4 (D. Or. June 10, 2005) (order granting
preliminary injunction). For more on spill as an RPA, see infra notes 195–201, 255 and
accompanying text. For analysis of litigation over spill, see infra Part IV.
129 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 144 (highlighting the difficulties of securing
adequate river flow during summer months).
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supplement its power supply with expensive spot market purchases, BPA
prefers to curtail spill, thus generating hydropower.130

c. Dam Breaching
In the late 1990s, advocates for in-river improvement and restoration of
the most imperiled salmon runs began to call for breaching the four Lower
Snake River Dams—Lower Granite, Lower Monumental, Little Goose, and
Ice Harbor.131 Before NOAA released its 2000 BiOp, political, economic, and
scientific support emerged for dam breaching as the only viable means of
restoring Snake River salmon runs.132 A group of federal, state, and tribal
scientists conducted peer-reviewed studies on salmon restoration measures,
known as the Plan for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses (PATH),
concluding that Snake River fall chinook and spring/summer chinook had
the greatest chance of recovery—eighty-two percent and one hundred
percent, respectively—if the Corps breached the four Lower Snake Dams.133
In an apparent effort to counter these conclusions NOAA convened a group
of its own scientists, called the Cumulative Risk Initiative (CRI), which
predicted many of the same dire consequences of hydropower development,
but did not embrace dam breaching.134

130 See BPA Salmon Crisis, supra note 9, at 10,726 (suggesting that BPA curtailed spill for
financial reasons).
131 Breaching a dam entails slowly lowering the reservoir and eventually removing the
earthen embankment. The concrete locks and powerhouses are left in place. The entire process
could take four to seven years, which includes time for engineering studies. See Bill Loftus,
How to Breach a Dam, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., June 7, 1998, at 1D. For a history of the Lower
Snake River Dams, see Saving Idaho’s Salmon, supra note 17, at 672–77.
132 For a history of the political momentum (which was short-lived), see Avoiding Dam
Breaching, supra note 97, at 250. For the economic reasons to breach the Lower Snake dams,
see The Case for Dam Breaching, supra note 96, at 1023–30.
133 See Blumm, supra note 31, at 179–80 (predictions also indicated that dam breaching
would benefit sockeye and steelhead, although the scientists did not complete modeling for
those species). The Plan for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses (PATH) was a creation of the
1995 BiOp, in response to the Oregon district court’s criticism that earlier BiOps had entirely
failed to adequately consider the recommendations of state and tribal scientists. See Idaho
Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as
moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). The scientific group consisted of about 25 federal, state,
tribal, and independent scientists. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 184. The
group’s efforts centered on developing mortality hypotheses that predicted death rates incurred
for each migration alternative. PATH then plugged those estimates into life-cycle models. Id.
For further description of the models, see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
134 NOAA Fisheries established the CRI—now called the NOAA Science Center—in 1999.
Composed of 25 NOAA Fisheries scientists, the team conducted similar life-cycle analyses as
PATH; however, CRI selected much lower delayed mortality rates, which are unexplained
mortalities suffered after transport. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 291; see also
supra note 103 and accompanying text). CRI emphasized the potential benefits from habitat
restoration, harvest limits, and predator control in its modeling, leading to CRI’s conclusion that
dam breaching was neither necessary nor adequate for salmon recovery. See SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 2, at 291.
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Relying on CRI’s recommendations (while discounting PATH’s),
NOAA’s 2000 BiOp postponed dam breaching for future consideration.135
Instead, it adopted a complex system of adaptive, ecosystem management in
an apparent effort to divert attention from the calls for dam breaching, while
deferring to the position of the Corps and BPA that they lacked the authority
to breach the dams.136 Although NOAA’s BiOps turned away from dam
breaching, many biologists, economists, and constituents continue to believe
that breaching the four Lower Snake River dams is the only effective way to
restore the imperiled Snake River salmon runs.137 In fact, dam breaching
recently gained one notable adherent: in 2005, Don Chapman, a long-time
consultant for dam operators and river users, recanted years of defending
hydropower status quo by acknowledging that breaching the four dams is
imperative.138
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HYDROPOWER BIOPS—1992 THROUGH 2000:
A HISTORY OF FORM OVER FUNCTION
To understand the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s
(NOAA) 2004 BiOp and its implications within the context of the future of
Columbia Basin salmon, it is important to understand the history of salmon
BiOps. The following section describes the four salmon hydropower BiOps
that preceded the 2004 BiOp. This survey suggests that, despite many
innovations, NOAA has consistently disregarded a precautionary approach
to salmon management. This Part also briefly describes the legal challenges
to these BiOps. Because the BiOps seemed to call for great change, but
produced little or no improvement in the condition of the species, this is
basically a history of form over function.
Two of the most important elements of a BiOp are its jeopardy analysis
and its proposed reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA). The former
consists of both a jeopardy framework—the structure of the jeopardy
analysis—and a jeopardy definition, which establishes the requirements
necessary for survival and recovery of the listed species. NOAA apparently

135 Although NOAA Fisheries concluded that breaching was the most risk-averse mitigation
alternative, the 2000 BiOp recommended dam breaching only if, after eight years of
implementation, NOAA Fisheries determined that the species remained in jeopardy and
gathered new data on delayed mortality showing that, without doubt the transportation
program was failing to avoid jeopardy. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 188–89.
136 See infra notes 248–93 and accompanying text (describing the 2000 BiOp RPA); see also
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 189 (explaining the influence of the action agencies).
137 See Scientists, Others Offer Policy Options for Saving Salmon, COLUMBIA BASIN FISH &
WILDLIFE NEWS BULL., Sept. 16, 2005, available at http://www.cbbulletin.com/Archive/09162005/
default.aspx (indicating that scientists, policy analysts, and wild salmon advocates have called
for dam breaching to restore salmon runs, but noting that was unlikely to happen); Views on
Salmon Recovery, ESA Aired at Clarkston Hearing, COLUMBIA BASIN FISH & WILDLIFE NEWS
BULL., June 10, 2005, available at http://www.cbbulletin.com/Archive/06102005/default.aspx
(noting constituent support for dam breaching). But see id. (describing views of local
community members opposed to dam breaching).
138 See Rocky Barker, Expert Changes His Mind: Dams Should Come Down, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Aug. 9, 2005 (discussing Chapman’s opinion that warmer river temperatures now
make breaching necessary).
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believes that either the framework or the definition may change in any given
BiOp.139 The evolution of the jeopardy framework and the jeopardy definition
in the context of Columbia Basin hydropower BiOps has produced no
discernable benefits to salmon; in fact, NOAA changed both to make it
considerably easier for the agency either to make a no-jeopardy finding or to
propose an RPA that essentially achieves a no-jeopardy determination.140

A. 1992 and 1993 Biological Opinions: Foreshadowing the Future
Once NOAA listed Snake River sockeye and chinook in 1991 and 1992,
respectively, any federal actions that might affect these species were subject
to the consultation requirements of the ESA, resulting in NOAA’s first BiOp
on hydropower operations.141 Despite hope that NOAA would undertake its
obligations with full regard to biological and ecological realities,142 the
agency issued a no-jeopardy opinion, surprisingly suggesting that the
proposed actions would, in fact, contribute to a decrease in salmon

139 Although the ESA regulations define “jeopardize,” FWS and NOAA Fisheries retain
considerable discretion in the implementation of the definition. See Mary Christina Wood,
Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 34
ENVTL. L. 605, 617–19 (2004) (discussing the massaging of the jeopardy determination
undertaken by FWS and NOAA Fisheries); see also DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 149 (1989) (maintaining that federal
agencies have “complete discretion” over the interpretation of the term). FWS and NOAA
Fisheries have produced an ESA Consultation Handbook that creates a standardized jeopardy
framework, suggesting that the framework consists of 1) defining the environmental baseline,
2) evaluating all effects of the proposed action, 3) considering the cumulative effects of other
anticipated actions, and 4) calculating the aggregate effects to determine whether a species can
be expected to both survive and recover. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES
SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 4-37 (1998) [hereinafter CONSULTATION
HANDBOOK], available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/consultations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm.
The 1995 and 2000 BiOps followed the handbook. See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying
text. The 2004 BiOp, however, did not. See infra note 471 and accompanying text.
The Consultation Handbook also provides general definitions of survival and recovery,
but it does so only qualitatively, affording NOAA Fisheries considerable discretion to translate
the definitions into quantitative standards. See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra, at 4-35.
Survival means “the species’ persistence, as listed or as a recovery unit, beyond the conditions
leading to its endangerment, with sufficient resilience to allow recovery from endangerment.”
Id. Recovery is “improvement in the status of a listed species to the point at which listing is no
longer appropriate. . . . Said another way, recovery is the process by which species’ ecosystems
are restored and threats to the species are removed.” Id.
140 Although RPA proposals are not technically binding on action agencies, the Supreme
Court has determined that they are virtually binding, imposing “a powerful coercive effect on
the action agency.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997). See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A)
(2000) (stating that the Secretary “suggests” RPAs). But see Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178
(determining that RPAs have “direct and appreciable legal consequences”). Thus, although an
action agency need not follow the RPA, not doing so would likely lead a court to conclude that
the agency violated its obligation to avoid jeopardy. See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note
97, at 247 (discussing the possible ramifications of not abiding by the consulting agencies’
recommendations).
141 See supra Part II.A (outlining implementation of the ESA).
142 See Saving Idaho’s Salmon, supra note 17, at 701 (suggesting that BPA’s biological
assessment was fundamentally flawed and expressing hope that NOAA Fisheries would act
“with greater biological sensitivity”).
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mortality.143 This conclusion was based entirely on qualitative indicators,144
relying mostly on the 1991 amendments to the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program under the Northwest Power Act (NPA),145 which promised
to increase salmon survival over previous years’ numbers, but made no
attempt to restore salmon populations to healthy, viable levels.146
This initial hydropower BiOp was a harbinger of the future. Over the
next decade-and-a-half, NOAA failed to take seriously the ESA’s calls for
salmon recovery. Instead, the agency pursued only small steps that did not
jeopardize the hydropower dominance of the Columbia Basin.147 Despite
incorporating innovations that could have positively affected salmon
recovery,148 since 1992, NOAA has maintained a policy that might be
described as “hopefully, the situation will get no worse,” producing various
manipulations of the ESA’s requirements in the process.
In its next BiOp, issued in 1993, NOAA finessed its jeopardy analysis,
blinding itself from scientific reality and causing the agency to again reach a
no-jeopardy conclusion. The agency’s new jeopardy analysis consisted of
two criteria, asking whether the actions would 1) improve survival, as
measured against the operations from a baseline period of 1986–1990, and 2)
be reasonably likely to reduce mortalities, when considered in combination
with all other human effects, so that salmon populations would stabilize
within four salmon life cycles.149 NOAA determined that the proposed
hydropower operations for 1993 met both criteria, predicting that the
operations would result in a three to eleven percent reduction in overall
salmon mortality, and opining that stabilizing salmon populations to 1990
levels was possible with a confidence range of sixty to seventy percent.150
NOAA’s conclusions in its 1993 BiOp marked the beginning of an era of
litigation over the application of the ESA to listed salmon runs.151 In Idaho
Department of Fish and Wildlife v. National Marine Fisheries Service, Idaho,
Oregon, and several tribes and environmental groups challenged NOAA’s
choice of its baseline period and the life-cycle modeling used to hypothesize

143 See Mark A. Eames, The Endangered Species Act, the Federal Columbia River Power
System, and the National Marine Fisheries Service, 25 ENVTL. L. 389, 395 (1995) (describing

NOAA Fisheries’ decision making regarding the 1993 BiOp).
144 Id. Appended to the 1992 BiOp was a report detailing a mathematical model that would
simulate conditions at various salmon life cycles, but NMFS declined to use the model, citing a
lack of scientific data. Id. at 394.
145 See generally NW. POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN
FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (1991) (amending the program to be a comprehensive salmon
plan).
146 See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 550 (discussing the lack of efforts to
counteract the decline of the listing species).
147 See supra notes 88–111 and accompanying text (analyzing the mortality rate of juveniles).
148 See infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text (discussing the jeopardy analysis).
149 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON 1993 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 10–11, 15 (1993); see also Eames, supra note 143, at 395–96
(discussing the goals and quantitative approach taken prior to the 1993 BiOp).
150 Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (IDFG v. NMFS), 850 F. Supp.
886, 891 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
151 Id. at 888–91 (recounting the many disputes over salmon brought in Oregon and
Washington’s federal district courts).
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probable salmon mortalities.152 Judge Malcolm Marsh agreed that the
agency’s jeopardy analysis was arbitrary and capricious.153
First, the 1986–1990 baseline period represented a significant change
from the 1992 BiOp154 and seemed to be an attempt to maintain hydropower
generation, instead of an attempt to reduce the effect of hydropower on
declining salmon populations.155 Judge Marsh saw through NOAA’s
manipulations, pointing out that the base period of 1986 to 1990 was a term
of record low salmon counts—record lows that, in fact, induced NOAA to
list the Snake River sockeye and chinook. Using this period for comparison
virtually ensured that NOAA was able to find improvements in survival.
Second, NOAA relied on overly optimistic data in arriving at its estimates of
mortality reduction because it systematically disregarded life-cycle modeling
that predicted lower survival rates.156 With the agency employing only the
high end of the survival assumptions in its confidence analysis, it ended up
with an arbitrarily inflated success rate, allowing it to conclude that
hydropower operations met the second criterion, which called for a
reduction in mortality.157
Judge Marsh observed that although NOAA may have tried to create a
framework for measuring the effects of hydropower operations on salmon,
“the process is seriously, ‘significantly,’ flawed because it is too heavily

152 Id. at 891. Notably, the intervening industries (Pacific Northwest Generating Co-op,
Direct Services Industries, and the Public Power Council) argued that NOAA Fisheries’
comparative baseline choice was flawed because it did not distinguish between mortality
caused by the proposed hydropower operations and that resulting from the existence of the
dams. Id. at 893–94. Instead, the industries insisted that the baseline should include all
mortalities caused by the dams’ existence. Id. at 894. In effect, that would mean that any
additional mortalities caused by the proposed action would have relatively little further effect
on salmon survival. Judge Marsh responded that:

There is no dispute that dam existence is properly part of the “environmental baseline”
as defined by 50 C.F.R. 402.02. The idea that the dams are immutable and uncontrollable
like the weather ignores decades of fish protection improvements (such as bypass
facilities and ladders) and other structural and operational enhancements.

Id. The argument that the hydropower dams are an immutable part of the salmon’s ecosystem
underlies much of NOAA Fisheries’ 2004 BiOp. See infra Part V.B.
153 IDFG v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. at 898.
154 In the 1992 BiOp, NOAA Fisheries employed a baseline of 1984–1990 for juvenile
mortality comparisons and a 1975–1990 baseline for measuring changes in adult mortality. Id. at
893.
155 Id. at 893.
156 Id. at 897.
157 Id. at 898–99. Because NOAA Fisheries cited a lack of scientific certainty in survival rates
for different methods of river passage, such as spills, Judge Marsh ordered the agency to initiate
a collaborative scientific endeavor, incorporating the analyses of “well-qualified scientists such
as the fisheries biologists from the states and tribes.” Id. at 900. Thus were born the scientific
efforts of Path for Analyzing and Testing Hypothesis (PATH) and Cumulative Risk Initiative
(CRI). See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 184–86 (describing the birth of PATH and
the later nativity of NOAA Fisheries’ own CRI, which was an apparent effort by NOAA Fisheries’
Snake River scientists to debunk interagency PATH conclusions that the four Lower Snake
dams needed to be breached if salmon were to have any reasonable chance at survival and
recovery). See also Eames supra note 143, at 395 (describing NOAA Fisheries’ decision-making
regarding the 1993 BiOp).
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geared towards a status quo that has allowed all forms of river activity to
proceed in a deficit situation—that is, relatively small steps, minor
improvements and adjustments—when the situation literally cries out for a
major overhaul.”158 Although NOAA substantially overhauled its analyses in
subsequent BiOps, hydropower operators and navigators maintained largely
status quo operations, while salmon populations continued to decline. The
overhaul Judge Marsh called for never occurred because NOAA persisted in
its disregard of precautionary salmon management in favor of traditional
hydrosystem operations.

B. The 1995 BiOp: Elaborate Maintenance of the In-River Status Quo
NOAA’s next hydropower BiOp governed river operations from 1995–
1999 (the 1995 BiOp).159 Unlike earlier BiOps, the 1995 BiOp declared that
hydropower operations would indeed jeopardize listed salmon
populations.160 Thus, Columbia Basin salmon restoration entered a new era
of legal legerdemain; this time NOAA’s efforts focused on issuing an RPA to
avoid jeopardy, in addition to its continued efforts to finesse the jeopardy
analysis.
The jeopardy analysis and the RPA are two of the most meaningful
parts of a BiOp. Beginning with the 1995 BiOp, these elements became much
more structured and more thoroughly analyzed. In large part, this
phenomenon may be attributed to the 1995 release of a draft of the Fish and
Wildlife Service’s (FWS) and NOAA’s Consultation Handbook.161 As
described in the handbook, the jeopardy analysis consists of two steps. First,
NOAA must decide on a jeopardy framework, which sets the stage for
measuring whether the proposed action jeopardizes a listed species. In other
words, the framework provides the elements NOAA must analyze to
determine whether jeopardy will occur.162 The framework gives the jeopardy
analysis structure. According to the handbook, the framework establishes a
kind of balance sheet where “the action is viewed against the aggregate
effects of everything that has led to the species’ current status . . . [and]
given the aggregate effects, [determines whether] the species can be
expected to both survive and recover.”163
Second, NOAA must decide how it will measure survival and recovery
or, in other words, define “jeopardy.” The ESA regulations stipulate only that

158
159

IDFG v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. at 900.

Am. Rivers, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *1
(D. Or. April 3, 1997). Just prior to Judge Marsh’s order in IDFG v. NMFS, NOAA Fisheries
finished a BiOp spanning hydropower operations from 1994–1998. However, in order to comply
with Judge Marsh’s decision on the 1993 BiOp, the agency reinitiated the consultation leading to
that BiOp. Id.; see also infra notes 220–27, and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
161 Although not completed until 1998, FWS and NOAA Fisheries released a draft version in
1995. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 10 (discussing release of draft CONSULTATION
HANDBOOK).
162 See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text (describing the jeopardy framework
presented in FWS and NOAA Fisheries’ CONSULTATION HANDBOOK).
163 CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 4-35.
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“jeopardize” means “to reduce [directly or indirectly] appreciably the
likelihood of both survival and recovery.”164 When FWS and NOAA revised
the ESA consultation regulations in 1986, it was not clear whether the ESA
required the consulting agencies to issue a jeopardy opinion if only injury to
recovery were likely.165 In the preamble to final rule, FWS and NOAA stated
that “except in exceptional circumstances, injury to recovery alone would
not warrant the issuance of a ‘jeopardy’ biological opinion.”166 Despite the
language of the regulatory preamble, the Consultation Handbook suggested
that the consultation agencies must measure jeopardy in terms of both
survival and recovery.167 However, the handbook provided no formula for
defining survival or recovery, even though the final stage of the jeopardy
framework—determining whether the aggregate effects and the effects of
the proposed action will jeopardize survival and recovery—depends on
knowing what recovery requires.168
Beginning in 1995, with its decision to incorporate recovery into the
jeopardy analysis,169 NOAA could no longer contend that hydropower
operations would not jeopardize salmon, but the agency did begin to inflate
the potential likelihood of success from its RPA. Although both the 1995
BiOp and 2000 BiOp concluded that hydropower operations would cause
jeopardy, the jeopardy definition offered enough flexibility to allow
hydropower operations to continue with only the minor adjustments called
for in the RPAs. In fact, the hydropower system ran nearly unfettered until
2005, when federal district Judge James Redden’s fears that the Columbia
Basin was headed for an impending “train wreck”170 led him to strike down
NOAA’s 2004 BiOp.171 In order to more clearly understand the evolution of
the hydropower BiOps and the relationship between the jeopardy analysis

164

50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).

165

See Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Final Rule,

51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,934 (June 3, 1986) (discussing commentary suggesting that “injury to the
recovery of an already depleted species would require the issuance of a jeopardy opinion”).
166 See id. (describing the addition of the word “both” to the definition of “jeopardize”). This
reasoning seems to make recovery functionally irrelevant. See ROHLF, supra note 139, at 149
(highlighting the irrelevancy of recovery to the jeopardy analysis). However, the 1995 and 2000
hydropower BiOps considered each survival and recovery as independent analyses. 1995 BIOP,
supra note 114, at 13; 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-12.
167 See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 4-37 (“The final analysis then looks at
whether, given the aggregate effects, the species can be expected to both survive and
recover . . . .”).
168 The CONSULTATION HANDBOOK does, however, qualitatively define survival and recovery.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
169 See 1995 BiOp, supra note 114, at 13–14 (indicating that NOAA Fisheries would consider
recovery in its jeopardy analysis).
170 Barry Espenson, Judge Concerned about BiOp Rewrite Getting off Track, COLUMBIA
BASIN BULL. (June 4, 2004); Ley Garnett, Judge: Salmon Plan a ‘Train Wreck’, OREGON PUBLIC
BROADCASTING (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/opb/news.
newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE_ID=689891; Bill Rudolph, BiOp Judge Worries about
Approaching ‘Train Wreck,’ NW. FISHLETTER (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.bluefish.
org/biopjudg.htm. For a detailed analysis of the 2004 BiOp and Judge Redden’s opinions
overturning the BiOp and ordering spill, see infra Parts V–VI.
171 NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *22 (D. Or. May 26,
2005); see also infra Part V.
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and the RPA, as well as the influence of the Consultation Handbook and the
basis of Judge Redden’s fears, the following section explains the jeopardy
analyses and the RPAs of the 1995 and 2000 BiOps.

1. The Jeopardy Analysis
The 1995 BiOp was innovative in many ways. First, the 1995 BiOp was
the first to govern hydropower operations for five years, a change from
annual consultations. The expanded time frame allowed NOAA to undertake
long-term planning and goal setting. This innovation influenced BiOps
nationwide; five-year BiOps are now the norm in many ESA contexts.
Second, the 1995 BiOp was the first hydropower BiOp that NOAA publicly
circulated pre-publication, allowing hydropower agencies and other
interested parties, including irrigators, recreationists, and landowners, to
influence NOAA’s conclusions.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in 1995, NOAA began to
incorporate salmon recovery into the hydropower BiOps. The agency
accomplished this feat in two ways. First, NOAA measured jeopardy in terms
of both survival and recovery.172 At least in theory, this innovation aimed to
ensure that in addition to not worsening the situation for salmon,
hydropower operations would actually improve the status quo. Second,
NOAA incorporated recovery planning into the BiOp. The ESA only
conditionally requires recovery plans173 and fails to make them legally
enforceable.174 But in the 1995 BiOp, NOAA employed the draft salmon
recovery plan, also released in 1995,175 to both ascertain the status of the
salmon runs and the biological requirements necessary for salmon recovery,
and also to set operational benchmarks against which NOAA could compare
the proposed action to make its jeopardy determination.176 Although in the
long-run the importance of these innovations was potentially path-breaking,
they did little for salmon in the short-run.
NOAA determined whether the proposed 1995–1999 hydropower
operations met the biological needs of salmon using a jeopardy framework
aimed at ascertaining “whether the species can be expected to survive with

172 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 13 (proposing that NOAA would “[d]etermine whether the
species can be expected to survive with an adequate potential for recovery under the effects of
the proposed or continuing action”). The 1992 and 1993 BiOps measured only survival. See
supra notes 141–50 and accompanying text.
173 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (2000) (“The Secretary shall
develop and implement [recovery] plans . . . for the conservation and survival of endangered
species and threatened species . . . [unless] such a plan will not promote the conservation of the
species.”).
174 See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996) (determining that
recovery plans do not have the “force of law”).
175 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON
(March 1995).
176 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 1 (describing incorporation of proposed recovery plan);
id at 14 (“NMFS will therefore first consider whether the proposed action is consistent with the
Recovery Plan. If not, NMFS will consider whether the proposed action reduces the risks to the
listed species as much or more than the Recovery Plan.”). Although the proposed recovery plan
played an integral role in the 1995 BiOp, it never went final. 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-11.
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an adequate potential for recovery under the effects of the proposed or
continuing action, the environmental baseline and any cumulative effects,
and considering measures for survival and recovery specific to other life
stages.”177 To implement this framework, the agency 1) defined the biological
status and needs of the listed salmon populations, 2) weighed the effect of
the conditions generated by the environmental baseline on the current status
of listed salmon, 3) calculated the effects of the proposed action, and 4)
added the impact of the “environmental baseline,”178 the effects of the
proposed action, along with any “cumulative effects”179 from non-federal
activities. Finally, the agency decided whether the salmon populations might
survive and possibly recover.180
This approach to jeopardy is an “aggregate” approach to jeopardy. In
effect, NOAA created a balance sheet: on one side, the agency put the
biological needs necessary for survival and for an “adequate potential for
recovery” of listed salmon; on the other side, the agency listed the aggregate
effect of 1) the effects incurred as a result of the environmental baseline, 2)
any cumulative effects, and 3) the effects of the proposed action. If the sides
balanced—if the aggregate effects did not exceed the biological needs of
listed salmon, defined on the basis of the definitions of survival and
recovery—NOAA would reach a no-jeopardy conclusion. If they did not, the
proposed action would jeopardize listed salmon. In the 1995 BiOp, NOAA
reached its jeopardy conclusion based on discrepancies between the
proposed hydropower actions and the draft recovery plan, released just
prior to the 1995 BiOp,181 which NOAA employed to define the biological
needs of the listed salmon.182
The 1995 BiOp employed a potentially revolutionary jeopardy
definition: it considered not merely the stabilization of salmon populations—
meaning survival—but also recovery—meaning population growth. In a draft
of the 1995 BiOp, NOAA distinguished between survival and recovery,
defining jeopardy as requiring a “‘high probability’” of survival and a

177
178

1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 13.
The environmental baseline is defined to include:

the past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human
activities in the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in
the action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7 consultation, and
the impact of state or private actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation
in process.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
179 “‘Cumulative effects’ are those effects of future State or private activities, not involving
Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area of the Federal
action subject to consultation.” Id.
180 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 13–14.
181 See id. at 91 (“NMFS concludes that the operation of [the hydropower system] is likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of listed . . . salmon . . . because of . . . the fact that the
proposed action differs in significant respects from the Recovery Plan . . . .”).
182 See id. at 83 (noting that in the decision-making process, consistency with the recovery
plan was influential in determining whether the proposed actions would achieve survival and
recovery goals).
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“‘moderate to high’” likelihood of recovery.183 In the final BiOp, NOAA
watered down its approach, stating that the biological needs of salmon
would be met if 1) the proposed actions led to a “high likelihood” of species
survival, meaning that, relative to historic likelihood, a majority of
populations will exist above threshold levels for twenty-four year and onehundred year periods,184 and 2) the proposed action demonstrated a
“moderate likelihood” that a majority of the salmon populations will achieve
recovery-based escapement thresholds within forty-eight years.185 This
analysis demanded neither survival nor recovery of all salmon populations,
since both may be satisfied even if certain populations remain precipitously
low or fail to survive at all.
By incorporating at least some recovery requirements, however, NOAA
substantially improved its jeopardy definition. Yet its application of that
definition continued to reflect the agency’s hesitation to require immediate
action. For example, the temporal periods framing the jeopardy standard
were quite long—achievement of above-threshold populations over twentyfour and one-hundred year periods, and recovery within forty-eight years—
particularly in light of the rapid decline of salmon populations during the
years prior to the 1995 BiOp. Further, the jeopardy standard did not require
unqualified survival and recovery: merely a high likelihood for survival and a
moderate likelihood of recovery for a majority, not all, salmon populations.
Finally, NOAA continued to rely on BPA’s life-cycle modeling, which was
based on lower risk assumptions and predictions of lower mortality rates for
transported fish than state and tribal models.186 The upshot was that in the
183 See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 554 (quoting NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—SECTION 7 CONSULTATIONS—REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON 1994–
1998 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION
PROGRAM IN 1995 AND FUTURE YEARS 16, app. 1 (pre-decisional document, Jan. 25, 1995))
(describing the 1995 draft BiOp).
184 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 83. The BiOp fixed escapement thresholds at either 150 or
300 spawners, depending on subpopulation size for Snake River spring/summer chinook; 300
adult spawners for Snake River fall chinook; and 150 or 300 for Snake River sockeye, also
depending on subpopulation counts. Id. at 24–27. None of the salmon subpopulations met these
thresholds regularly at the time the agency issued the 1995 BiOp; in fact, the situation was so
dire that NOAA Fisheries predicted that only two adult Snake River sockeye would return to
spawn in Redfish Lake in 1995. See id. at 27–31 (analyzing salmon population status under the
environmental baseline).
185 Id. at 32. For recovery, the BiOp set thresholds at the salmon levels proposed in the draft
recovery plan, which was set to be released for public comment the same month as the BiOp.
Id. at 1. These thresholds described eight-year geometric means, meaning that for sockeye at
least 1000 naturally-produced fish would return to one lake, and 500 would return to each of its
other spawning lakes in the Stanley Basin; for fall chinook at least 2,500 would spawn; for
spring/summer chinook, the escapement threshold was 31,440 at Lower Granite Dam. Id. at 32.
186 Id. at 84–85 (concluding that BPA’s “model assumptions are more consistent [than the
state and tribal model] with available data on passage survival and therefore the results of life
cycle modeling that use [BPA’s] results . . . are due more weight”). To predict juvenile migration
mortality, BPA scientists developed a model called the Columbia River Fish Passage Model
(CRISP). See Rollie Wilson, Removing Dam Development to Recover Columbia Basin Treaty
Protected Salmon Economies, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 357, 415 (2000) (explaining that BPA
created CRISP in collaboration with University of Washington scientists). The CRISP model
assumed much lower mortality rates, ultimately not factoring in delayed, post-transportation
mortalities, producing results that favored the transportation program. Id. A competing state
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1995 BiOp NOAA was able to preserve the hydropower status quo, reflected
in the RPA’s continued heavy reliance on the juvenile transportation
program.187

2. The Reasonable and Prudent Alternative
Because the proposed action would produce jeopardy, NOAA
developed an RPA to allow the hydropower system to continue operations
while avoiding jeopardy. The RPA adopted an “adaptive” management
scheme under which the action agencies were to take specified immediate
measures and do a considerable amount of planning and evaluation.188 The
goal of this adaptive management scheme was to combine “immediate
actions to improve mainstem survival while reducing the uncertainty about
the likely benefits of, need for and feasibility of major system structural
modifications.”189 In reality, the scheme amounted to another NOAA attempt
to maintain the status quo of hydropower operations.
The 1995 BiOp’s immediate measures consisted of flow augmentation,
spills, and continuation of the transportation program. Although billed as
“immediate” actions, flow augmentation and increased spills were hardly
immediate because factors unrelated to the salmon’s biological requirements
could forestall action. Even though NOAA touted the flow measures as a
means to increase “the priority for the use of reservoirs for fish flow
augmentation relative to power production,” the agency structured the flows
so as to not interfere with optimum hydropower operations.190 This
paramount concern for maintaining hydropower status quo became clear
when viewed through the lens of the draft BiOp.191 The draft BiOp included
biweekly benchmarks for flow averages in the Columbia and Snake Rivers.192

and tribal model, Fish Leaving Under Several Hypotheses (FLUSH), in contrast, presumed that
transported fish suffer a level of delayed mortality, and thus concluded that improved in-river
migration was the most favorable option for juvenile salmon. Id.
187 See infra notes 202–12 and accompanying text.
188 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 91. NOAA maintained that the RPA “employs an adaptive
approach to increasing survival and the probability of recovery of listed salmon, by taking
immediate actions to improve mainstem survival while reducing the uncertainty about the likely
benefits of, need for and feasibility of major system structural modifications.” Id. NOAA’s
increasing reliance on RPAs calling for planning, phased evaluations, and delayed
implementation was once termed “studying the salmon to death.” Neil Hamilton, Feature: New
Hope for Salmon in Northwest, THE PLANET NEWSL., Dec.–Jan. 1995 (quoting Jim Baker, Sierra
Club Wild Salmon Campaign Director), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/planet/
199412/ftr-salmon.asp; see Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 68 n.299 (describing the collective
voices advocating for NOAA Fisheries to not use science, or a lack of it, as a delay mechanism,
including an editorial by a former Northwest Power Planning Council Chairman Ted Hallack,
urging that science no longer be used as a delay mechanism).
189 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 91.
190 Id. at 96.
191 The final BiOp’s provisions were less protective than earlier drafts, which seemed to
consider the biological needs of salmon more seriously. See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22,
at 552–54 (highlighting the chronology of several drafts and noting that the final version
contained only “vague exhortations” and caveats like “economic mitigation”).
192 For example, the draft BiOp called for Snake River biweekly flow averages of 85,000 to
100,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) and Columbia River biweekly flow averages of 220,000 to
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The final BiOp included the same flow averages but, instead of biweekly
requirements, called only for “recommended” seasonal averages—a
significant change.193 Moreover, the final BiOp indicated that flow targets
could vary depending on optimum hydropower operations, suggesting that
releases in specified reservoirs should be considered “interim” only because
low runoff years would increase hydropower demand for stored water and,
in such years, the flow targets for salmon would be impossible to meet.194
Mandatory biweekly averages would have provided relatively steady and
reliable flows for salmon, but NOAA set generous targets that could
accommodate the demands of power generation, essentially allowing the
hydropower agencies to conduct business as usual.
Although the BiOp’s RPA declared that the action agencies “shall spill at
the Snake and Columbia River projects in order to increase fish passage
efficiency and survivals at the dams,” it clarified that this apparent directive
was actually merely an advisory guideline.195 First, during the juvenile
spring/summer chinook migration, low flow “triggers” would stop spill from
occurring, allowing hydropower operators to pass all the water in the river
through power generating turbines, although NOAA offered no biological
justification for stopping spill.196 Instead, increased transportation at juvenile
collection sites would attempt to compensate for decreased spill.197 During
fall chinook migration, spill would occur only at those sites where juveniles
were not collected for transportation, reflecting NOAA’s wholesale
commitment to the transportation program.198
260,000 cfs. See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 553–54 (offering a critique of the 1995
BiOp based on stronger salmon conservation terms in the drafts) (citing Nat’l Marine Fisheries
Serv., Pre-decisional ESA Document 10,957, 10,960–61 (released to operating agencies Dec. 30,
1994)).
193 The final BiOp called for Snake River spring flow averages of 85,000 to 100,000 cfs and
Columbia River spring flow averages of 220,000 to 260,000 cfs. It also called for summer
averages of 50,000 to 55,000 cfs in the Snake River and 200,000 cfs in the Columbia. See 1995
BIOP, supra note 114, at 103 (noting that “recommendations shall take into account the goal of
meeting a seasonal average flow objective”). The draft BiOp, on the other hand, set biweekly
targets, rather than seasonal—“spring” or “summer”—average targets, which would have made
water levels much more reliable for salmon. See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 553–54.
194 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 95 (noting that summer migration flows would suffer in
low water years).
195 Id. at 104.
196 See id. at 105. At Lower Granite Dam, unregulated weekly average flows of less than
100,000 cfs would halt spill. Id. When unregulated weekly average flows fell below 85,000 cfs, no
spill would occur at Lower Granite, Little Goose, or Lower Monumental Dam. Id.
197 See id. at 105 (explaining the relationship between the spill triggers and the collection
program, and suggesting that action agencies aimed to achieve a fish passage rate of 80% at noncollector projects). In fact, the BiOp set 80% fish passage efficiency standards for all of the
dams. Id. This standard actually represented a low passage rate for the hydropower system. For
example, if 100 Upper Snake River salmon migrate downstream, with an expected 80% passage
rate at each dam, 80 fish would survive the first dam, 64 salmon would make it through the
second dam, and so forth. Since some Snake River salmon must pass eight dams during their
migration, only approximately 13 salmon would actually complete the migration. Upper
Columbia River runs pass through nine dams, so below Bonneville Dam about 11 salmon would
survive. See Blumm, supra note 31, at 118, for a similar description of mortalities produced by a
90% passage rate.
198 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 105.
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Second, the 1995 BiOp conditioned spill on the levels of total dissolved
gases measured below the dams, reducing or eliminating spills when gas
levels exceeded 115% saturation over a twelve hour average.199 The BiOp set
these spill caps despite evidence from the states and tribes that showed gas
levels as high as 120% would not increase the probability of mortality or
susceptibility to disease and predation.200 Yet NOAA concluded, “the
impairments to migrating fish as a result of the sublethal effects of dissolved
gas may be sufficiently grave to warrant caution,” thereby maintaining the
spill cap and continuing to ensure that all doubts were resolved in favor of
the hydropower status quo.201
The transportation program, widely criticized as ineffectual and with
virtually no evidence of success,202 was also conditional: Under the 1995
BiOp, it would continue to operate only until “credible” scientific data
proved it ineffective.203 Maintaining the transportation program represented
the core of NOAA’s vision of adaptive management: continued barging and
trucking, more studies, and adaptation of the transportation program if, at a
later date, the studies showed in-river migration to be more beneficial to
salmon, creating a comparative test.204 NOAA termed this policy “spreading
the risk.”205
199 Id. at 108. Favoring spill reduction, NOAA Fisheries chose 12 hour averages over 24 hour
averages and calculated the averages using the highest twelve hourly measurements. Id. NOAA
Fisheries cited a desire to be “conservative” as its reason for these choices. Id.
200 See id. at 109 (summarizing the reasons NOAA rejected 120% as the maximum saturation
level, which the states and tribes had recommended). The state agency and tribal evidence
relied largely on studies conducted by NOAA, one of which indicated that prolonged exposure
to 120% dissolved gas concentrations would not cause significant increases in mortality unless
the fish remained in that water for over 40 days. Id. A second study demonstrated that exposure
to gas saturation levels of 120% did not increase vulnerability to squawfish predation. Id. For the
tribes’ plan for spill implementation, see TRIBAL RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 99, at 5B-24 to
5B-31.
201 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 108.
202 See id. at 111 (acknowledging that most state and tribal commentators favor decreased
reliance on transportation); TRIBAL RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 99, at 5B-25 to 5B-26
(discussing the failure of transportation to improve salmon runs and suggesting that
transportation may, in fact, harm salmon); see also The Case for Dam Breaching, supra note 96,
at 1009–10 (noting that two decades of barging and trucking have failed the salmon).
203 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 110 (indicating that transportation may be discontinued
if “credible evidence is presented that in-river migration will be beneficial”). For a discussion of
the ineffective nature of transportation, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
204 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 81 (suggesting that continued reliance on transporting
juveniles and limited implementation of a spill regime would allow for evaluation of the relative
merits of in-river versus out-of-river passage methods). NOAA claimed its goal was to create a
dynamic and interconnected spill and transportation program in which the relative significance
of each passage method depended on flow conditions, in-river survivals, and the rate of delayed
mortality from transport. See id. at 112 (promising that NOAA would establish a working group
to review data and recommend a relationship between spill and transport in the future). NOAA’s
plan relied on transportation unless river levels were high enough so that spilling would not
have an overly detrimental effect on hydropower generation. In contrast, the tribal plan called
for the immediate halt of the entire transportation program. See TRIBAL RESTORATION PLAN,
supra note 99, at 5B-27, 5B-29 (explaining that closure of the program would allow thorough
study of alternative passage methods).
205 See Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. Civ. 96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at
*5 n.6 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997) (discussing the basis behind the “spread the risk” policy). “Spread
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The spill and transportation program portions of the RPA exemplified
NOAA’s approach to scientific uncertainty. The RPA made clear that
uncertainty warranted caution only in those circumstances that interfered
with hydropower operations.206 In other circumstances, uncertainty meant
simply that questionable actions could continue until scientific evidence
proved otherwise.207 This is a reckless, not a precautionary approach,
resolving all doubts in favor of the status quo. For example, NOAA’s decision
not to commit to an unconditional spill program rested on its judgment that
studies showing high gas levels were not likely to endanger salmon were
inconclusive, so it maintained spills caps.208 And the agency retained the
transportation program, claiming that data submitted by the states and tribes
concerning that program’s delayed mortality needed further assessment
before it was reliable enough to call into question the merits of barging
juvenile salmon, even though two decades of the transportation program had
yielded no evidence of improved salmon runs.209
Had NOAA followed the same approach it took regarding spill
implementation in its decision making concerning the transportation
program, the agency would have concluded that precaution warranted a
suspension of barging and trucking.210 In short, one might have expected that
the agency charged with protecting listed salmon would resolve at least

the risk” was actually a policy initiated by the Northwest Power Planning Council. See 1994
AMENDMENTS, supra note 113, at 2-3 (describing a “system” approach for assessing conflicts and
trade-offs). However, the Council’s “spread the risk” policy favored reductions in the
transportation program. See Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 73 (comparing “spread the risk”
policy of the 1994 Amendments to the that of the 1995 BiOp). The 1994 Amendments to the
Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program advocated employment of both in-river and out-ofriver approaches to juvenile migration, with equal numbers of fish migrating in-river as those
transported, which required a reduction in the number of transported fish. 1994 AMENDMENTS,
supra note 113, at 5-6 to 5-7.
206 See infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
208 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 109–10 (explaining that the spill requirements were
experimental because of uncertainties about the benefits and the need to collect more
information on total dissolved gas levels).
209 See RETURN TO THE RIVER 2000, supra note 92, at 293. The efficacy of the transportation
program remains unknown:
Available evidence is not sufficient to identify transportation as either a primary or
supporting method of choice for salmon recovery in the Snake River Basin. . . . Even if all
juvenile salmon could be collected for transportation, there is not enough evidence from
previous research to suggest that even the minimum survival rates necessary for
maintenance of population levels could be achieved, let alone those survival rates
necessary for rebuilding of salmon populations.

Id. at 299.
210 Unlike the 1995 BiOp, the 1994 Amendments to the Columbia River Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program recognized the need for precaution regarding the transportation program.
1994 AMENDMENTS, supra note 113, at 5-46; see also Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 58
(suggesting that the 1994 Amendments restricted the transportation program). The
Amendments also adopted an adaptive management plan, but, unlike NOAA, the Northwest
Power Planning Council understood that transportation had yet to produce any evidence of
salmon recovery. The Council consequently recommended that the transportation program
operate only in “extremely adverse” river conditions. 1994 AMENDMENTS, supra note 113, at 5-46.
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some uncertainties in favor of the salmon. But the 1995 BiOp clearly put the
burden of proof on salmon, a far cry from the first draft of the 1995 BiOp,
where NOAA expressly stated that “the ESA does not require that the burden
of proof be put on the listed species.”211 Thus, despite Judge Marsh’s calls for
precautionary salmon management,212 scientific uncertainty continued to
benefit the maintenance of the hydropower status quo.
In addition to studying the relative merits of spill and transport, the
“planning and evaluation” provisions in the 1995 BiOp called for extensive
studying of the feasibility of reservoir drawdowns.213 The lack of immediate
attention to significant reservoir drawdowns distinguished the BiOp from
other prominent salmon restoration plans at the time,214 which called for
reservoir drawdowns to hasten juvenile salmon migration and reduce the
threats that juveniles face in the dangerous slackwater of reservoirs.215 In the
first draft of the 1995 BiOp, NOAA endorsed reservoir drawdowns as a
primary means of reducing harm to salmon, but the final version offered
only a watered-down directive, calling for operation of the Lower Snake
River reservoirs within a foot of minimum operating pool and operation of
the John Day Reservoir within one-and-a-half feet of minimum irrigation
pool.216 Ignoring the advice of the states and tribes, NOAA delayed further
action at John Day until it studied the feasibility of extending irrigation
211 Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 553 (quoting Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
Predecisional ESA Document 10,945 (released to operating agencies Dec. 30, 1994)).
212 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
213 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 91 (outlining the stages of implementation, planning,

and evaluation).
214 For example, the 1994 Amendments to the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program called for a phased approach to drawdowns, immediately drawing down Lower
Granite Dam to near minimum operating pool for the juvenile migration period and the John
Day Reservoir to minimum irrigation pool during the summer months. 1994 AMENDMENTS, supra
note 113, at 5-25. John Day Reservoir would subsequently remain at minimum operating pool
year-round, and Lower Granite Dam, as well as Little Goose Dam, would eventually be drawn
down to near spill level during the migration period. Id. at 5-26 to 5-27. See Beyond Parity, supra
note 112, at 54–57 (describing the drawdown provisions of the 1994 Amendments). Central to
the 1994 Amendments was an understanding that the effects of drawdowns could not be
understood until they were implemented. Id. at 56.
The tribes’ plan also called for immediate drawdowns, echoing the 1994 Amendments
concerning the immediate drawdown of Lower Granite Dam and the immediate drawdown to
minimum operating pool of the John Day Reservoir, and also calling for seasonal drawdowns to
minimum operating pool at the other Lower Snake River dams (Little Goose, Lower
Monumental, and Ice Harbor dams). TRIBAL RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 99, at 5B-29 to 5B-31;
see also Melissa Powers, The Spirit of the Salmon: How the Tribal Restoration Plan Could
Restore Columbia Basin Salmon, 30 ENVTL. L. 867, 898–99 (2000) (detailing the potential effects
on salmon of the tribal plan’s calls for permanent drawdowns).
215 See Noonan, supra note 121, at 796–98 (describing the predicted benefits on juvenile
salmon migration of reservoir drawdowns). But see id. at 798–99 (highlighting the threats
drawdowns could pose to other salmon runs, including prevention of proper operation of adult
fish ladders).
216 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 113. The immediate calls for drawdowns on the Lower
Snake were conditional: the reservoirs could operate at higher levels to conduct approved
research. Id. The first draft of the BiOp called for immediate drawdown of the Lower Snake
River reservoirs to near minimum operating pool and directed that planning should begin
immediately for operation of those reservoirs at natural river levels. See Salmon and the ESA,
supra note 22, at 553–55 (describing the changes in the series of drafts of the 1995 BiOp).
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pumps and reconstructing boat ramps, as well as the impacts drawdowns
would have on other wildlife.217 The 1995 BiOp deferred final action on
reservoir drawdowns until 2000.218 Pre-decisional release of draft versions of
the 1995 BiOp clearly influenced the final version, as in virtually every
provision NOAA (whose representatives were able to comment on the draft
BiOps) accommodated economic concerns, diffusing its directives in order
to protect status quo hydropower operations.219

3. 1995 BiOp Litigation
Although the 1995 BiOp found jeopardy and consequently created an
RPA to avoid the jeopardizing effects of the proposed action, environmental
groups nonetheless challenged NOAA’s decision.220 In American Rivers, Inc.
v. National Marine Fisheries Service, environmentalists claimed that the
1995 BiOp failed to adequately explain how the RPA would avoid jeopardy,
and why it dropped a twenty-four year period from the recovery analysis.221
The environmentalists also maintained that NOAA unjustifiably diminished
the significance of state and tribal life-cycle modeling results, relying instead
on the overly optimistic modeling of BPA to conclude that the RPA would
avoid jeopardy.222 They also argued that the reason for excising the twentyfour year period from the recovery analysis was to produce more optimistic
results.223
Despite considerable skepticism of NOAA’s approach to salmon
recovery by the reviewing court, Judge Marsh upheld the 1995 BiOp just
three years after he had called for a “major overhaul” of hydropower
operations224—though not without noting that he remained quite skeptical.
Unlike the 1993 BiOp, NOAA discounted each life-cycle model based on its
relative flaws and underestimations, and explained that it relied on each
model proportionately in its decision making.225 Further, Judge Marsh
217 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 113. The states and tribes recommended immediate
drawdown of John Day to minimum operating pool, largely because that reservoir has one of
the highest smolt predation rates. Id. The “economic mitigation” at John Day Reservoir had an
extensive history. See Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 66 n.291 (explaining the context for
NOAA’s decision-making regarding drawdowns at John Day Reservoir).
218 See 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 75 (describing NOAA’s decision-making). NOAA stated
that, if drawdowns became the preferred alternative, implementation could not begin until 2000.

Id.
219 See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 553–55 (noting changes from draft 1995 BiOps
to the final version and indicating that NOAA described the changes as reasonable economic
considerations).
220 See generally Am. Rivers, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 96-384-MA, 1997 WL
33797790 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997). Although Oregon and Idaho had both been plaintiffs in IDFG v.
NMFS, in American Rivers, three years later, reflecting a change from a Democratic to a
Republican governor, Idaho filed an amicus brief in support of NOAA. Id. at *6.
221 See id. at *4–5, *9.
222 See id. at *8.
223 See id. at *9. In the final BiOp, NOAA Fisheries’ definition of recovery included an
analysis considering recovery only over a 48 year period, but in an earlier draft NOAA included
a 24 as well as a 48 year period. Id.
224 See IDFG v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994).
225 See American Rivers, 1997 WL 33797790, at *8. For example, NOAA discounted the state
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determined that NOAA had adequately explained its recovery definition,
although observing that the environmentalists’ “criticism of the merits
of . . . [NOAA’s] ultimate selection of a 48 year recovery period may be wellfounded since it appears to have produced the most optimistic results.”226
This sort of judicial unease characterized Judge Marsh’s opinion, and he
expressly noted: “Given the dwindling numbers, time is clearly running out
[for the salmon]. As a long-time observer and examiner of this process, I
cannot help but question the soundness of the selected level of risk
acceptance.”227 However, judicial restraint and deference to agency
decisionmaking led him to uphold the 1995 BiOp, the only one of the
Columbia Basin hydropower BiOps to survive judicial scrutiny.

C. The 2000 BiOp: More Status Quo (with Offsite Mitigation Promises)
By the time NOAA released its 2000 BiOp, governing hydropower and
irrigation operations from 2001 to 2005,228 several additional salmon
evolutionary significant units (ESUs) had been listed under the ESA.229
Despite the additional listings, the 2000 BiOp retained many features of the
1995 BiOp. Both BiOps employed the same basic jeopardy framework,
although the 2000 BiOp added an additional step, as discussed below. Both
incorporated adaptive management into the RPAs.

and tribal models because they failed to consider predator removal programs and dismissed
BPA’s model for its failure to consider likely departures from assumed recruit-to-spawner
ratios. Id. Further, NOAA did not outright reject any of the models. Id.
226 Id. at *9.
227 Id. at *10.
228 The 2000 BiOp examined the effects of the continued operation of 19 individual Bureau of
Reclamation projects on listed Columbia Basin salmon, as well as the juvenile salmon
transportation program. 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-1, 1-3; see Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra
note 97, at 250–51 (discussing the 2000 BiOp).
229 In addition to considering Snake River fall and spring/summer chinook and Snake River
sockeye, the 2000 BiOp assessed the status of Upper Columbia River spring chinook, Upper
Willamette River chinook, Lower Columbia River chinook, Snake River steelhead, Upper
Columbia River steelhead, Middle Columbia River steelhead, Upper Willamette River steelhead,
Lower Columbia River steelhead, and Columbia River chum. See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-7
to 1-8 (listing salmon considered during consultation); see also Endangered and Threatened
Species: Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs)
in Washington and Oregon, and Endangered Status for One Chinook Salmon ESU in
Washington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (Mar. 24, 1999) (listing Upper Columbia River spring chinook
as endangered, Upper Willamette River chinook as threatened, and Lower Columbia River
chinook as threatened); Endangered and Threatened Species: Listing of Several Evolutionarily
Significant Units (ESUs) of West Coast Steelhead, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (Aug. 18, 1997) (listing
Snake River steelhead as threatened and Upper Columbia River steelhead as endangered);
Endangered and Threatened Species: Threatened Status for Two Steelhead ESUs in Washington
and Oregon, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,517 (Mar. 25, 1999) (listing Middle Columbia River steelhead as
threatened and Upper Willamette River steelhead as threatened); Endangered and Threatened
Species: Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, and California,
63 Fed. Reg. 13,347 (Mar. 19, 1998) (listing Lower Columbia River steelhead as threatened);
Endangered and Threatened Species: Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Chum Salmon in
Washington and Oregon, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,508 (Mar. 25, 1999) (listing Columbia River chum as
threatened).
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In other significant ways, the BiOps were quite different. The 2000
BiOp’s jeopardy definition was less favorable to salmon than was the 1995
BiOp’s definition. Further, the additional step in the jeopardy analysis—
which measured both survival and recovery in the context of an entire
salmon life-cycle—induced NOAA to incorporate non-hydropower agency
actions from the Basinwide Recovery Strategy (BRS), NOAA’s new salmon
recovery plan,230 as “offsite mitigation.” This reliance would ultimately cause
the 2000 BiOp to fail to survive judicial scrutiny.231

1. The Jeopardy Analysis
In the 2000 BiOp, NOAA employed the same four step jeopardy
framework analysis it used in the 1995 BiOp, but added an additional step.232
As in 1995, the agency added the effects of the proposed action in the action
area to the environmental baseline and the cumulative effects, then
determined whether those aggregate effects met the biological requirements
of the listed salmon.233 Unlike the 1995 BiOp, however, NOAA undertook a
further “comprehensive analysis,” considering the proposed actions in light
of a salmon life-cycle, involving a much larger area than the action area.234
This extra analysis was central to the agency’s concept of “ecosystem
management” in the 2000 BiOp.235 But instead of creating sound ecosystem
management for hydropower operations, the analysis placed the burden of
both salmon survival and recovery beyond the boundary of the action area—
that is, beyond the operation of the dams, where most human-caused salmon
mortalities occur.236
This expansive view of salmon survival and recovery shifted the focus
of attention beyond hydrosystem operations. Thus, the 2000 BiOp evaluated
the proposed dam operations in the context of the BRS’s life-cycle approach,
which examined the biological needs of salmon at each life-stage in order to
recover healthy populations, including parts of the life-cycle unaffected by

230 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-11 (noting that the BRS replaced the 1995 draft salmon
recovery plan). See generally Federal Caucus, Conservation of Columbia Basin Fish: Final
Basinwide Salmon Recovery Strategy Volume 1 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://www.salmon
recovery.gov/reports_and_papers/all_h_strategy/docs/2000_Final_Strategy_Vol_1.pdf.
231 See infra notes 294–313 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text (describing the four step jeopardy frame–
work).
233 The “action area means all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action
and not merely the immediate area involved in the action.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
234 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-9 (citing the 1995 BiOp). The goal of this comprehensive
analysis was an examination of “measures likely to be necessary in all life stages that, in
combination, would insure that the biological requirements of the listed species will be met and
thereby insure its continued existence.” Id.
235 For more on the relationship between ecosystem management and salmon restoration,
see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 309–22.
236 As one of the authors of this Article put it: “In the case of Columbia Basin salmon,
ecosystem management plans can also make it appear that serious salmon restoration
strategies are being pursued when in fact the existing activities that produce the lion’s share of
salmon mortalities are allowed to continue.” Id. at 309.
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hydropower operations.237 The result was that the 2000 BiOp included an
RPA in which “offsite mitigation” was the preeminent feature.
The definitions of survival and recovery—the jeopardy definition—
morphed in the 2000 BiOp as well. In effect, they became even more
favorable to hydropower status quo. NOAA equated survival with avoiding
absolute extinction over the next 100 years, with absolute extinction defined
as just one returning fish over the course of a salmon generation.238 This
definition assumed that survival is commensurate with merely not being
extinct, a considerable dilution from the 1995 definition of survival.239
Further, NOAA incorporated into the definition a five percent chance that
natural phenomena other than the proposed actions would cause
extinction.240 Finally, the agency continued to gauge survival against a “high
likelihood” standard, meaning that any given population still had some
chance of extinction, beyond the five percent factored in to account for the
possibility of “natural” extinction.241 This definition of survival—with its longrange time spans, the criterion of only one returning spawner, the
presumption of natural extinction, and the need to demonstrate only a “high
likelihood” of survival—was undeniably favorable to the hydropower status
quo.
NOAA described recovery as the likelihood that natural spawners
would achieve average returns, over an eight year period, comparable to the
recovery levels specified by the BRS.242 However, since the agency had
recovery abundance-level estimates for only a limited number of the listed
populations,243 the BiOp also relied on a second indicator of recovery, the
237 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-10 to 1-11 (directing that recovery planning provides the
best barometer of whether the proposed actions satisfy species-level biological requirements).
238 Id. at 1-13. Although NOAA chose 100 years as the main time frame for measuring
survival, the agency acknowledged that hypothesizing population dynamics over a 100 year
period was fraught with uncertainty. Id. For this reason, NOAA Fisheries also conducted a 24
year analysis, suggesting that if predictions at the 24 year stage were dire, the adaptive
management process would allow the action agencies to modify their operations. Id. The
agency explained that it chose absolute extinction instead of “quasi-extinction level because of
the unambiguous interpretation of this criterion, whereas quasi-extinction levels such as 20, 50,
or 100 fish have different meanings for populations of different sizes and capacities in different
river systems.” Id.
239 The 1995 BiOp judged survival as at least 350 returning spawners for most salmon
populations. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text (describing the 1995 jeopardy
standard for survival).
240 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-13 (explaining that NOAA determined that 5% was
adequately conservative relative to other estimations employing 10% probability factors).
241 See id. Had NOAA Fisheries wanted to ensure that a population met the survival
standard, it would have chosen a gauge of absolute survival—in other words, a 100% chance of
meeting the survival standard.
242 See id. at 1-14 (stating that the recovery standard in the 1995 BiOp is still relevant). For a
description of the 1995 BiOp’s recovery standard, see supra notes 183–87 and accompanying
text. As in the 1995 BiOp, the standard was phrased as simply a likelihood of achievement. Id. In
quantifiable terms, this meant that recovery would be achieved if the probability was greater
than or equal to 50%. See id. at 6-79 (describing a risk level of greater than, or equal to, 50% for
recovery); see also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 182 (estimating quantifications of
NOAA’s qualitative assessment criteria in the 1995 BiOp).
243 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-14 (indicating that NOAA had no complete estimates for
any of the ESUs but identified recovery abundance levels for five ESUs based on the best
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same as that found in the 1995 BiOp: “the level of improvement needed in
the productivity of the population to result in a median annual population
growth rate . . . greater than 1.0 over 48 years.”244 A rate of 1.0 indicates that
the population is at least replacing itself; any rate higher than 1.0 means that
the population is growing.245 Thus, any growth in wild populations of listed
salmon, however slight, over a span of forty-eight years would satisfy the
recovery definition.246 This standard did not require populations to grow
yearly: any growth over the forty-eight-year period was sufficient.247

2. The Reasonable and Prudent Alternative
Despite these generous definitions of survival and recovery, the
proposed hydropower operations could not convince NOAA to issue a nojeopardy determination for each of the listed salmon.248 To satisfy the
biological requirements of an entire salmon life-cycle, and therefore avoid
jeopardy, the 2000 BiOp incorporated the BRS into the RPA as nonhydropower “offsite” mitigation, thus further implementing “ecosystem
management.”249 In so doing, NOAA employed a multi-tiered approach.
First, the agency created a system of performance standards, which it
used to measure the progressive success of staged RPA actions during
periodic reviews.250 The BiOp employed this system to implement adaptive
management, under which NOAA and the action agencies would redirect
efforts based on periodic review and evaluation. Second, the BiOp directed
the action agencies to implement a series of ongoing hydropower-related
measures.251 Third, it incorporated “offsite mitigation,” which included
numerous promised actions related to salmon harvest, habitat, and
hatcheries, mostly by agencies other than the hydropower agencies.252

available science).
244 See id. (concluding this standard provides a goal that is at least higher than current
abundance levels).
245
246

Id.
See id. (noting that a population must be growing at least slightly to recover).

247 Action agencies therefore would not have to adjust their activities in response to annual
population declines.
248 The 2000 BiOp concluded that FCRPS operations would jeopardize the continued
existence of eight salmon species: 1) Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon, 2) Snake
River fall chinook salmon, 3) Upper Columbia River spring Chinook salmon, 4) Snake River
steelhead, 5) Upper Columbia River steelhead, 6) Middle Columbia River steelhead, 7) Columbia
River chum salmon, and 8) Snake River sockeye salmon. Id. at 8-3, 8-5, 8-7, 8-13, 8-23, 8-25. The
BiOp also determined that FCRPS operations did not jeopardize four species. See id. at 8-3, 8-5,
8-7, 8-9, 8-11, 8-13, 8-15, 8-17, 8-19, 8-21, 8-23, 8-25 (Upper Willamette River chinook, Lower
Columbia River chinook, Upper Willamette River steelhead, and Lower Columbia River
steelhead).
249 See id. at 9-1 (determining that the measures provided for in the BRS would avoid
jeopardy for all listed salmon species). See generally Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97
(describing both the 2000 BiOp’s RPA and the BRS).
250 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-1, 9-3 to 9-5 (providing for performance standards,
staged planning, periodic assessments, and monitoring and evaluation reporting).
251 See infra notes 269–82 and accompanying text.
252 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-1 to 9-2 (calling for ongoing measures, as well as offsite
mitigation actions).
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Included in the RPA were 199 measures designed to offset the effects of
FCRPS operations on Columbia Basin salmon.253 Although RPAs generally
attempt to mitigate the adverse effects an agency’s action may have on listed
species by altering the proposed action itself,254 remarkably, the 2000 BiOp
called for very few FCRPS operational changes, and instead made only
minor technical changes.255 The 2000 BiOp did, however, assign the spill
program as its “highest priority” for improving the survival rate of juvenile
salmon in the Columbia Basin.256
253 For example, the 2000 BiOp established flow objectives for the Lower Snake River at
Lower Granite Dam that ranged from 85,000 to 100,000 cfs in the spring, and 50,000 to 55,000 cfs
in the summer. Id. at 9-56 tbl.9.6-1. Flow objectives for the Lower Columbia River were 220,000
to 260,000 cfs in the spring, 200,000 cfs in the summer, and 125,000 to 160,000 cfs in the winter.
Id. The 2000 BiOp required the Bureau of Reclamation to work to reduce streamflow depletions
in water supply contracts, acquire water through purchases, pursue water conservation
measures, and develop plans to reduce illegal water use. Id. at 9-68 to 9-71. The RPA also
established water quality measures like installing spill deflectors to reduce levels of dissolved
gases, which can cause gas bubble trauma in juvenile salmon. Id. at 9-121 to 9-125. The RPA
called for the maximizing juvenile transportation as well as providing annual spill on all
mainstem dams. Id. at 9-76, 9-88. And the RPA set minimum reservoir levels. Id. at 9-65. See also
Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 250–67 (providing a detailed summary of the 2000
BiOp and its RPA).
254 Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 253.
255 For example, the RPA included a plan to operate the FCRPS dams and reservoirs with the
intent of meeting certain flow objectives (e.g., at Lower Granite Dam, 85,000-100,000 cfs during
spring and 50,000-55,000 cfs during summer). 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-55. The RPA
contained a directive to the action agencies to coordinate with the state, tribes, NMFS, and
USFWS in planning for spill and flow objectives. Id. at 9-60. The RPA also directed the Corps
and BPA to continue to negotiate with British Columbia Hydro for annual releases from storage
projects in excess of that called for by the Columbia River Treaty. Id. at 9-67. And the RPA
called for enhanced spill and spillway improvements, improved flow management, physical
improvements to juvenile and adult passage facilities, and increased use of barges rather than
trucks for transporting juvenile salmon around Columbia Basin dams. Id. at 9-2.
256 Id. at 9-82. The 2000 BiOp also relied heavily on the development of removable spillway
weirs (RSWs), which may provide an alternative route of dam passage for juvenile salmon that
is as safe as traditional spill. See id. at 9-54, 9-85 to 9-86 (calling for further evaluation of
removable spillway weirs). RSWs, a relatively new dam passage technology, are massive
structures—approximately 105 feet tall, 70 feet wide, and 1.7 million pounds—installed on the
surface of the reservoir at the dams, which allow juvenile salmon to pass through the dams near
the water’s surface over a raised spillway crest—similar to a waterslide—and through the dam
to avoid turbine passage without the use of traditional spill or artificial transportation. Initial
studies show that juvenile fish pass over the weir as safely as conventional spill but without the
loss of large quantities of water. The Corps claims that the use of RSWs can actually improve
salmon survival compared to traditional spill because traditional spill normally involves opening
“spill gates” that are 50 to 60 feet below the surface of the water, which can expose juvenile
salmon to trauma from high pressure and high velocity passage. Also, because the weir allows
juvenile salmon to pass through the dam continually, there is no migration delay at the dams’
reservoirs, where juvenile salmon are often the target of predatory birds and marine species.
RSWs are designed to be removed by controlled submersion, allowing dam operators to return
the spillway flow to full capacity during major flood events. A prototype RSW was installed at
Lower Granite Dam in 2001, a second RSW was installed at Ice Harbor Dam in 2005, and a third
RSW is scheduled to be installed at Lower Monumental Dam in 2007. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG’RS, WALLA WALLA DIST., SPILLWAY WEIR FACT SHEET, http://www.nww.usace.army.mil/
spillway_weir/SW_FactSheet.pdf (last visited Jul. 15, 2006) [hereinafter SPILLWAY WEIR FACT
SHEET].
Although initial studies of salmon survival through RSW show that salmon passage
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“Offsite mitigation” measures, addressing factors unrelated to actual
dam operations, such as habitat protection, hatchery operations, predator
control, as well as harvest control measures,257 dominated the RPA.258
Claiming that “hydro actions alone” could not avoid a finding of jeopardy to
listed species, NOAA concluded that such “offsite mitigation” measures were
necessary to avoid jeopardy under the ESA.259 Thus, most of the 199
mitigation measures in the RPA were offsite, away from the hydrosystem,
and many involved studies, evaluations, reports, and requests for funding,
rather than concrete remedial action.260 In addition, many of these measures
directed nonfederal agencies, such as states, tribes, and local agencies—
over which NOAA had no authority—to take specific actions designed to
improve juvenile salmon survival.261

a. Performance Standards, Planning, and Review
NOAA’s method of planning, review, evaluation, and adaptation in the
2000 BiOp was extraordinarily complex, relying on analyses of tiered
standards and progressive implementation. As with the final 1995 BiOp, the
final 2000 BiOp represented weakened directives relative to earlier drafts.
For example, a draft of the 2000 BiOp would have imposed concrete
biological performance standards, which, if not met, would trigger a failure
report and produce changes in hydropower operations.262 The final 2000

through an RSW is as safe as through a traditional spill (Lower Granite tests showed 98%
survival), conservationists have expressed doubts as to whether the RSWs can improve juvenile
salmon migration over conventional spill, calling for more studies of survival rates through the
RSW. Id.; Joe Rojas-Burke, Spillway Device May Offer Safer Spillway for Migrating Salmon, THE
OREGONIAN, Nov. 26, 2004, at D01, available at http://www.fwee.org/news/getStory?story=1320.
Moreover, RSWs are quite expensive: each RSW costs approximately $13 million to build and
install, with another $5–8 million required for testing over several years. SPILLWAY WEIR FACT
SHEET, supra; see Bill Rudolph, Removable Spillway Weir at Ice Harbor a Top Priority for 2004,
NW. FISHLETTER, Feb. 6, 2004, http://www.bluefish.org/weiratop.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
Funding for such measures depends on congressional appropriations, over which neither NOAA
nor the action agencies have any control.
257 See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 253, 260.
258 Id. at 284.
259 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-2.
260 Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 253–54.
261 Id. For example, one provision called for the action agencies, states, and tribes to
“coordinate” management of flow and spill operations. 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-60. Another
measure directed BPA and the Corps to request, and negotiate with B.C. Hydro, a Canadian
entity, for storage water for flow enhancement within the Columbia Basin. Id. at 9-67. Several
actions asked for peer-review panels and third party independent groups to conduct various
studies. See, e.g., id. at 9-72 (calling for a peer-review panel with at least three independent
reviewers with expertise in water management, flood control, or anadromous salmonids and
the involvement of state, tribal, and Canadian agencies to provide a feasibility analysis of
modifying flood control operations); see also Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 283–88
(examining the legality of the 2000 BiOp and its accompanying RPA).
262 See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—SECTION 7 CONSULTATION:
DRAFT BIOLOGICAL OPINION: OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM
INCLUDING THE JUVENILE FISH TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S 31
PROJECTS, INCLUDING THE ENTIRE COLUMBIA BASIN PROJECT 9-22 (July 27, 2000) [hereinafter
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BiOp did include a series of general categories of biological performance
standards, measured at different stages of a salmon’s life-cycle for both
hydropower and offsite actions, but the performance standards were much
less concrete than in the draft.263
The BiOp also included physical performance standards.264 Evaluations
of these standards were to occur at three, five, and eight year periods.265 The
five-year plan set long-term goals for operation of the hydropower system
and funding and evaluation objectives for the coordination of offsite
mitigation efforts.266 The first yearly plan would specify project-specific and
technical measures needed to implement the initial year of the five-year
plan.267 This phased and tiered structure for implementing the RPA
encouraged adaptive management, but it also fostered considerable
possibility of inaction (and perhaps aimed to dissuade active judicial

DRAFT BIOP]. The draft BiOp measured population productivity using lambda, defined as annual
population growth or decline, measured by observed population abundance, reflecting a
population’s productivity. Id. at 9-8. NOAA used lambda to indicate whether the hydropower
and other RPA actions were successful. Id. at 9-22. For example, at the eight-year review, if
NOAA calculated lambda as greater than 1.1 (meaning that the population was more than
replacing itself), actions could continue without reinitiation of consultation. Id. If lambda was
between .95 and 1.1, NOAA would continue to recommend implementation but reinitiate
consultation to reassess the jeopardy conclusion. Id. If lambda was less than .95 (meaning
declining population numbers), however, “[NOAA] shall notify the Action Agencies in writing
that the RPA is failing to avoid jeopardy . . . [and NOAA] shall propose a specific plan for
changes to avoid jeopardy, including breaching one or more dams as appropriate.” Id.
263 The performance standards consisted of three tiers. First, population-based standards
indicated an adequate likelihood of survival and recovery for each listed population. Id. at 9-7.
Second, a life-stage standard distributed performance expectations between habitat, harvest,
hatcheries, and hydropower. Id. The final tier aimed to ensure that biological requirements were
satisfied at each stage of a salmon’s life-cycle. Id. Whether these standards were met depended
on achieving a positive lambda. Finally, NOAA delineated various standards, either quantitative
or qualitative, for each of the four types of actions—hydro, habitat, harvest, and hatchery. See
id. at 9-11 to 9-17 (establishing the various standards); see also Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra
note 97, at 255 (noting that “in response to comments on the draft BiOp . . . [NOAA] diluted the
significance of lambda”).
264 The physical standards estimated changes in ecosystem characteristics necessary to
support the biological requirements of each listed salmon population at each life-stage. See id.
at 9-17 (suggesting that these standards may be used in lieu of biological standards when
biological standards are hard to quantify). Physical standards applied to actions such as water
quality improvements, habitat access, and in-stream flow levels. See Avoiding Dam Breaching,
supra note 97, at 254 (observing that although the BiOp outlined the standards, it established no
specific targets and established no concrete parameters).
265 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-7 (defining the performance standards as the scheduled
actions at each review period). Further, NOAA established a framework for creating “rolling”
one and five year plans, with involvement from regional tribes and state fish and wildlife
managers, when possible. See id. at 9-3 (indicating that “[a]n annual, multiyear planning process
to refine, implement, evaluate, and adjust ongoing efforts is critical to achieving the . . . hydro
and offsite performance standards within the time frame covered by this biological opinion”).
The BiOp suggested that regional consensus was desirable, but a lack of it did not equate to a
failure to implement the RPA. See id. at 9-24.
266 See id. (noting that long-term projections will indicate the actions needed to be taken to
meet performance standards).
267 See id. (planning for action agencies to include detailed implementation directives in
annual plan).
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review).268 The BiOp gave hydropower operators nearly a decade to show
any overall improvement in salmon productivity, and whether any of the
offsite mitigation measures would actually occur was entirely speculative.
Although the listed salmon populations’ continued decline suggested the
need for immediate and concrete action, the 2000 BiOp demanded action
only at some uncertain future date, effectively choosing maintenance of the
hydropower status quo over the needs of salmon.

b. Hydropower Operation Mitigation
The 2000 BiOp’s hydropower mitigation measures reflected NOAA’s
determination that the proposed action, as modified by the RPA, would
produce an “acceptably low risk of extinction.” 269 This conclusion effectively
allowed hydropower agencies at least a decade to phase in adjustments
providing for promised long-term productivity improvements. Many of the
RPA’s hydropower prescriptions merely repeated the federal hydropower
agencies’ proposals and included many of the same operating parameters as
in the 1995 BiOp’s RPA, including flow objectives, transportation reliance, a
limited spill regime, and setting reservoir levels.270
The flow objectives in the 2000 BiOp’s RPA were not mandatory:
instead, the action agencies had to operate dams and reservoirs only with
the mere “intent” to attain goals on seasonal and weekly averaged bases,
mirroring the language in the 1995 RPA.271 Despite the 1995 BiOp’s goal of
reworking the juvenile fish passage strategy based on studies of the record
of river migration methods, the 2000 BiOp simply maintained the same
transportation program approved in the 1995 BiOp.272 Thus, the 2000 RPA
268 See Powers, supra note 214, at 893 (suggesting that adaptive management can be “a
smokescreen for agency recalcitrance or irresponsibility” and “another term for compromise
and inaction”).
269 See 2000 BiOp, supra note 8, at 9-1 (“Based on the best available scientific information,
the following fundamental components of the RPA would allow the FCRPS to avoid
jeopardizing the continued existence of the listed species or adversely modifying their critical
habitat.”); see also NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (D. Or. 2003) (describing briefly
the components of the RPA and its effects on eight of the listed salmon ESUs).
270 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 3-1. The action agencies’ proposed action largely
continued implementation of the 1995 RPA. Id.; see Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at
253 (questioning the efficacy salmon protection from the RPA because few operational changes
were to occur). Many of the changes were merely technical, including proposals to study inriver fish passage versus the juvenile transportation program. Id.
271 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-55 (suggesting that flow objectives will benefit migrating
juvenile salmon). Snake River flow targets at Lower Granite Dam remained the same as those
called for in the 1995 BiOp: spring flows ranging from 85,000 to 100,000 cfs, and 50,000 to 55,000
cfs for summer flows. Id. at 9-56, tbl.9.6-1. Columbia River flows at McNary Dam were 220,000
to 260,000 cfs during the spring, 200,000 cfs for summer, and 125,000 to 160,000 cfs for winter at
Bonneville Dam, depending on water volume forecasts. Id. At Priest Rapids Dam, spring flows
had a target of 135,000 cfs. Id. For a description of the 1995 BiOp’s flow schedule, see supra
note 193 and accompanying text.
272 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 3-6 (proposing to continue barging efforts approved in the
1995 BiOp with the same “spread the risk” approach); see also Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra
note 97, at 258 (noting that the only change was a minor adjustment, which emphasized barging
over trucking). The Corps collected juvenile migrants at many of the Lower Snake and
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adopted an identical “spread the risk” approach as the 1995 RPA but
provided an even more limited spill schedule, allegedly because gas limits
were regularly exceeded under the 1995 regime.273 NOAA imposed these
limits on spill, despite the fact it recognized that “the body of research
evidence indicates that juvenile survival is generally highest through this
passage route.”274 Unfortunately, for juvenile salmon survival, this approach
meant less effective action and more ineffective studying.275
As with most other hydropower actions, the specified reservoir levels
were nearly exactly the same as those in the 1995 BiOp. In fact, the only
reservoir-level change was a ten day extension of operating the John Day
Reservoir within a foot-and-a-half of minimum irrigation pool, moving the
start date from April twentieth to April tenth.276 Despite the many promises
of operational changes resulting from the studies conducted under the 1995
RPA, the 2000 BiOp merely called for additional studies,277 apparently
content to continue the hydropower status quo. The commitment to the
status quo was even more obvious in the BiOp’s treatment of dam
breaching.278 In a draft of the 2000 BiOp, NOAA insisted that the Army Corps
of Engineers, operator of the Lower Snake River dams, request
congressional authorization for dam breaching in 2006.279 Even in the final
BiOp, NOAA acknowledged that “breaching the four Lower Snake River
Columbia River dams and transported them downriver for release below Bonneville Dam. 2000
BIOP, supra note 8, at 3-6. Spill, which interferes with collection of juvenile fish for transport,
was curtailed during summer months in order to coordinate with a comprehensive trucking
regime, which would collect juveniles from all four transport facilities. See id. (indicating that
reduced spill would allow more juveniles to be diverted into collection facilities).
273 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-82 (describing assumption that increased spill would occur
only if “implemented in a biologically safe manner to maintain appropriate water quality”). For
example, because NOAA set so-called “conservative” gas level limits in 1995, the spill goal of
80% at Lower Granite Dam caused gas limits to be regularly exceeded. See Avoiding Dam
Breaching, supra note 97, at 259 (highlighting changes in spill regime between the 1995 and 2000
BiOps); see also supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text (detailing the 1995 BiOp’s flow
schedule and gas limits). Consequently, NOAA set the set the spill goal at Lower Granite Dam at
60,000 cfs, a reduction of approximately 20% from earlier spill goals, in the 2000 BiOp. See 2000
BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-88 to 9-89 (indicating project-by-project spill requirements).
274 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-88 to 9-89 (noting that studies would continue and that
spill would be the baseline for measuring the relative successes of the various passage
methods).
275 See id. at 9-101 to 9-102 (directing action agencies to continue studies of spill efficacy).
276 See id. at 9-65. The Snake River reservoirs were to operate within one foot of minimum
operating pool, from April third until the time small numbers of juveniles were present, at which
point collection for transport would begin. Id.
277 See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 295 (concluding that the 2000 BiOp
eschewed immediate action in favor of planning and evaluation).
278 Prior to the release of the 2000 BiOp, numerous salmon advocates and environmental
groups urged NOAA to seriously consider the possibility of breaching the four Lower Snake
River Dams. See id. at 248–50; Dan Hansen, Breaching Hearings Draw 9,000: Nearly 30,000
Submit Opinions on What Should Happen to Snake River Dams, SPOKESMAN REV., Mar. 17, 2000,
at B1. The Lower Snake River Dams consist of the Lower Granite, Little Goose, Lower
Monumental, and Ice Harbor dams. For an examination of the biological, economic, and legal
arguments for breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, see The Case For Dam Breaching, supra
note 96, at 1005-06.
279 See Jonathon Brinckman, Unreleased Federal Plan calls for Dam Breaching, THE
OREGONIAN, Nov. 18, 2000, at A1 (describing the draft BiOp released to federal agencies).
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dams would provide more certainty of long-term survival and recovery than
would other measures.”280 But the BiOp stated only that the action agencies
should consider the need to breach the Lower Snake River dams if NOAA
issued a failure report at the five or eight year reviews.281 As a result of
NOAA’s lip service to the possibility of dam breaching, environmentalists
and salmon advocates scrutinized the 2000 BiOp closely.282

c. Offsite Mitigation
Because status quo operations of the hydropower system would not
alone achieve a no-jeopardy determination, NOAA incorporated numerous
offsite mitigation actions to improve the productivity of salmon populations
in order to avoid jeopardy through promises to achieve appropriate levels of
survival and recovery.283 This offsite mitigation was mostly directed at
agencies other than the action (federal hydropower) agencies, since the
BiOp aimed to address the phases of the salmon lifecycle not directly
affected by hydropower operations, including harvests, habitat, and
hatcheries.284 The BRS supplied the offsite mitigation outline, since its plan
incorporated recovery at all salmon life-stages, thus directing actions at
other federal agencies, as well as state, tribal, local, and private entities.285
Reliance on a recovery plan like the BRS was not an innovation of the 2000
BiOp. But unlike the 1995 BiOp—which used the 1995 draft recovery plan
directives as a baseline for proposing improved hydropower operations, like
spills, drawdowns, and so forth—the 2000 BiOp’s RPA incorporated actions
directed at entities unrelated to the federal hydropower system, and these
actions were crucial to the RPA’s jeopardy analysis.286
Because NOAA has authority to affect only the operational choices of
the federal hydropower agencies as action agencies,287 it called for those

280

2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-5.
Id. at 9-130 (indicating that only reevaluation, not action, would occur if NOAA Fisheries
issued a failure report).
282 See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 276.
283 See 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-2.
284 See id. at 9-15 (explaining that the goal of offsite mitigation is to improve the likelihood
that all of the species’ biological requirements will be met).
285 See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 260–61 (explaining that authority to
implement many of the offsite mitigation measures rests with agencies other than those
operating the dams); see also NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (D. Or. June 29, 2001)
(quoting Def.’s Summ. J. Mem. 6) (indicating that the 1995 BiOp included “actions to be taken
by federal, state and private entities across all phases of the salmon life-cycle (the four ‘Hs’ of
Habitat, Hatcheries, Harvest, and Hydropower) to restore the runs”). But see 2000 BIOP, supra
note 8, at 9-21 (“Offsite enhancement includes only measures that are within the current
authorities of the Action Agencies.”).
286 “In combination with efforts to reduce hydro-mortality, improvements expected from
other ongoing Federal actions, and the cumulative effects of state or private activities . . .
should be sufficient to allow . . . [dam] operations to meet the jeopardy standard.” 2000 BIOP,
supra note 8, at 9-21 (describing significance of offsite mitigation). For details on the 1995
BiOp’s RPA, see supra notes 188–219 and accompanying text.
287 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(iv) (2000) (delineating the authority of consulting agencies
to establish “terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency or
281
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agencies to fund, study, and coordinate the offsite actions in order to link
the actions in the BRS with the RPA.288 For example, NOAA directed BPA to
fund habitat programs related to both tributaries and the Columbia River
estuary and to coordinate efforts with the Northwest Power Planning
Council to develop subbasin habitat assessments.289 Although BPA has
virtually no authority to affect salmon harvest, the RPA called for the power
agency to “work with” other federal agencies, states, and tribes to study and
initiate use of selective fishing gear (which could minimize incidental takes
of listed salmon) and to develop better stock assessments for use in the
creation of harvest management plans.290
The RPA also indicated that BPA should become a benefactor of the
hatchery program, funding hatchery and genetic management plans, a
hatchery fish identification program, and an “artificial propagation safety net
program.”291 Thus, the 2000 BiOp created a new BPA funding role concerning
applicant . . . to implement the measures specified [as a reasonable and prudent alternative to
avoid species jeopardy]”); see also 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-30 to 9-31 (describing
responsibility of action agencies to plan, research, monitor, and evaluate habitat, hatchery, and
harvest actions).
288 See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 260–67 (describing funding, studying, and
coordination obligations and the need to link the RPA to the BRS).
289 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-134. The RPA directed BPA to fund protection of productive
non-federal habitat through conservation easements, acquisitions, or coordination with
conservation organizations. Id. It also called for the agency to research methods of increasing
tributary flow, such as establishing a water brokerage. Id. Further, NOAA suggested a variety of
ways BPA could support offsite habitat enhancement, including participating in tribal, state, and
regional restoration efforts. Id. at 9-135. Additionally, the RPA required BPA to fund an estuary
restoration program and develop an estuary habitat plan. Id. at 9-139; see also Avoiding Dam
Breaching, supra note 97, at 261–62 (describing RPA’s habitat provisions).
290 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-146 to 9-148. NOAA enlisted BPA to help create a multi-year
development program for devising, testing, and implementing selective fishing gear in
coordination with NOAA , FWS, and tribal and state fishery management agencies. Id. at 9-146.
The BiOp also called for BPA to work with the same agencies and with the Pacific Salmon
Commission (which administers the Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and
Canada) as well as the Pacific Fishery Management Council (which establishes harvest rates for
ocean fishers), to improve and revise stock assessment models. Id. at 9-147. The extent to which
BPA can participate in the efforts of these fishery agencies is questionable; certainly BPA does
not have authority to require any of these agencies to use data or other information from any
studies it might conduct or fund. See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 263
(questioning whether BPA’s assigned role in harvest management is sufficient to avoid
jeopardy).
291 These hatchery provisions seemed a closer fit in terms of BPA’s involvement in offsite
mitigation activities because federal hydropower agencies have relied on hatchery production
for years to insulate the hydroelectric system from criticism over declining salmon runs. See
Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 263–64 (noting that hydroelectric operators have
long pointed to hatchery fish to claim that the Columbia Basin could reap the awards of both
cheap electricity and abundant salmon runs). The hatchery and genetic management plan is a
comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan, studying the impacts of hatchery fish and wild
fish and setting forth facility and operational details for the hatchery program. 2000 BIOP, supra
note 8, at 9-155. In terms of the marking program, BPA was merely to fund the undertaking,
enabling regional, state, tribal, and federal fish managers to mark the adipose fin of all hatcheryorigin salmon. Id. at 9-157 to 9-158. The “artificial propagation safety-net program” created a
four-step process for artificial production supplementation and intervention when a particular
depressed salmon population faces a high risk of extinction. Id. at 9-158. NOAA instructed BPA
to fund this program and, when appropriate, to implement necessary measures. Id. at 9-159.
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habitat, harvest, and hatchery measures. Actually implementing most of the
actions with any direct benefits to salmon was well beyond the scope of
BPA’s authority.292 And whether NOAA could legally rely on speculative
implementation of these actions to support its no-jeopardy determination
was highly questionable. In fact, Judge Redden, the reviewing district court
judge, struck down the 2000 BiOp because he concluded that the habitat,
harvest, and hatchery directives aimed at non-action agencies were not
“reasonably certain to occur,” as required by ESA regulations.293

3. Judicial Rejection of the 2000 Biological Opinion
In May 2001, a coalition of salmon advocates294 sued NOAA, challenging
its reliance in the 2000 BiOp on uncertain future federal, state, and private
mitigation actions that had not undergone consultation.295 Among other
things, the salmon advocates argued that NOAA had no authority to direct
nonfederal entities to take any particular action in the Columbia River
Basin.296 Thus, the mitigation measures that the 2000 BiOp called for the
states and private parties to implement—including habitat protection,
hatchery improvements, and harvest controls297—were not “reasonably
certain” to occur, as required by the ESA298 Therefore, NOAA could not rely

292 The 2000 BiOp described the extent of BPA’s authority to implement these actions. See
id. at 9-21. Under the Northwest Power Act, BPA has authority to “protect, mitigate, and

enhance” the fish and wildlife compromised by construction and operation of the hydropower
system through participation in the Council’s fish and wildlife program, but this authority
extends only to some of the 2000 BiOp’s offsite programs. Id.; see also supra note 5, infra notes
406–08, 411 and accompanying text (describing Northwest Power Act).
293 See infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text.
294 The State of Oregon, the Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon all filled amicus curiae briefs
on behalf of the plaintiffs, which were comprised of 13 non-profit environmental and salmon
conservation organizations: the National Wildlife Federation, the Idaho Wildlife Federation,
Washington Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, Trout Unlimited, the Pacific Coast Federation
of Fishermen’s Associations, the Institute for Fisheries Resources, Idaho Rivers United, Idaho
Steelhead and Salmon United, the Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association, Friends of the
Earth, Salmon for All, and Columbia Riverkeeper. NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200
(D. Or. 2003).
295 Id. at 1203.
296
297

Id.

For example, the RPA called for the development of an estuary restoration program to
protect and restore 10,000 acres of tidal wetlands and other key habitat areas over 10 years,
through the acquisition of lands, breeching levees, creation of wetlands, and other habitat
measures. 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-139 to 9-140. It was not clear, however, who would
implement habitat measures on non-federal lands. See Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97,
at 262. Moreover, hydropower managers have virtually no authority over harvest management.
See id. at 163.
298 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1213–14; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152 (D. Ariz. 2002) (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376,
1389 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“Mitigation measures must be reasonably specific, certain to occur, and
capable of implementation; they must be subject to deadlines or otherwise—enforceable
obligations; and most important, they must address the threats to the species in a way that
satisfies the jeopardy and adverse modification standards.”).
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upon them to reach a no jeopardy conclusion.299 In National Wildlife
Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service (NWF v. NMFS I),300 Oregon
District Court Judge James Redden agreed with the environmentalists and
struck down the 2000 BiOp.301
Judge Redden first concluded that NOAA’s definition of the “action
area” subject to section 7 consultation was unreasonably narrow.302 Although
the ESA regulations required NOAA to assess the biological impact of
Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) operations on “all areas to
be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the
immediate area involved in the action,”303 the agency claimed that only the
mitigation measures within the immediate action area—the mainstem

299 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1213–14. The salmon advocates also argued that
NOAA’s no-jeopardy conclusion relied on implementation of future federal conservation plans
that required, but had yet to undergo ESA consultation, and thus might never be implemented.
Id. at 1207–08. In addition, they challenged an emergency exemption in the 2000 BiOp,
authorizing the action agencies to ignore the BiOp’s measures for indefinite periods of time in
the event of power system, flood control, or other emergencies. Plaintiff’s Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 35, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
CV 01-00640-KI (D. Or. June 29, 2001) [hereinafter NWF Complaint]; see Avoiding Dam
Breaching, supra note 97, at 276–77; 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-62, 9-88. Because NOAA had
never assessed the effects of the emergency exemption, the plaintiffs argued that such a broad
exemption was contrary to the ESA. NWF Complaint, supra, at 35; see Avoiding Dam Breaching,
supra note 97, at 260, 279. Importantly, the BiOp did not define what constituted an emergency.
2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-62. Further, the BiOp did not require the action agencies to consult
with NOAA prior to invoking the exemption. Id. For an examination of the legality of the 2000
BiOp’s emergency exemption, see Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at 288–92 (arguing
that there was no authority in the ESA authorizing an agency to unilaterally exempt itself from
the ESA’s requirements). Nowhere in the 2000 BiOp was there an explanation of how the
exemption fit into NOAA’s no jeopardy conclusion.
The salmon advocates also maintained that NOAA’s issuance of an incidental take permit
was unlawful, alleging that NOAA’s failure to track or even evaluate the amount of the
incidental take violated the ESA. Id. at 293. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that NOAA failed to use
the best available science in assessing the status of the species. Id. at 277. Judge Redden
declined to address most of these arguments, limiting the scope of his ruling to NOAA’s
noncompliance with the ESA and its regulations. In so doing, he avoided the most difficult
issues raised by the plaintiffs: whether NOAA employed the best available science, whether the
emergency exception was contrary to the ESA, and whether the ESA required NOAA to track
and evaluate the amount of incidental take authorized by the BiOp.
300 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003).
301 Id. at 1211–13.
302 Id. at 1212. Under the ESA regulations, NOAA must consider the “effects of the action”
and the “cumulative effects” of “future State or private activities, not involving Federal
activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area of the Federal action
subject to consultation.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005) (defining cumulative effects); see 50 C.F.R. §
402.14(g)(3) (2005) (defining NOAA’s responsibilities during formal consultation). The
regulations define “action area” to include “all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the
Federal action and not merely the immediate area involved in the action.” Id. § 402.02. In its
2000 BiOp, NOAA considered the action area as “the farthest upstream point at which smolts
enter . . . the Snake and Upper Columbia Rivers to the farthest downstream point at which they
exit . . . the migration corridor. In the Snake River, that area translates to immediately below
Hells Canyon Dam . . . to the confluence of the Snake and Columbia Rivers. In the Columbia
River, the action area begins immediately below Chief Joseph Dam . . . .” 2000 BIOP, supra note
8, at 5-1.
303 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005) (defining action area).
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Columbia and Snake Rivers—were subject to the ESA’s consultation
requirements.304 The court rejected NOAA’s argument that the RPA’s “rangewide” mitigation measures305 were outside the scope of section 7
consultation, and consequently did not need to be “reasonably certain” to
occur.306 Judge Redden observed that the agency’s no-jeopardy conclusion
depended on the same “range-wide” habitat, harvest, and hatchery mitigation
measures that it now claimed were outside the action area, which suggested
that the “range-wide” area was indirectly affected by FCRPS operations, and
thus subject to the requirements of section 7.307
The court also rejected NOAA’s argument that its proposed offsite
mitigation measures did not have to be “reasonably certain” to occur,
holding that the ESA regulations expressly required such certainty.308 Since
there was no evidence indicating that any of the states, tribes, or private
parties named in the RPA had committed to implementing any of the
measures that the RPA assigned to them, Judge Redden concluded that
those measures were not “reasonably certain” to occur.309 In addition, the
RPA included a number of federal actions that required, but had not
undergone, ESA consultation.310 Because NOAA placed such a heavy reliance
304
305

NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1210; see 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 5-1.

The range-wide mitigation measures included in the 2000 RPA consisted of both federal
and non-federal offsite habitat, harvest, and hatchery proposals listed in the Basinwide
Recovery Strategy. The Basinwide Recovery Strategy included, among other things, a variety of
short- and long-term federal, state, regional, tribal, and private off-site mitigation actions,
primarily related to habitat, harvest, and hatchery programs designed to “provide survival
improvements needed to avoid jeopardy.” 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-282; see id. at 9-133 to 9141 (calling for habitat improvements, such as creating an agricultural incentive program,
developing improvement plans, establishing riparian buffers, restoring and protecting 10,000
acres of tidal wetlands, and conducting habitat improvement feasibility studies); id. at 9-143 to
9-149 (calling for harvest improvements such as developing selective fishing methods and
equipment, tribal and state fishery management and stock assessment models, improved
methods of estimating mortalities in fisheries, and credit systems for harvest reforms); id. at 9151 to 9-160 (calling for hatchery improvements such as developing hatchery and genetic
management plans, hatchery maintenance plans, a safety-net program, and implementing
hatchery reforms).
306 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1209–10. Under the ESA, “[m]itigation measures must
be reasonably specific, certain to occur, and capable of implementation; they must be subject to
deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations; and most important, they must address the
threats to the species in a way that satisfies the jeopardy and adverse modification standards.”
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152 (D. Ariz. 2002) (citing Sierra
Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th Cir. 1987)). In NWF v. NMFS I, NOAA argued that
“range-wide” offsite mitigation measures were adequate if there monitoring and evaluation
standards were in place, so that it was reasonable to expect that the measures were likely to
occur. NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
307 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
308 See id. at 1210 (rejecting NOAA’s claim that the mitigation measures had to be merely
“reasonably likely” to occur); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005) (requiring a consulting agency
to assess the “effects . . . that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area”).
309 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1213; cf. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 16 F. Supp.
2d 1256, 1259 (D. Or. 1998) (warning that NOAA “may not make [an] ESA listing decision based
upon the hope that Oregon implements adequate enforceable measures and the hope that those
measures will be taken in time to save the Oregon Coast ESU”).
310 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1214. For example, The RPA called for the
development of the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Plan, a joint Forest
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on offsite federal actions that had not undergone section 7 consultation, as
well as non-federal mitigation actions that were not reasonably certain to
occur, Judge Redden ruled that the 2000 BiOp’s no-jeopardy conclusion was
arbitrary and capricious.311
Despite the 2000 BiOp’s substantial legal flaws, Judge Redden denied
the salmon advocates’ motion to vacate the 2000 BiOp; instead, he instructed
NOAA to cure the deficiencies in the 2000 BiOp within one year.312 The
potentially disruptive effect that an injunction vacating the 2000 BiOp could
have had on federal power operations, as well as NOAA’s potential exposure
to takings liability under the ESA for FCRPS operations during the remand
period, led Judge Redden to conclude that the balance of equities favored
allowing the 2000 BiOp to remain in place during the remand period.313
IV. THE BRIEF RISE AND FALL OF THE BPA/CORPS PROPOSAL TO CURTAIL SUMMER
SPILL
During the summer of 2004—just a year after Judge Redden struck
down the 2000 BiOp—BPA and the Corps issued proposals to curtail the
summer spill at four Columbia Basin dams in an effort to generate
hydroelectric revenue.314 Although the 2000 BiOp cited the spill program as a
core element of successful salmon mitigation through the Federal Columbia
River Power System (FCRPS),315 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Service and Bureau of Land Management Plan designed to provide long-term guidance for
managing habitat east of the Cascades, and the Mid-Columbia Habitat Conservation Plan, aimed
at improving juvenile and adult salmon survival. Id. at 1207–08; 2000 BIOP supra note 8, at 9-30
to 9-31.
311 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp.2d at 1214–15.
312 Id. at 1215. Judge Redden ordered NOAA to insure that only those federal mitigation
actions which had undergone section 7 consultation, and those non-federal actions that were
reasonably certain to occur, were considered in NOAA’s determination of whether any listed
Columbia Basin salmon would be jeopardized by continued FCRPS operations. Id.; Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Minute Order, Civ. No. 01-00640-KI (D. Or. June
25, 2003). The one-year time frame was later extended to 18 months. NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV
01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *2 (D. Or. May 26, 2005). According to Judge
Redden, the environmentalists failed to offer a convincing argument that an injunction vacating
the 2000 BiOp, standing alone, would enhance the survivability or recovery of listed Columbia
Basin salmon. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV-01-640-RE, at *3 (D.
Or. July 1, 2003) (order denying plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the 2000 BiOp).
313 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV-01-640-RE, at *3 (D. Or. July 1,
2003).
314 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., FINAL PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM (FCRPS) SUMMER JUVENILE BYPASS OPERATIONS 1 (June 22,
2004), available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/Implementation/final_summerspill_proposal
_6_22.pdf [hereinafter 2004 FINAL PROPOSAL]; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, STATEMENT OF
DECISION, MODIFICATION TO SUMMER SPILL OPERATIONS FOR FISH PASSAGE IN 2004 12–14 (July 6,
2004) [hereinafter CORPS STATEMENT OF DECISION], available at http://www.salmonrecovery
.gov/docs/summer_spill/statement_of_decision/corps_Statement_of_Decision.pdf; BONNEVILLE
POWER ADMIN., 2004 FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM JUVENILE BYPASS OPERATIONS
STATEMENT OF DECISION 1–2 (July 6, 2004), available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/
docs/summer_spill/statement_of_decision/BPA_Statement%20of%20Decision.pdf
[hereinafter
BPA STATEMENT OF DECISION].
315 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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Administration (NOAA) surprisingly concluded that the proposed reduction
in spill was consistent with the 2000 BiOp, and thus would not produce
jeopardy for any listed Columbia Basin salmon.316 A number of
environmental groups, led by the National Wildlife Federation, immediately
filed suit, claiming that the agency had illegally modified the summer spill
program established in the 2000 BiOp.317 This Part describes the BPA/Corps
proposal to curtail spill during summer 2004, outlines the arguments of those
who opposed that proposal, and explains the significance of Judge Redden’s
decision to enjoin the proposal. The court’s spill decision clearly reflected
Judge Redden’s growing impatience with attempts by federal hydrosystem
operators to evade the ESA’s requirements.

A. The 2004 Proposal to Curtail Summer Spill
The BPA/Corps 2004 proposal to curtail spill called for eliminating spill
at The Dalles and Bonneville dams for the entire month of August, as well as
eliminating spill at the Ice Harbor and John Day dams during the last week
of August.318 BPA and the Corps maintained that the majority of juvenile
salmon would have passed The Dalles, Bonneville, Ice Harbor, and John Day
dams by the end of July, so the reduction of spill in August would have little
effect on the majority of migrating fish.319 Although the two dam operating
agencies acknowledged that the spill proposal might result in a loss of up to
376,000 listed juvenile salmon,320 they claimed that in the context of an
estimated total run of 50 million juvenile salmon, the effect would be
minimal, and that any adverse effects to listed salmon could be mitigated.321
The agencies claimed their proposal would save the region’s ratepayers $1828 million,322 while ensuring salmon survival equivalent to, if not better than,

316 NOAA, FINDINGS REGARDING ADEQUACY OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM
ACTION AGENCIES 2004 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 9 (July 1, 2004), available at
http://www.eswr.com/704/spill04findings.pdf.
317 NWF v. NMFS II, No. CV 01-6940-RE, 2004 WL 1698050, at *2 (D. Or. July 29, 2004). As in
NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003), the plaintiffs were 13 environmental and
salmon advocacy groups: National Wildlife Federation, Idaho Wildlife Federation, Washington
Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, Trout Unlimited, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s
Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Idaho Rivers United, Idaho Steelhead and
Salmon United, Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association, Friends of the Earth, Salmon for
All, Columbia Riverkeeper. NWF v. NMFS II, 2004 WL 1698050, at *1. The State of Oregon and
several treaty tribes filled amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the plaintiffs as well. Id.
318 NWF v. NMFS II, 2004 WL 1698050 at *3-4.
319
320

Id.

BPA STATEMENT OF DECISION, supra note 314, at 4.
Id.
322 Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Summer Spill Program Expected to Reduce
Costs, Protect Fish (July 6, 2004), available at http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/BPAnews/2004/
NewsRelease.cfm?ReleaseNo=504. Salmon advocates claimed that the primary beneficiaries of
the savings that BPA and the Corps claimed would result from the reduction in spill were
industrial power users, and that the average residential ratepayer would save only seven to ten
cents per month. Press Release, Pat Ford & Rob Masonis, Save Our Wild Salmon & American
Rivers et al., Court Orders Federal Agencies to Keep Spilling for Salmon (July 28, 2004) (on file
with author).
321
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the estimated juvenile salmon survival rates in the 2000 BiOp.323 The latter
contention rested on a series of proposed “offsets” that would allegedly
mitigate any adverse effects to protected fish.324
Among the proposed “offsets” was continuation of an aggressive
transportation program, predator control, new fish passage technologies,
harvest controls, and water flow management.325 But, each of these measures
was included in the 2000 BiOp’s RPA, which was still in effect.326 One “offset”
not required by the 2000 BiOp was the release of an additional 100,000 acrefeet of water from Idaho Power Company’s Brownlee Reservoir in July 2004,
the product of a one-year agreement between BPA and Idaho Power.327 If
timed properly, increased river flows could improve juvenile salmon
survival, increasing the speed at which salmon are able to migrate through
reservoirs to the ocean, thus minimizing both the threat of predation and
potentially lethal water temperatures during the summer.328 BPA and the
Corps claimed that the Brownlee storage release would benefit migrating
juvenile salmon and offset the adverse effects that spill reduction would
have on migrating salmon, even though the proposal called for the release of
water in July, a month before the agencies planned to reduce spill in
August.329 Although BPA and the Corps claimed that the proposal was
323 2004 FINAL PROPOSAL, supra note 314, at 15. While BPA and the Corps acknowledged that
the spill proposal could result in the loss of an estimated 81,000 to 376,000 juvenile salmon, the
agencies claimed that the proposed predator control measures and the release of 100,000 acrefeet of water at Brownlee Reservoir could benefit approximately 1.1 million to 1.3 million
juvenile salmon. BPA STATEMENT OF DECISION, supra note 314, at 4.
324 BPA STATEMENT OF DECISION, supra note 314, at 4; CORPS STATEMENT OF DECISION, supra
note 314, at 6.
325 CORPS STATEMENT OF DECISION, supra note 314, at 6.
326 NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1215 (D. Or. 2003); see also 2000 BIOP, supra note
8, at 9-75 to 9-80 (calling for transportation at all Snake River collector projects, maximizing
transportation during summer migration, extending barge transportation and reducing reliance
on trucking, developing transportation evaluation programs with federal, state, and tribal
salmon managers, studying delayed mortality of transported salmon versus in-river mortality,
and evaluating the effects of transportation on salmon homing ability); id. at 9-54 (promising to
develop measures to control predation); id. at 9-74, 9-81 to 9-87 (calling for new and improved
fish passage technologies); id. at 9-143 to 9-150 (discussing harvest mitigation measures); id. at
9-55 (setting forth flow management objectives).
327 2004 FINAL PROPOSAL, supra note 314, at 6.
328 RETURN TO THE RIVER 2000, supra note 92, at 238–40. But see Powers, supra note 214, at
880–81 (questioning the efficacy of increased fish flows because the idea of flushing fish out to
sea ignores the natural migration patterns of juvenile fish). Migration involves more than just
moving downstream as quickly as possible; it is likely that juvenile fish typically alternate
between migrating, resting, and feeding as they migrate downstream. RETURN TO THE RIVER
2000, supra note 92, at 238–41. The Independent Scientific Group suggested that increased
water flow could adversely affect the natural migration cycle of young salmon. Id. at 231–32. It
is possible that faster flows may just end up pushing fish into the next dam more quickly than
they would have otherwise traveled. See Powers, supra note 214, at 880 (discussing problems
with flow augmentation).
329 See BPA STATEMENT OF DECISION, supra note 314, at 4 (claiming salmon that are affected
by the reduction in spill “will benefit from the additional July discharge from Brownlee as that
water flows through the lower river”); CORPS STATEMENT OF DECISION, supra note 314, at 3 (“The
modification also includes actions to offset potential adverse impacts to listed and non-listed
salmonids in order to achieve similar or better biological benefits than those anticipated in the
NOAA Fisheries 2000 BiOp.”). Notably, the agreement between BPA and Idaho Power contained
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consistent with both the ESA and the Northwest Power Act, their focus on
the economic benefits of reducing spill to the detriment of listed juvenile
salmon seemed at odds with the ESA, the Northwest Power Act, and the
case law interpreting those statutes.330

B. The District Court’s Spill Decision
Environmentalists quickly challenged the spill proposal, arguing that it
was inconsistent with the 2000 BiOp because spill was a core element of the
2000 BiOp’s reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA), and the 2000 BiOp
concluded that the continued operation of the FCRPS would jeopardize the
continued existence of listed salmon unless the action agencies
implemented the measures contained in the RPA.331 But NOAA, the Corps,
and BPA maintained that the offsets—especially the release of 100,000 acre
feet of water from Brownlee Reservoir in July—would mitigate any adverse
effects that the spill proposal might have on listed salmon.332
In July 2004, in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine
Fisheries Service (NWF v. NMFS II),333 Judge Redden agreed with the
environmentalists and enjoined the BPA/Corps 2004 spill proposal.334 The
court observed that the offsets consisted only of the release of water from
Brownlee Reservoir, since the other promises simply reiterated mitigation
measures to which NOAA already committed in the 2000 BiOp.335 Judge
Redden also found fundamental defects in the BPA/Corps conclusion that
the Brownlee release would adequately remedy the increased salmon
mortalities the agencies acknowledged could occur due to terminating the
spill program.336 Absent any meaningful offset, and given the centrality of the

no assurances that the water would be released at a uniform rate. Without such assurances,
there was no guarantee that a large release of water early in July would have any beneficial
effect on juvenile salmon migrating downstream in August.
330 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–85 (1978) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(c),
1532(2) (1976 ed.)) (discussing Congressional intent in the ESA). The court stated:
“The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost. . . . Agencies in particular are directed by
§§ 2(c) and 3(2) of the Act to ‘use . . . all methods and procedures which are necessary’
to preserve endangered species. . . . In addition, the legislative history undergirding § 7
reveals an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford first priority to
the declared national policy of saving endangered species.”

Id.; see also Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the Northwest Power
Act placed “fish and wildlife on an equal footing with power production”).
331 NWF v. NMFS II, No. CV 01-6940-RE, 2004 WL 1698050, at *4 (D. Or. July 29, 2004); see
supra note 256 and accompanying text (core element).
332 NWF v. NMFS II, 2004 WL 1698050, at *4.
333

Id.
Id. at *6.
335 Id. at *4.
336 Id. First, Judge Redden noted that the 2000 BiOp had already directed BPA and the Corps
to negotiate with Idaho Power for additional water. Id.; see 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-70.
334

Thus, NOAA erroneously assumed that the Brownlee release in summer 2004 would provide a
greater amount of “new” water to the Columbia and Snake Rivers than NOAA had already
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spill program to the 2000 BiOp’s RPA, the court concluded that the proposed
curtailment of spill would result in FCRPS operations that jeopardized ESAlisted salmon.337
The NWF v. NMFS II decision was remarkable because it effectively
constrained dam operations over the objections of dam operators—an
unusual result.338 The result suggested that consulting agency action that is
inconsistent with its own BiOp is subject to exacting judicial scrutiny. The
decision also revealed Judge Redden’s growing impatience with attempts by
federal hydrosystem managers to obfuscate the effects of FCRPS operations
on listed salmon species. The judge’s observation that ESA implementation
required more than a simple “numbers game”339 reflected his increasing
skepticism of the claims of federal dam operators and NOAA, who were
willing to risk large numbers of listed salmon, while professing to fulfill their
ESA duty to avoid jeopardy through other actions that allegedly
compensated for the increased risk.
V. THE 2004 BIOP—NOAA’S NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: A NOVEL WAY OF
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO
In November 2004, nearly eighteen months after Judge Redden issued
his order remanding the 2000 BiOp to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and instructing the agency to cure the deficiencies

contemplated would be available in the 2000 BiOp. NWF v. NMFS II, 2004 WL 1698050, at *4.
Second, NOAA’s conclusion that the Brownlee Reservoir release would produce the same or
better juvenile fish survival was based on the assumption that the water would be released at a
uniform rate throughout the month of July, but BPA’s agreement with Idaho Power did not
require the utility to release the water at a uniform rate. Id. at *4-5. In fact, the record showed
that during the first two weeks in July there were large fluctuations in flow, and that the utility
released water at a faster rate than NOAA assumed it would. Id. Thus, the July releases of
storage water from Brownlee Reservoir might provide little, if any, benefit to listed salmon
migrating in the latter part of August. Id. at *5 n.3.
337 Id. at *5; 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-82.
338 For example, in In re Operation of Missouri River System Litigation, 421 F.3d 618, 627–28
(8th Cir. 2005), the States of Missouri and Nebraska and the Nebraska Public Power District
argued that the Corps Master Navigation Manual violated the Corps’ non-discretionary duty
under the Flood Control Act of 1994 to maintain river flow sufficient to support downstream
navigation because, under certain drought conditions, it called for canceling the navigation
season in order to hold water in the reservoirs for the benefit of recreation. The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the Flood Control Act imposed no duty to maintain a minimum level of
downstream navigation independent of consideration of other interests. Although the court
acknowledged that “[t]he dominant functions of the Flood Control Act were to avoid flooding
and to maintain downstream navigation, . . . the Act recognizes secondary uses of the River
including irrigation, recreation, fish, and wildlife.” Id. at 629 (citing South Dakota v. Ubbelohde,
330 F.3d 1014, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 2003)). Thus, the court concluded that the statute “clearly gives
a good deal of discretion to the Corps in the management of the River.” Id. at 633 (citing
Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d at 1027). See generally Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
384 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) (exempting federal dams from Clean Water Act water quality
standards); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussed in
Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79,
83–91 (2003)) (evaluating the Gorsuch decision).
339 NWF v. NMFS II, 2004 WL 1698050, at *5.

768

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 36:709

in the 2000 BiOp by developing measures that met the regulatory standard of
being “reasonably certain” to occur,340 NOAA issued a revised BiOp for
Columbia Basin operations from 2004 to 2014,341 designed to formally replace
the 2000 BiOp.342 For the first time since 1994, the agency concluded that the
continued operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS)
would not jeopardize the continued existence of any of the listed Columbia
Basin salmon.343 Thus, the 2004 BiOp contained no reasonable and prudent
alternative (RPA),344 eliminating the need for mitigation measures required
by the ESA regulations to be “reasonably certain” to occur.345
This Part describes the NOAA’s attempt to cure the deficiencies in the
2000 BiOp, and the agency’s deviation from the terms of Judge Redden’s
remand order. It then examines the 2004 BiOp’s new analytical framework
for determining jeopardy and the resulting “no-jeopardy” conclusion. We
suggest that NOAA’s new jeopardy definition was simply an attempt to
justify FCRPS status quo operations.

340 See supra notes 308–11 and accompanying text. Although Judge Redden concluded that
the 2000 BiOp was inconsistent with both the ESA and its regulations because NOAA
improperly relied on mitigation measures that were not “reasonably certain” to occur, he did
not enjoin its implementation. NWF v. NMFS I, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1211–12 (D. Or. 2003).
Instead, he remanded the 2000 BiOp to NOAA, instructing the agency to revise the BiOp and
cure its deficiencies within one year. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Minute
Order, Civ. No. 01-00640-KI (June 25, 2003). Judge Redden later extended that deadline, giving
NOAA 18 months to revise the BiOp. NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL
1278878, at *2 (D. Or. May 26, 2005).
341 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, RECORD OF CONSULTATION AND STATEMENT OF DECISION
CONCERNING THE FINAL UPDATED PROPOSED ACTION FOR THE FCRPS BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON
REMAND 6 (Jan. 2005). NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *3. The 2004 biological opinion
included consultation on 12 listed salmon species as well as the Lower Columbia River coho
salmon, proposed for listing on June 14, 2004. NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *3
(consultation on 1) Snake River spring chinook salmon, 2) Snake River fall chinook salmon, 3)
Upper Columbia River spring chinook salmon, 4) Snake River steelhead, 5) Upper Columbia
River steelhead, 6) Middle Columbia River steelhead, 7) Columbia River chum salmon, 8) Snake
River sockeye salmon, 9) Lower Columbia River chinook, 10) Upper Willamette River chinook,
11) Lower Columbia River steelhead, and 12) Upper Willamette River steelhead).
342 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 2-3.
343 Letter from Dr. Robert Lohn, Reg’l Adm’r, NOAA Fisheries Serv., to Stephen J. Wright,
Adm’r, Bonneville Power Admin., Brig. Gen. William T. Grisoli, Commander & Div. Eng’r, U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, & William McDonald, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1–2 (Nov.
30, 2004), available at http://seahorse.nmfs.noaa.gov/pls/pcts-pub/sxn7.pcts_upload.download?
p_file=F10237/200400727_coverletter_section01-04_11-30-2004.pdf. See also Blumm, supra note
31, at 103–05, 107–09, 113–16 (comparing and contrasting the 1995, 2000, and 2004 BiOps).
Compare 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 8-1 to 8-38 (concluding the proposed operations of the
FCRPS will not jeopardize any of the twelve listed Columbia Basin salmon), with 2000 BIOP,
supra note 8, at 8-1 to 8-26 (concluding the proposed operation of the FCRPS would jeopardize
eight of the 12 listed Columbia Basin salmon), and 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 83–91
(concluding the proposed operation of the FCRPS would jeopardize the continued existence of
three listed Columbia Basin salmon and adversely modify their critical habitat).
344 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 8-1 to 8-38.
345 See supra notes 308–11 and accompanying text.
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A. The 2000 BiOp on Remand: Making It ESA Compliant?
Judge Redden was intimately involved in the process of revising the
2000 BiOp to comply with the ESA, requiring NOAA to file quarterly reports
on the agency’s progress and attending steering committee meetings with
the parties, the action agencies, and members of the public.346 In January
2004, when NOAA’s 2003 progress report required by the 2000 BiOp claimed
the agency “was making substantial progress toward completing the
objectives of the remand,”347 the court expressed misgivings, noting that
NOAA had failed to collaborate with government agencies, the states, or the
tribes, as the court had ordered, and warning that “time was running out.”348
The 2003 progress report also revealed that NOAA had yet to implement the
monitoring programs required by the 2000 BiOp349 and failed to develop
performance standards necessary to implement the RPA.350 Even though the
action agencies’ uncertain ability to implement off-site mitigation measures
was the basis of Judge Redden’s 2003 decision invalidating the 2000 BiOp,351
those agencies had yet to develop off-site mitigation plans three years after
the 2000 BiOp promised them.352
Later in 2004, citing “evidence of strong salmon returns in recent
years,”353 NOAA signaled it was revisiting its jeopardy analysis.354 But Judge
Redden responded by noting that NOAA had failed to report data on 2001
salmon returns, and he wondered if there was any real support for NOAA’s
assertion that salmon returns had actually improved.355 In September 2004,
NOAA released a draft BiOp, which Judge Redden observed “differs
markedly from the 2000 BiOp in both its analytical approach and its
conclusions.”356 Expressing “concerns regarding whether the remand process
has diverged significantly from the intent and terms of the court’s orders,” he
predicted that the process was headed for a “train wreck,” declaring that a
revised BiOp would be vacated if it was legally infirm.357

346
347
348
349

NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.; NOAA FISHERIES, 2003 IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS EVALUATION REPORT 6 (Dec. 19,

2003).
350 NOAA FISHERIES, 2003 IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS EVALUATION REPORT at 5, 10; see also
NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *2 (citing NOAA’s failure to develop habitat and hatchery

performance standards, as required by the 2000 BiOp).
351 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *2; see supra note 310 and accompanying text.
352 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *2; 2003 IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 349, at 11. The progress report indicated that the reason the action agencies
had not implemented most of the key actions under the 2000 BiOp was their inability to obtain
funding from Congress. Id. at 4.
353 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *2.
354 Id. NOAA indicated that it planned to apply the “reasonably certain to occur standard” to
future harmful activities, as well as future mitigation activities. Id.
355 Id.
356 Barry Espenson, Judge Redden Expresses Concern About BiOp Remand Process,
COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.bluefish.org/judgecon.htm.
357 Id.
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B. NOAA’s New Analytical Framework Designed to Avoid Jeopardy
Instead of attempting to ensure that the RPA measures in the 2000 BiOp
were both “reasonably certain” to occur and consistent with the
requirements of section 7 of the ESA, NOAA abandoned the analytical
approach it used in the 2000 BiOp (and in the 1995 BiOp), replacing it with
an analytical framework the agency had never before used. Despite NOAA’s
own findings over the previous decade that FCRPS operations jeopardized
listed salmon and overwhelming scientific evidence suggested that Columbia
Basin salmon populations were in serious peril,358 NOAA’s 2004 BiOp
abruptly concluded that the continued operation of the FCRPS would not
jeopardize any listed Columbia Basin salmon.359 This remarkable new
conclusion stemmed not from a major revision in the proposed FCRPS
operations or new scientific information, but from a new legal interpretation
concerning which federal agency actions were subject to ESA review.
Before 2004, NOAA’s jeopardy inquiry evaluated the “environmental
baseline,”360 together with the effects of proposed FCRPS operations, to
determine whether the continued operation of the FCRPS would “jeopardize
the continued existence”361 of listed Columbia Basin salmon.362 This
358 See NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *4 (“It is apparent that the listed species are in
serious decline and not evidencing signs of recovery.”); id. at *23–30 (recounting the Biological
Review Team’s conclusions for each of the listed salmon species in the Columbia River Basin).
359 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 8-1 to 8-38.
360 The ESA regulations define the “environmental baseline” to

include the past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other
human activities in the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal
projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7
consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with
the consultation in process.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005). The ESA regulations define the “effects of the action” as “the direct
and indirect effects of an action on the species or critical habitat, together with the effects of
other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with that action, that will be added to the
environmental baseline.” Id.
361 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005) states “Jeopardize the continued existence of means to engage
in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.”
362 See, e.g., 1995 BIOP, supra note 114, at 13 (focusing on “whether the species [could] be
expected to survive with an adequate potential for recovery under the effects of the proposed or
continuing action, the environmental baseline and any cumulative effects, and considering
measures for survival and recovery specific to other life stages”); 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-9
(stating, “[t]he effects of the action, the effects of the environmental baseline, and the
cumulative effects in the action area are considered together relative to the action area
biological requirements of the various listed species.”); see also NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL
1278878, at *6–7 (discussing the previous standard); Blumm, supra note 31, at 113–16
(discussing the effects of the Northwest Power Act on Columbia River Basin fish and wildlife
programs). The Endangered Species Consultation Handbook—the guidance document jointly
published by NOAA and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service—required NOAA to analyze
the “aggregate” effects of the proposed action, the environmental baseline, and any cumulative
effects. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text;
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“aggregate approach” focused on whether the cumulative adverse impacts
from both the environmental baseline and the proposed action were
consistent with the biological requirements of the listed species.363 In
contrast, the 2004 BiOp adopted a “comparative approach” to jeopardy, in
which NOAA simply compared the incremental additional adverse effects of
the proposed action against an expanded definition of the environmental
baseline to determine whether the proposed action would reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both survival and recovery of the listed
species.364 Under this new framework, even if NOAA concluded that the
species was likely to become extinct due to the environmental baseline
conditions, so long as the proposed action did not appreciably “reduce the
abundance, productivity, or distribution of [the listed species] compared to
the environmental baseline,” the agency could conclude that the proposed
action would not jeopardize the continued existence of the species.365

In determining whether an action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
species, the action is viewed against the aggregate effects of everything that has led to
the species’ current status and, for non-Federal activities, those things likely to affect the
species in the future. . . . The final analysis then looks at whether, given the aggregate
effects, the species can be expected to both survive and recover, as those terms are
defined above.
CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 4-35; see also supra note 179 (definition of
“cumulative effects”).
363 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-9.
364 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-6, 5-7; see Blumm, supra note 31, at 116–17. The result of
the BiOp’s comparative approach produced an almost singular focus on the effects of proposed
discretionary federal actions, which were essentially identical to the mitigation actions
enumerated in the 2000 BiOp’s RPA. See, e.g., 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 3-1 (stating, “[t]o a
large extent, the [updated proposed action] continues the implementation of many of the
actions contained in the 2000 Biological Opinion”).
365 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 1-12. According to NOAA, a proposed action could not
jeopardize the continued existence of the listed species if it did not appreciably diminish the
likelihood of both survival and recovery of the listed species. Thus, if NOAA found that the
proposed FCRPS operations did not appreciably reduce current salmon reproduction,
abundance, or distribution of listed salmon (i.e., the likelihood of survival), the proposed action
could not, by definition, “jeopardize the continued existence of” listed salmon because it did not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of both survival and recovery. Thus, when NOAA determined
that the action would not appreciably reduce the likelihood of listed salmon survival, the
jeopardy inquiry came to an end, and there was no reason to consider whether the proposed
action appreciably reduced the likelihood of species’ recovery. Id. at 8-1, 1-12.
The 2004 BiOp’s approach to the jeopardy analysis was remarkably similar to the
framework used in the 1993 BiOp, see supra notes 141–50 and accompanying text, which Judge
Marsh struck down in the 1994 case Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine
Fisheries Service, 850 F. Supp. 886, 899 (D. Or. 1994), rejecting NOAA’s claim that any agency
proposal that resulted in improved survival, as a matter of law, could not be said to have
“reduced both the likelihood of survival and recovery” so as to result in jeopardy. Judge Marsh
noted that such an interpretation could lead to a bizarre result in which the agency may find an
improved survival rate—mandating a no-jeopardy conclusion—even though the survival rate
might still be so low that as to constitute a threat to the species’ existence. Id. Three years later,
while upholding the 1995 BiOp in American Rivers, see supra notes 220–27 and accompanying
text, Judge Marsh rejected the same argument, then raised by Columbia Basin industries, that
“any improved survival rates necessarily satisfied the ESA.” Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries
Serv., No. Civ. 96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *4 n.4 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997).
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The most startling change in the 2004 BiOp was NOAA’s assertion that
it was required to assess only those federal actions over which federal
agencies have discretionary control.366 According to this new jeopardy
framework, any nondiscretionary actions became part of the environmental
baseline and not subject to ESA consultation, since, as noted above, the
jeopardy analysis focused only on whether the proposed action would
appreciably diminish the species likelihood of survival and recovery when
compared to the impacts of the environmental baseline on the listed
species.367 Although acknowledging that the ESA required the agency to
distinguish the effects of nondiscretionary operations from the effects of
proposed discretionary operations, NOAA claimed it was “analytically
impossible” to do so.368 Instead, the agency simply assumed any FCRPS
operations necessary to achieve congressionally authorized purposes—such
as navigation, flood control, irrigation, and power generation—were
nondiscretionary,369 and therefore part of the environmental baseline and
outside the scope of ESA consultation.370
The 2004 BiOp also considered whether the proposed action would
destroy or adversely modify the designated critical habitat371 of three of the
listed salmon species—Snake River spring/summer chinook, fall chinook,
and sockeye.372 Although NOAA acknowledged that the condition of
366 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-1 (stating, “[50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2005)] provides: ‘Section 7
and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control’”).
367 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-1.
368 Id. at 5-5, 5-8.
369 Id. at 5-1, 5-6; NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 W.L. 1278878, at *7
(D. Or. May 26, 2005); Blumm, supra note 31, at 115.
370 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-6. Notably, NOAA also assumed that BPA and the Corps
would implement a variety of fish survival enhancing measures, and included those actions in
the baseline. Id.
371 “Each federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency . . . is not likely to . . . result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical . . . .” Endangered Species
Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). A biological opinion must state “whether or not the
Federal action is likely to . . . result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
372 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *14. NOAA designated critical habitat for all listed
Columbia Basin salmon in 2000, but voluntarily withdrew the critical habitat designations for
nine Columbia Basin salmon species in 2002 following a legal challenge to those designations
brought by the National Association of Homebuilders and a subsequent settlement decree. See
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Evans, No. 00-CV-2799, 2002 WL 1205743 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2002).
In Home Builders, pointing to an e-mail written by then acting NOAA Northwest regional
administrator Donna Darm that stated, “[w]hen we make critical habitat designations . . . we
just designate everything as critical,” the plaintiffs alleged that NOAA failed to properly analyze
the economic effects of its critical habitat designations for nineteen listed salmon populations,
as required by the ESA. Bill Rudolph, NMFS Caves on Critical Habitat, NW. FISHLETTER, Mar. 15,
2002, available at http://www.newsdata.com/enernet/fishletter/fishltr139.html; see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(2) (2000) (NOAA and the FWS must make critical habitat designations “on the basis
of the best scientific data available . . . after taking into consideration the economic impact . . .
and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat”).
The plaintiffs also relied on New Mexico. Cattle Grower’s Association v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Service, 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001), in which the Tenth Circuit rejected
FWS’s conclusion that the designation of critical habitat for the southwest willow flycatcher
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designated critical habitat for each of the three species was poor, and that
the proposed action was likely to degrade the habitat further,373 the 2004
BiOp concluded the proposed action was not likely to modify adversely or
(Empidonax trallis extimus) would have no economic effects beyond those already been caused
by the initial decision to list the species under the ESA. Id. at 1285–86. The Tenth Circuit
concluded that FWS was required to consider all of the economic effects of critical habitat
designations, regardless of whether those effects were attributable to the listing decision itself,
the critical habitat designation, or a combination of co-extensive causes. Id. at 1284–85. Despite
a distinct factual record in Home Builders, NOAA entered into a settlement agreement with the
National Association of Home Builders, and voluntarily withdrew its critical habitat
designations for 19 listed salmon species. Environmentalists decried the settlement agreement
as an attempt to “short-circuit” the formal rulemaking process—including public participation
and opportunity to comment—for critical habitat designations. Rudolph, NMFS Caves on
Critical Habitat, NW. FISHLETTER, Mar. 15, 2002, available at http://www.newsdata.com/enernet/
fishletter/fishltr139.html (quoting Earthjustice attorney Todd True).
The settlement agreement reached in Home Builders appeared to be another example of
what one of us has called the “Bush Administration’s Sweetheart Settlement Policy.” Michael C.
Blumm, The Bush Administration’s Sweetheart Settlement Policy: A Trojan Horse Strategy for
Advancing Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,397, 10,397 (2004). The
Bush Administration has successfully reversed a series of Clinton-era environmental regulations
without initiating time-consuming public participation, administrative rulemaking, or judicial
processes by simply settling (or failing to litigate) the lawsuits brought by industry interest
groups challenging the Clinton Administration’s environmental policies. Id. at 10,397. Rather
than defend the Clinton Administration’s environmental policy initiatives, such as the “roadless
rule,” wilderness study area protections, Northwest Forest Plan protections, and snowmobile
restrictions in Yellowstone National Park—policies that the current administration opposes—
the Bush Administration has often settled such lawsuits, agreeing to rescind the challenged
administrative rules and promising to adopt the changes advocated by industry. Id. at 10,397.
These “sweetheart settlements” invariably take place behind closed doors without public
participation, administrative rulemaking, or adjudication; thus advancing industry interests
while bypassing administrative procedures and undermining environmental controls. Id. at
10,397–98. On September 2, 2005, NOAA issued revised critical habitat designations for the nine
species of Columbia Basin whose critical habitat designations had been withdrawn in 2002. 70
Fed. Reg. 52,630, 52,630–31 (Sept. 2, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 226). The 2005 critical
habitat determinations represented only about one-fifth of the critical habitat designated in
2000. See Bill Crampton & Barry Espenson, NOAA Releases Final Salmon Critical Habitat
Designations, THE COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Aug. 12, 2005 (on file with author). Whereas the 2000
critical habitat determination assessed all potentially accessible river reaches within 150 subbasins in the Northwest, the 2005 designation identified habitat more narrowly, listing only
reaches where salmon and steelhead have actually been observed, or where biologists with
expertise presumed the fish existed. NOAA regional chief Bob Lohn explained, “[t]he 2000
designations were over-inclusive . . . . We have focused very specifically on those areas that are
most important to recovery of salmon and steelhead, allowing us to most efficiently use our
resources to protect fish.” Id.
373 See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 6-76 ("The net effect of the proposed action is to
negatively impact an essential feature of designated critical habitat from 2004 through 2009.").
For Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon, the "essential features of critical habitat . . . .
under the environmental baseline are poor." Id. at 8-8. "The proposed action negatively impacts
the essential habitat feature of safe passage in the juvenile migration corridor" for Snake River
spring/summer chinook salmon. Id. at 8-7. For Snake River fall chinook salmon "essential
features of critical habitat . . . are poor under the environmental baseline . . . . The effect of the
proposed action . . . is a further degradation of the "safe passage" characteristic of the habitat in
the 2005-2009 period." Id. at 8-13. "[T]he proposed action would [also] negatively impact the
essential feature of safe passage in critical habitat [for Snake River sockeye salmon] . . . . Safe
passage and other essential features of critical habitat in the juvenile migration corridor under
the environmental baseline are poor." Id. at 8-35 to 8-36.
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destroy the critical habitat for any of the listed species.374 These conclusions
rested on the action agencies’ implementation of measures designed to
improve juvenile migration, such as aggressive hatchery, habitat restoration,
and predator-control programs, as well as removable spillway weirs.375
By assuming that the existence and operation of the FCRPS were
immutable facts, not attributable to the actions of federal agencies in its
2004 BiOp, NOAA sought to create the impression that federal agencies were
not responsible for most of the harm that continuing FCRPS operations
inflict upon listed salmon. Under the 2004 BiOp’s comparative approach and
its revolutionary definition of the environmental baseline, the action
agencies could effectively ignore whether the listed species would become
extinct. Indeed, as a result of its new interpretation of the ESA regulations,
NOAA was able to maintain the status quo for FCRPS operations, concluding
not only that the proposed federal actions would not jeopardize the
continued existence of listed Columbia Basin salmon, but that the proposed
FCRPS operations would actually benefit the listed species.376 That
implausible contention was promptly challenged in federal court.
VI. JUDICIAL REJECTION OF THE 2004 BIOP
Perhaps not surprisingly, environmentalists immediately challenged the
legality of the 2004 BiOp, claiming that the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) improperly included the existence of
the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) and allegedly
nondiscretionary dam operations in its definition of the “environmental
baseline,” and challenging the agency’s comparative approach to jeopardy.377
They also maintained that NOAA’s critical habitat determinations were
flawed, and that the agency failed to consider measures necessary for
species recovery.378 This Part first explains the standard of review the district
court employed in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries
374
375

Id. at 8-8, 8-12, 8-36.
Id. at 8-7 to 8-8, 8-12 to 8-13, 8-35 to 8-36; see supra note 256 (explaining removable

spillway weirs).
376 See id. at 8-7 (stating “beneficial actions would reduce the effect to ‘no change’ and
perhaps to a net improvement by 2010” for Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon); id. at
8-11 (stating “by 2010, various hydro improvements and non-hydro offsets would be expected to
result in improved hydro survival” for Snake River fall chinook salmon); id. at 8-16 (stating
“beneficial actions would reduce the effect to ‘no change’ and perhaps to a net improvement by
2010” for Upper Columbia River spring chinook salmon); id. at 8-25 (stating “ beneficial actions
would reduce the effect to ‘no change’ and perhaps to a net improvement by 2010” for Upper
Columbia River steelhead).
377 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *7. The plaintiffs were 15 environmental
organizations, joined by the intervening state of Oregon. The environmental groups included the
National Wildlife Federation, the Idaho Wildlife Federation, the Washington Wildlife Federation,
the Sierra Club, Trout Unlimited, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, the
Institute for Fisheries Resources, Idaho Rivers United, Idaho Steelhead and Salmon United,
Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association, Salmon for All, Columbia Riverkeeper, American
Rivers, Inc., the Federation of Fly Fishers, and the Northwest Energy Coalition. Id. at *1.
378 Id. at *7. The environmentalists also claimed that NOAA relied on faulty and unproven
scientific and commercial data, and that the agency improperly issued an incidental take
statement. Id.
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Service (NWF v. NMFS III).379 It then examines four legal flaws in the 2004
BiOp that prompted Judge Redden to invalidate it.

A. Requiring a “Reasonable Rationale” for Agency Departures from Past
Practices
In NWF v. NMFS III, Judge Redden declined to defer to NOAA’s new
interpretations of jeopardy and the environmental baseline. While
acknowledging that “[d]eference to an agency’s technical expertise and
experience is particularly warranted with respect to questions involving . . .
scientific matters,”380 the court noted that judicial deference to agency
expertise is not unlimited. As Judge Redden explained, “[w]hen an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation conflicts with its earlier interpretation, the new
[interpretation] is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a
consistently-held agency view.”381 Under these circumstances, “[t]he agency
will be required to show not only that the new policy is reasonable, but also
to provide a reasonable rationale supporting its departure from prior
practice.”382 Since NOAA’s new approach was clearly inconsistent with its
earlier BiOps, the agency needed to offer a convincing rationale for its
reinterpretation of the ESA regulations and its conclusion that the ESA did
not require consultation on any elements of a pre-existing project that are
beyond the agency’s current discretion or control.383 Like other judicial
decisions striking down abrupt administrative changes in regulatory
enforcement,384 Judge Redden found NOAA’s position untenable and
declined to defer to the agency.
379
380

Id.
Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 887 F.2d 207, 213 (9th Cir.

1989)).
381 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *5 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)).
382 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *5 (quoting Seldovia Native Ass’n, Inc. v. Lujan,
904 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990)).
383 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-1 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2003)). Section 402.03 provides:
“Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary
involvement or control.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2005). Neither the ESA nor its implementing
regulations define the term “discretionary.”
384 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983)
(“While [an] agency is entitled to change its view . . . it is obligated to explain its reasons for
doing so.”); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30
(1987) (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)) (holding that when an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation conflicts with an earlier interpretation, the new interpretation is
“entitled to considerably less deference” than a consistently-held agency view); Seldovia Native
Ass’n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Mobil Oil Co. v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 871 F.2d 149, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that an agency’s interpretation is entitled to
deference “so long as the agency acknowledges and explains the departure from its prior
views”); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1192-93 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(holding the Forest Service had an obligation to disclose and explain the basis for its decision to
eliminate Survey and Manage standards from the Northwest Forest Plan, when the agency had
previously determined that the standards were necessary to protect rare and sensitive species
on National Forest land); Moden v. U. S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1203 (D. Or.
2003) (rejecting an FWS decision to delist a sucker fish because the agency failed to adequately
explain its conclusion).

776

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 36:709

The court relied heavily on NOAA’s own section 7 consultation
handbook. Indeed, the court even referred to the “requirements” contained
in the handbook.385 Although not legally binding,386 Judge Redden considered
the handbook to be persuasive evidence of the agency’s previous and
consistently held agency interpretation of the ESA regulations.387 Because
NOAA’s new interpretation of the ESA’s jeopardy regulations was
inconsistent with the agency’s previous regulatory interpretations and
lacked a “thorough consideration” or explanation of the reasons for the
change, the court gave the new interpretation “considerably less deference”
than its prior consistently held view.388

B. The Four Fatal Flaws in the 2004 BiOp
In NWF v. NMFS III, Judge Redden agreed with four of the
environmentalists’ challenges to the 2004 BiOp. The court concluded that the

385 See NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *17 (“Both regulation § 402.02 and NOAA’s
own Consultation Handbook require that listed species be protected from any appreciable
reduction in their likelihood of recovery”) (emphasis added). As noted supra notes 161–63 and
accompanying text, The Endangered Species Consultation Handbook, jointly published by
NOAA and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in 1998, aimed to promote efficient and
consistent implementation of consultation procedures under the ESA. CONSULTATION
HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at xx–xxi.
386 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).

Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference. . . . Instead, interpretations contained in
formats such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect,’ . . . but only to the extent that
those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’

Id.
387 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *5–7. Other courts have looked to agency guidance
documents in overruling agency decisions inconsistent with previous regulatory interpretations.
See, e.g., Moden v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1204 (D. Or. 2003)
(overruling FWS’s denial of a petition to delist the sucker fish under the ESA, and noting that
FWS’s “Petition Management Guidance” manual directed the agency to determine whether a
reasonable person would view the scientific information in the petition as indicating that the
species may have achieved the recovery objectives for reclassification or delisting); Am. Rivers
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 251–52 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the Corps’
master manual on navigation allowed the Corps to consider a variety of factors, thus
“afford[ing] the Corps discretion in management of the Missouri River,” contrary to the agency’s
claim that it lacked discretion to comply with the ESA).
388 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *11. Although not explicitly mentioned in the
court’s opinion, the Supreme Court’s rationale in both Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576 (2000), and Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), supports Judge Redden’s decision,
suggesting that the consultation handbook should be “entitled to respect,” depending upon the
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. Thus, when
NOAA failed to provide a reasonable explanation in its 2004 BiOp for its departure from its
previous practices, it was no surprise that Judge Redden could look to the consultation
handbook for guidance, since the handbook thoroughly and comprehensively described the
requirements of a jeopardy analysis, requirements which NOAA itself had followed in its
previous BiOps.
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BiOp: 1) improperly segregated the elements of the proposed action NOAA
deemed to be discretionary, 2) compared, rather than aggregated, the effects
of the proposed action with the environmental baseline, 3) contained flawed
critical habitat determinations, and 4) failed to consider recovery in its
jeopardy determination.389 This Part examines the reasons the court struck
down the 2004 BiOp.

1. Segregating “Non-Discretionary” Operations from the Proposed Action
One of the most significant and contentious aspects of the 2004 BiOp’s
analytical framework was NOAA’s attempt to insulate adverse impacts that
FCRPS operations have on listed salmon from the scope of the jeopardy
analysis by characterizing certain congressionally-authorized FCRPS
operations as part of the environmental baseline.390 Despite the long history
of federal hydrosystem managers jealously guarding agency discretion in

389 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *7. Stating that each of those issues was
“independently dispositive,” the court declined to address the environmentalists’ claim that the
2004 BiOp’s incidental take statement was invalid and their challenge to scientific and
commercial data relied on by NOAA. Id. The court’s decision not to address the science and
commercial data used by NOAA was not surprising, given the difficult nature and contentious
history of the issue. As previously noted, “given the vast uncertainty and potential economic
consequences of various salmon recovery options, virtually anything anyone says about salmon
has at least some kernel of truth to it.” SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at ii. In 1994,
Judge Marsh observed:

Within this conflict are the sharply divided scientific disputes over transportation
benefits, flow-survival relationships and mortality allocation figures used by NMFS for
comparative purposes. Scientific advocates on all sides accuse each other of a lack of
sufficient scientific backing, and to this I quote the following: “[O]pportunities to save
fisheries have been squandered because of concerns for adequate data. This lesson was
clearly noted for another Pacific fishery. The California sardine fishery is a monument to
the failure to act in time, and to the insistence of having conclusive scientific evidence
before acting.”
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 892 n.18 (D. Or.
1994) (quoting Nehlsen, Williams, & Lichatowich, Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks at
Risk from California, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES NO. 2, at 16 (Mar.–Apr.
1991)). In 2000, the Independent Scientific Group, formed by the Northwest Power and
Conservation Council described the problem as:
a relative lack of evaluation of the results of biological monitoring. A significant reason
has been the lack of identified forums responsible for making evaluations and acting on
the results. Among existing groups, there has been confusion generally about the proper
roles and responsibilities of technical groups (evaluation) and policy groups
(deliberation and decision). Evaluation by technical specialists has often been derided as
improper excursions into policy formulation. Consequently, critical technical evaluations
have not been done or have not been fully incorporated into management decisions. A
clearer role is needed for technical/scientific evaluation in the pathway to management
and policy decisions.
RETURN TO THE RIVER 2000, supra note 92, at 416.
390 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-5. One of the odd implications of NOAA’s re-interpretation
of the environmental baseline is that by arguing that that the action agencies lacked discretion
in the operation of the FCRPS, NOAA and the action agencies were essentially limiting their
own authority.
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dam operations,391 NOAA now claimed that a significant portion of FCRPS
operations—for flood control, navigation, irrigation, and power generation
operations—was beyond the discretionary authority of the action agencies,
and therefore outside the scope of ESA consultation.392 NOAA argued that its
new interpretation of the environmental baseline followed from what it
called a “fundamental principle” of the section 7 consultation regulations:
“[s]ection 7 and [its regulations] apply to all actions in which there is
discretionary Federal involvement or control.”393 Judge Redden was not
persuaded, however, noting that the regulatory history of the regulations
suggested that NOAA and the FWS intended for section 7 to apply “when
some meaningful discretionary control or involvement [was] retained by an
action agency.”394 The fact that NOAA and FWS added the term

391 Indeed, the Corps’ Statement of Decision for the 2004 BiOp asserted that “[t]raditionally,
the Corps has been granted broad discretion by Congress in planning, constructing, and
operating federal water resource projects.” U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, RECORD OF
CONSULTATION AND STATEMENT OF DECISION 2 (2004), available at http://www.salmon
recovery.gov/Implementation/Army_Corps_UPA_Rod.pdf.
392 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *7; 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-5 to 5-6; see also
2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 3-1 (“[T]his Opinion covers all of the Action Agencies’ proposed
discretionary operations of the FCRPS, associated projects, and coincident mitigation actions
through 2014.”) (emphasis added). NOAA’s attempt to segregate discretionary from nondiscretionary actions was widely criticized. For example, observing that the revised 2004 BiOp
“differ[ed] markedly from the 2000 BiOp in both its analytical approach and its conclusions,”
Judge Redden expressed concern that the remand process aimed at revising the 2000 BiOp was
headed for a “train wreck.” See Barry Espenson, Judge Redden Expresses Concern About BiOp
Remand Process, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Oct. 1, 2004 (on file with author). Environmentalists
claimed that the 2004 BiOp’s reinterpretation of the environmental baseline was “driven by a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the agency action that should be the subject” of
consultation under the ESA. Plaintiffs’ Second Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 38, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-00640-RE
(D. Or. Dec. 30, 2004). The State of Oregon asserted that NOAA’s definition of the
environmental baseline failed “to provide a legal or rational basis for partitioning the existence
and non-discretionary operations of the federal action from the so-called non-discretionary
operations.” Oregon Warns it May Want to Intervene in BiOp Challenge, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL.,
Jan. 21, 2005 (quoting Oregon’s Notice of Intent to Sue) (on file with author). A spokesperson
for tribes and conservation groups decried the 2004 BiOp as the “abandonment of recovery as a
goal, and a declaration of the hydropower system as an unchangeable part of the Columbia
Basin’s natural landscape.” BiOp Reaction: Some Applaud, Others Say It’s Not Enough,
COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Dec. 3, 2004.
There were some, however, who disputed environmentalists’ assessment of the 2004
BiOp’s focus on discretionary operations. For example, the intervening BPA Customers Group
countered, “The bottom line is that the Plaintiffs are mischaracterizing what the biological
opinion does and does not do.” BPA Customers File Motion to Intervene in BiOp Case,
COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Jan. 20, 2005 (quoting Ken Canon, executive director of the Industrial
Customers of Northwest Utilities). And NOAA claimed that “where there is no agency discretion
to act, the ESA does not apply.” Fed. Defendant’s Memo. in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to NWF’s and Oregon’s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at
30, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 01-00640-RE, 2005 WL 1182723 (D.
Or. Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Def. Summ. J. Mem.] (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 1998)).
393 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-1; 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2005).
394 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 W.L. 1278878, at *8 n.6. In August 2005, three months after NWF v.
NMFS III, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. EPA,
420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the ESA to an Environmental Protection Agency decision
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“discretionary” to the final regulation in 1986 without any explanation
suggested to the court that the agencies’ silent addition of a single word was
not intended to exclude numerous congressionally authorized actions from
ESA consultation. 395
More importantly, the court thought that the statutes authorizing
FCRPS operations did not support NOAA’s new theory that the ESA
regulations insulated the action agencies from accountability because of
their alleged nondiscretionary nature.396 Even a cursory examination of the
statutes that govern the operation of the FCRPS reveals that, contrary to
NOAA’ assertions, Congress gave the Corps, BPA, and the Bureau of
Reclamation enormous discretion in managing the hydrosystem, authorizing
the agencies to operate the FCRPS to meet a wide variety of different
purposes under varying conditions.397 Indeed, the congressionally authorized
to delegate water pollution discharge permit authority to the state of Arizona). The Defenders
court noted that “an agency cannot escape its obligation to comply with the [ESA] merely
because it is bound to comply with another statute that has consistent, complementary
objectives.” Id. at 967 (quoting Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005)).
The court reasoned that the only possible source for the ESA regulation’s “discretionary . . .
involvement” qualification of all actions was the ESA’s statutory reference to actions
“‘authorized, funded, or carried out’ by the agency”, and accordingly the “discretionary . . .
involvement” regulation must be interpreted congruently with that statutory provision.
Defenders, 420 F.3d at 968. Thus, section 7(a)(2) applies where the agency in question has
continuing decision-making authority over the challenged action. Id.
395 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *8 n.6.
396 Id. at *11.
397 Id. at *9–10. In the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925, Congress jointly authorized the Corps
and the Federal Power Commission to prepare feasibility studies and estimate costs for
developing navigable the streams and tributaries of the Columbia River for the purposes of
navigation, irrigation, flood control, and water power. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925, ch. 467, §
3, 43 Stat. 1186, 1190 (1925). The Bonneville Project Act authorized the construction, operation,
and maintenance of the Bonneville Dam for the purpose of improving navigation and power
generation. Bonneville Project Act, ch. 720, 50 Stat. 731 (1937) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 832
(2000)). The Grand Coulee Dam was authorized for flood control, navigation, downstream flow
regulation, reclamation, “other beneficial uses,” and power generation as a means of generating
revenue to carry out the primary purposes. River and Harbor Act of 1935, ch. 831, § 2, 49 Stat.
1028, 1039–40. In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of the Hungry Horse Dam in
Montana for the purposes of irrigation, flood control, downstream flow regulation,
hydroelectric generation, and “other beneficial uses primarily in the State of Montana but also
in downstream areas.” Act of June 5, 1944, ch. 234, § 1, 58 Stat. 270 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 593a
(2000)). The Flood Control Act of 1944 gave the Corps to prescribe flood control and navigation
regulations at all dams constructed with federal funds. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 655, § 10,
58 Stat. 890, 891-92. In 1945, Congress authorized the four Lower Snake River dams—Ice
Harbor, Little Goose, Lower Granite, and Lower Monumental—for the purposes of navigation
and irrigation. River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 10, 21. Although power
production was not among the express purposes of the Lower Snake River dams, the Act
directed the Secretary of Interior to market any “surplus electrical energy” generated at the
dams. Id. § 2, 59 Stat. at 22. The River and Harbor Act of 1945 also authorized the construction
of the McNary Dam for navigation, power development and irrigation. Id. The Act expressly
required the McNary Dam to be operated to protect anadromous fish: “In the design,
construction, and operation of the [McNary Dam] adequate provision shall be made for the
protection of anadromous fishes.” Id. The 1945 Act also directed the FWS to conduct “studies
and surveys necessary for fish protection.” Id. In 1946, Congress authorized the construction of
the Chief Joseph Dam for purposes of navigation, irrigation, and power production. River and
Harbor Act of 1946, ch. 595, § 1, 60 Stat. 634, 637. The Flood Control Act of 1950 authorized the
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operating purposes of all fourteen FCRPS dams and water projects include
“incidental” hydroelectric power production,398 fish and wildlife protection,399
and recreation.400

construction of the Albeni Falls, Libby, Dalles, and John Day dams “for the benefit of navigation
and the control of destructive floodwaters and other purposes.” Flood Control Act of 1950, ch.
188, § 204, 64 Stat. 163, 170–79. The Flood Control Act of 1950 was included as Title II of the
River and Harbor Act of 1950. Id. § 219, 64 Stat. 184. The Dworshak Dam on Idaho’s Clearwater
River was authorized “for control of distructive [sic] floodwaters and other purposes.” Flood
Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1180, 1193.
398 The Bonneville Project Act of 1937 authorized the Corps to “construct, operate, maintain,
and improve at [the] Bonneville [Dam] such machinery, equipment, and facilities for the
generation of electric energy . . . and BPA to market “surplus” electricity.” 16 U.S.C. § 832
(2000). The Act made it clear, however, that power production is “an incident” to the dam’s
primary purpose of improving navigation. Id. § 832f; see Hydropower v. Salmon, supra note 20,
at 226–27 n.68. Bonneville Dam was a public works project, designed primarily to create jobs
during the depression. Id. at 226. Power production was merely a secondary consideration to
the project’s primary purpose of promoting economic growth by improving navigation. Id.; see
also E. KIMBARK MACCOLL, THE GROWTH OF A CITY: POWER AND POLITICS IN PORTLAND, OREGON,
1915 TO 1950, at 436–52 (1979) (describing the negotiations which led to Bonneville Dam’s
construction as a public works project and the public reaction to the project). The Grand
Coulee Dam was also a public works project, see River and Harbor Act of 1935, 1946, ch. 595, §
1, 49 Stat. at 1039–40 (authorizing the construction of Grand Coulee Dam for purposes of flood
control, improving navigation, storage, reclamation, and “other beneficial uses, and for the
generation of electric energy as a means of financially aiding and assisting such undertakings”);
see Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 20, at 227. In addition, from 1945 to 1946, Congress
authorized the development of the Ice Harbor, Little Goose, Lower Granite, Lower Monumental,
and Chief Joseph dams as a means of stabilizing the postwar economy and employing returning
soldiers when World War II ended. River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. at 22; River
and Harbor Act of 1946, ch. 585, § 1, 60 Stat. at 637; see Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 20,
at 233–34; see also S. REP. NO. 79-22, at 3, as reprinted in 1945 U.S.C.C.A.N. 666, 666 (announcing
that “the bill is a post-war planning measure”).
399 For statutes authorizing FCRPS managers to provide for fish and wildlife protection, see
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 (2000)
(outlining that “the purposes of this Act . . . are: . . . to assure the Pacific Northwest of an
adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply; . . . to protect, mitigate and enhance
the fish and wildlife, including related spawning grounds and habitat, of the Columbia River and
its tributaries, particularly anadromous fish”); and Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 661 (2000), noting:
For the purpose of recognizing the vital contribution of our wildlife resources to the
Nation, the increasing public interest and significance thereof due to expansion of our
national economy and other factors, and to provide that wildlife conservation shall
receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features of water-resource
development programs through the effectual and harmonious planning, development,
maintenance, and coordination of wildlife conservation and rehabilitation . . . .

Id.
400 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *10. For statutes authorizing FCRPS operators to
provide for recreation, see Federal Water Project Recreation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460l–12 (2000),
which declares:

It is the policy of the Congress and the intent of this Act that (a) in investigating and
planning any Federal navigation, flood control, reclamation, hydroelectric, or multiplepurpose water resource project, full consideration shall be given to the opportunities, if
any, which the project affords for outdoor recreation and for fish and wildlife
enhancement and that, wherever any such project can reasonably serve either or both of
these purposes consistently with the provisions of this part, it shall be constructed,
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The statutes authorizing the construction of the FCRPS dams and
reservoirs directed the Corps to operate ten of the projects for navigation
purposes,401 six for irrigation,402 seven for flood control,403 and two for water
quality purposes.404 In none of these statutes did Congress supply any
specific operating directions. Moreover, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act405 stipulated that “wildlife conservation shall receive equal consideration”
in the operation of the FCRPS for water-resource development,406 and the
Northwest Power Act of 1980407 placed fish and wildlife on an “equal footing”
with power production.408

operated, and maintained accordingly . . . .

Id. The Flood Control Act of 1944 also provides for recreation, stating:
In connection with the exercise of jurisdiction over the rivers of the Nation through the
construction of works of improvement, for navigation or flood control, as herein
authorized, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to recognize the
interests and rights of the States in determining the development of the watersheds
within their borders and likewise their interests and rights in water utilization and
control, as herein authorized to preserve and protect to the fullest possible extent
established and potential uses, for all purposes, of the waters of the Nation’s rivers . . . .
Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887, 887–88.
401 See, e.g., Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (authorizing the completion,
maintenance, and operation of the Bonneville Dam, locks, power plant, and appurtenant works
for the purpose of improving navigation); River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 10,
21–22 (authorizing the McNary, Lower Granite, Little Goose, Lower Monumental, and Ice
Harbor dams for navigation); River and Harbor Act of 1946, ch. 595, § 1, 60 Stat. 634, 637
(authorizing Chief Joseph Dam for navigation purposes); Flood Control Act of 1950, ch. 188,
§ 204, 64 Stat. 163, 170–79 (authorizing Libby, The Dalles, John Day, and Albeni Falls dams for
navigation purposes).
402 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *10; see also Act of June 5, 1944, ch. 234, § 1, 58
Stat. 270 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 593a (2000)) (authorizing the Hungry Horse Dam for irrigation);
River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 10, 21–22 (authorizing the McNary, Lower
Granite, Little Goose, Lower Monumental, and Ice Harbor dams for irrigation).
403 See River and Harbor Act of 1935, ch. 831, § 2, 49 Stat. 1028, 1039–40 (authorizing Grand
Coulee Dam for flood control purposes); Act of June 5, 1944, ch. 234, § 1, 58 Stat. 270 (codified
at 43 U.S.C. § 593a (2000)) (authorizing Hungry Horse Dam for flood control); Flood Control Act
of 1950, ch. 188, § 204, 64 Stat. 163, 170–79 (authorizing Libby, The Dalles, John Day, and Albeni
Falls dams for flood control purposes); Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat.
1180, 1193 (authorizing Dworshak Dam for flood control).
404 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *10.
405 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661–666c (2000).
406 Id. § 661.
407 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. §§
839–839h (2000).
408 See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-976, at 57 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989) (construing the statute to place “fish and wildlife concerns on an equal
footing with power production”). The Northwest Power Act directs the federal agencies
responsible for managing and operating the FCRPS to:
[E]xercise such responsibilities consistent with the purposes of this Act and other
applicable laws, to adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife, including
related spawning grounds and habitat, affected by such projects or facilities in a manner
that provides equitable treatment for fish and wildlife with the other purposes for which
the system and facilities are managed and operated . . . .
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In no statute did Congress ever tell dam operators how to operate the
FCRPS. Indeed, it would be difficult for Congress to do so, since it is
institutionally incapable of operating a dam. Although there may be conflicts
among the authorized purposes of the FCRPS, nothing suggests Congress
intended to limit agency discretion in balancing these conflicts.409 On the
contrary, each of the projects’ authorizing legislation included open-ended
directives to operate the dams for “other purposes” or “other beneficial
uses,” suggesting that hydrosystem operators have considerable discretion
to operate the FCRPS for the benefit of listed fish.410 Further, McNary Dam’s
authorizing legislation, which expressly calls for the protection of
anadromous fish411—along with considerable other legislative history412—
evinces congressional solicitude for operating the FCRPS dams to avoid the
negative effects of the FCRPS on salmon. The multiple, and sometimes
conflicting, purposes for which Congress authorized the dams led Judge
Redden to conclude that the FCRPS operating agencies “have considerable
discretion in their administration of the systems, allowing them to meet their

Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i) (2000). For a discussion of the litigation
over the meaning of the obligation to give fish and wildlife “equitable treatment,” see Blumm,
supra note 31, at 136–41.
409 See Hydropower v. Salmon, supra note 20, at 248.
410 Id.
411 See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 10, 22 (requiring that “[i]n the
design, construction, and operation of the [McNary Dam, originally known as the Umatilla Dam]
adequate provision shall be made for the protection of anadromous fishes [sic] by affording free
access to their natural spawning grounds or by other appropriate means”). The Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1945 might have been interpreted to establish a federal policy of requiring dam
operations to provide maximum fish passage and favoring improvements in natural spawning
habitat rather than hatchery production, but federal dam operators never construed the statute
in that way. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 97.
412 See H.R. DOC. NO. 87-403, at 313 (2d Sess. 1962) (indicating that some of the storage water
at Dworshak Dam was to be released to improve downstream flow conditions for fish migration
in order to mitigate the loss of spawning grounds inundated by the reservoir); S. REP. NO. 78862, at 1–4 (2d Sess. 1944), as reprinted in 1944 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1133–35 (contemplating the
use of Hungry Horse Dam for multiple purposes); H.R. DOC. NO. 81-531, app. P, at 2901 (2d Sess.
1950) (requiring that “[m]inimum flows for fish life should be provided at all times in the river
below the [Hungry Horse] dam, and all diversions should be screened.”); S. RES. 75-113 (1st
Sess. 1937) (directing the Commissioner of Fisheries to assess the effect of the Bonneville Dam
on the propagation of the Columbia’s salmon fishery and to recommend measures “to attain the
full conservation of such fish and the preservation of the fishing industry on” the Columbia
River); S. REP. NO. 85-1981, at 5 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3446, 3450 (noting that
equal consideration provision of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act “would have the effects
of putting fish and wildlife on the basis of equality with flood control, irrigation, navigation, and
hydroelectric power in our water resource program . . . .”); see also Hydropower v. Salmon,
supra note 20, at 248. On several occasions, Congress has expressed concern about the status of
anadromous fish in the Columbia Basin. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-308, §
8(a)(2), 92 Stat. 358, 359 (declaring that “[t]he vitality of the Columbia River estuary and marine
environment is crucial to the maintenance and enhancement of major fishery resources for the
enjoyment and livelihood of present and future generations”); Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (2000) (directing the Administrator
of the Bonneville Power Administration to use BPA to “protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and
wildlife to the extent affected by the development and operation of any hydroelectric project of
the Columbia River and its tributaries in a manner consistent with the plan” developed by the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council).
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mandates and yet adjust operations to fulfill multiple purposes.”413
Accommodating the divergent interests and balancing the multiple purposes
of the FCRPS projects clearly involves making difficult choices and
exercising considerable administrative discretion.414
Judge Redden also concluded that ESA case law lent no support to
NOAA’s attempt to segregate congressionally authorized operations from its
jeopardy analysis.415 For example, in American Rivers v. Corps of
Engineers,416 the District Court for the District of Columbia addressed an
almost identical issue and rejected an argument that the Flood Control Act
deprived the Corps of its discretion in its management of the Missouri River
Basin.417 That court held that “if an agency has any statutory discretion over
the action in question, that agency has the authority, and thus the
responsibility, to comply with the ESA.”418 In a related case, the District
Court of Minnesota ruled that while Congress authorized the Corps to
manage the Missouri River for multiple purposes—including flood control,
irrigation, power, navigation, wildlife, and recreation—the Corps’
prioritization of those interests was discretionary, and therefore the Corps
was not exempt from the ESA.419
NOAA’s attempt to segregate the alleged nondiscretionary effects of the
existence of the FCRPS from the discretionary effects of the proposed
action appeared to be an attempt to take advantage of the Ninth Circuit’s
2004 decision in National Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers (NWF v. USACE),420 a case in which environmentalists
unsuccessfully claimed that the Corps’ operation of four Lower Snake River
dams violated the Clean Water Act (CWA)421 by causing excessive water
temperatures.422 Although the Corps acknowledged that the construction and
existence of the dams contributed to a shift in the temperature regime of the
Snake River, the agency maintained that it had already implemented several
413

NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 W.L. 1278878, at *10 (D. Or. May

26, 2005).
414 Id.
415 Id. Although not specifically mentioned by the court, NOAA’s new regulatory
interpretation conflicted with the Oregon District Court’s rejection of NOAA’s existence versus
operations argument in IDFG v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. 886, 894 (D. Or. 1994), where Judge Marsh
noted “[t]he idea that the dams are immutable and uncontrollable like the weather ignores
decades of fish protection improvements (such as bypass facilities and ladders) and other
structural and operational enhancements.”
416 271 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2003).
417 Id. at 251.
418 Id. The American Rivers court also noted that the Corps’ master manual on navigation
allowed the Corps to consider a variety of factors in the management of the river, and thus
afforded the Corps wide discretion. Id. at 251–52. Similarly, Judge Redden turned to NOAA’s
consultation handbook to support his conclusion that the action agencies have considerable
latitude in their management of the FCRPS. See supra notes 385–88, and accompanying text.
419 In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., No. 03-MD-1555(PAM), 2004 WL 1402563, at
*3–4 (D. Minn., June 21, 2004).
420 384 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2004).
421 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
422 NWF v. USACE, 384 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2004). The Corps operates four dams on the
Lower Snake River: Ice Harbor, Lower Monumental, Little Goose, and Lower Granite. Id. at
1166.
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actions to help alleviate adverse water temperatures and claimed that there
were no operational changes—short of removing the dams, which would
require congressional approval—that the agency could implement to
significantly reduce water temperatures.423 The court concluded that the
Corps had reasonably determined that the existence of the dams, rather than
any discretionary dam operations, caused the excessive water temperatures
in the Snake River. Since there were no additional feasible steps the Corps
could take to decrease water temperatures short of removing the dams, the
court refused to hold the agency in violation of the CWA for its failure to
meet state water quality standards.424 The court opined that dam removal
was inconsistent with the congressional mandate to build and operate the
dams, and thus beyond the Corps’ authority.425
NOAA used the NWF v. USACE court’s “existence versus operations”
distinction to argue that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling supported its decision to
“limit [its ESA] consultation to the discretionary actions in the operations of
the dams and consider[] the non-discretionary aspects of those operations
[as part of] the Environmental Baseline.”426 Judge Redden rejected that
argument, distinguishing NWF v. USACE on its facts,427 concluding that the
decision did not relieve NOAA of its duty to consult on the entirety of its
proposed action under the ESA.428

423
424
425

Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1178–79.
Id. at 1180. According to the Ninth Circuit, the CWA and the 1945 Rivers and Harbors Act,

which authorized the construction and operation of the Lower Snake River dams, had to be
read consistently with each other. Id. at 1178. The net effect of the decision was to provide what
appeared to be an implicit judicial exemption from the CWA, despite the fact that the statute
contains an express presidential exemption for water projects, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000),
which might have been interpreted to be the exclusive means of relief.
426 Def. Summ. J. Mem., supra note 392, at 33.
427 NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 W.L. 1278878, at *11. Judge
Redden noted that, unlike the Corps in NWF v. USACE, NOAA never asserted that “the sole
cause” of salmon and steelhead decline in the Columbia Basin was “the existence of the dams
and not any discretionary method of operating” the dams. Id. In addition, NOAA did not claim
that there were “no operational changes” that could be taken to protect endangered salmon. Id.
(citing NWF v. USACE, 384 F.3d at 1169). Moreover, NWF v. USACE involved compliance with
state water quality standards required by the CWA, whereas NWF v. NMFS III turned on NOAA’s
contention that certain congressionally authorized federal actions were exempt from ESA
requirements. NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 W.L. 1278878, at *11.
Note that NOAA did not claim that all congressionally authorized FCRPS operations,
including those designed to protect fish and wildlife, water quality, and provide for recreation,
were ESA exempt, but that only some congressionally authorized operations, namely
hydroelectric power, navigation, flood control, and irrigation, were more “non-discretionary”
than other congressionally mandated purposes of the FCRPS, and thus exempt from
consultation. At the same time, NOAA was forced to admit that it was unable to define the limits
of the action agencies’ discretionary operational authority, “given all of the various possible
permutations of the FCRPS.” 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-5, 5-8. Indeed, NOAA’s decision to
characterize some congressionally authorized operations of the FCRPS as mandatory, and thus
non-discretionary, while categorizing others as discretionary, suggested that the action agencies
have considerable discretion in how they interpret the statutory authorities governing the
FCRPS.
428 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 W.L. 1278878, at *11.
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Judge Redden recognized that the effect of NOAA’s new interpretation
of agency actions subject to consultation was to create an administrative
exemption from section 7 consultation far broader than the only statutory
exemption expressly created by Congress in the ESA.429 According to the
court, this administrative exemption was sweeping, potentially insulating
federal proposals from the ESA’s consultation requirements simply by
characterizing certain activities, however lethal, as “non-discretionary.”430
The judge observed that if Congress had intended to provide such a farreaching exemption, it would have done so expressly, so he ruled that such
an administrative exemption conflicted with the structure, purpose, and
policy of the ESA.431

429 Id. Under the ESA, where the agency cannot insure that an action is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered or threatened species or results in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat, the agency may apply to the Endangered Species
Committee for an exemption from the requirements of the ESA. Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(2) (2000). Also known as the “God Squad,” the Endangered Species
Committee is composed of at least seven members: The Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary
of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Administer of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and one individual, appointed by the President, from each state affected by the
proposed exemption. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3)(A)–(G). The Endangered Species Committee is
known as the God Squad because it is the “ultimate arbiter of the fate of an endangered
species.” Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1537, as
amended, 988 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1993). To create an exemption, the Endangered Species
Committee must conclude that 1) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
proposed action; 2) the action is of regional or national significance; 3) the benefits of
alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species are clearly outweighed by
the benefits of the action; and 4) the agency has not made any irretrievable or irreversible
commitments of resources with respect to the agency action. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iv).
In granting an exemption, the committee can also require the agency to implement “reasonable
mitigation and enhancement measures.” Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B).
430 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *11. In addition, the court noted that NOAA’s
interpretation would result in a jeopardy analysis that “ignore[d] the reality of past, present, and
future effects of federal actions” and would almost always limit the consultation to only a part
of the proposed action. Id.
431 Id. NWF v. NMFS III never addressed the short-term “emergency” exemption tucked into
the action agencies’ proposed action, authorizing FCRPS operators to deviate from the
proposed action and the 2004 BiOp’s prescriptions. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, & BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., FINAL UPDATED PROPOSED ACTION FOR THE FCRPS
BIOLOGICAL OPINION REMAND 19 (Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter FINAL UPDATED PROPOSED ACTION].
The broad exemption stated:

[a]s anticipated in the 2000 BiOp, operators may have to interrupt or adjust water
management actions in response to unforeseeable power system, flood control, or other
emergencies. . . . During winter power emergencies, . . . hydrosystem operators may draft
water from reservoirs that they otherwise would hold for spring and summer flow
augmentation. . . . Similarly, during summer emergencies, the federal hydrosystem
operators may draft storage reservoirs below biological opinion draft limits, or reduce
bypass spill for fish.

Id. Like the 2000 BiOp’s emergency exemption, the 2004 emergency exemption made no attempt
to define what might constitute an emergency. 2000 BIOP, supra note 8, at 9-62 (describing the
emergency exemption); FINAL UPDATED PROPOSED ACTION, supra, at 19; see Avoiding Dam
Breaching, supra note 97, at 260, 279, 288–92 (arguing that the emergency exemption in the 2000
BiOp violated the ESA. Nor does the exemption require the action agencies to consult with
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The court also ruled that NOAA’s reinterpretation of the environmental
baseline conflicted with longstanding practices in previous BiOps over ten
years. 432 In the absence of a reasonable rationale for this departure from its
previous analytical approach, NOAA’s new interpretation was “entitled to
considerably less deference than its consistently-held agency view.”433 Thus,
in order to comply with the ESA, NOAA had to consult on all actions in
which the action agencies possessed “meaningful discretion” in FCRPS
operations.434

2. The Comparative vs. Aggregative Approaches to Jeopardy
The error in NOAA’s improper segregation of allegedly
nondiscretionary FCRPS operations from its jeopardy analysis was
compounded, according to Judge Redden, by the agency’s comparative
approach to jeopardy.435 Instead of examining the effects of the proposed
action in conjunction with the environmental baseline, as it had in previous
BiOps, the 2004 BiOp merely compared the proposed action, which now

NOAA prior to declaring an emergency. Id.
Remarkably, the 2004 BiOp failed to mention the emergency exemption included in the
proposed action. Even had NOAA analyzed the effects of emergency exemption, Judge
Redden’s treatment of NOAA’s de facto ESA exemption for so-called nondiscretionary
operations from the jeopardy analysis suggested that the emergency exemption also violated
the ESA, since the emergency exemption gives the action agencies a license to unilaterally
avoid the 2004 BiOp’s spill and flow prescriptions. Avoiding Dam Breaching, supra note 97, at
292.
432 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *11.
433 Id. (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)).
434 Id. at *9 (“I hold that NOAA must consult on the entire proposed action if the action
agencies have meaningful discretion to operate the dams in a manner that complies with the
ESA.”). As noted above, see supra note 425, the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Defenders of
Wildlife v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 420 F.3d 946, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2005), holding
that section 7 applies where the agency in question has continuing decision-making authority
over the challenged action, suggests that the Ninth Circuit should affirm Judge Redden’s
interpretation of the ESA regulations to require federal dam operators to comply with the
section 7 consultation procedures for all FCRPS operations where the action agencies have
“meaningful discretion.” See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Washington Toxics Coalition v. Environmental
Protection Agency (Washington Toxics), 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005), also indicates that Judge
Redden’s decision should be affirmed. In Washington Toxics, environmentalists challenged an
EPA decision to register several pesticide ingredients under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) without undergoing section 7 consultations. Id. at 1028. Although
NOAA had determined that pesticides may kill or injure listed salmonids, EPA argued that only
FIFRA—not the ESA—governed the registration of pesticides, and that the agency was bound
to follow only the limited provisions dealing with endangered species in FIFRA. Id. at 1031. The
Ninth Circuit rejected EPA’s argument, holding that “an agency cannot escape its obligation to
comply with the ESA merely because it is bound to comply with another statute that has
consistent, complementary objectives.” Id. at 1032. Although the court acknowledged that
FIFRA’s goal of ensuring that pesticides present no unreasonable risk to people or the
environment, and the ESA’s goal of protecting listed species were distinct, it observed that the
two statutes served complimentary purposes. Id. Because EPA has a continuing discretionary
authority to register, alter, and cancel pesticide registrations, the court concluded that the
agency also had a continuing obligation to follow the requirements of the ESA. Id. at 1033.
435 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *13–14.
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consisted primarily of fish passage improvements, to other federal actions it
chose to characterize as part of the environmental baseline.436 According to
the court, this comparative approach to the jeopardy analysis evaluated only
“a portion of the impacts properly attributable to” the operation of the
FCRPS—the discretionary effects of the proposed action—and effectively
ignored all the adverse effects occurring under the agency’s expansive
definition of the environmental baseline.437 Not only did the 2004 BiOp’s new
comparative approach to jeopardy depart significantly from earlier BiOps, it
conflicted with the language of the ESA consultation regulations438 as well as
the agency’s own consultation handbook,439 both of which contemplated an
aggregation approach to the jeopardy analysis.440

436
437
438

Id. at *13.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *12. During section 7 consultation, the consulting agency must “[e]valuate the

effects of the action and cumulative effects on the listed species or critical habitat” and
determine “whether the action taken together with cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
critical habitat.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)–(4) (2002). The “effects of the action” include the
“direct and indirect effects of an action on the species or critical habitat, together with the
effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with that action, that will be
added to the environmental baseline.” Id. § 402.02.
439 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *12; see CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 139,
at 4-35. “In determining whether an action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
species, the action is viewed against the aggregate effects of everything that has led to the
species’ current status and, for non-Federal activities, those things likely to affect the species in
the future.” Id. at 4-36.
In the majority of cases, a jeopardy opinion is rendered when the total of the species’
status, environmental baseline, effects of the proposed action, and cumulative effects
lead to the conclusion that the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of the entire species, subspecies, or vertebrate population as listed.

Id. See also id. at 4-31 stating:
The conclusion section presents the Services’ opinion regarding whether the aggregate
effects of the factors analyzed under ‘environmental baseline,’ ‘effects of the action,’ and
‘cumulative effects’ in the action area—when viewed against the status of the species or
critical habitat as listed or designated—are likely to jeopardize the continued existence

of the species or result in destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.
Id.
440 NOAA argued that to interpret the consultation regulations to require it to aggregate the
impacts of the action with the adverse effects of the environmental baseline could lead to an
“absurd result”—a situation where an impaired environmental baseline would result in a
jeopardy finding even if the proposed action had beneficial effects, but where the benefits might
be insufficient to overcome the impaired baseline. NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *12.
Judge Redden found that argument unpersuasive, noting that such a “hypothetical situation”
was not before the court, and that there was no real dispute that ongoing FCRPS operations
were killing listed salmon. Id. In any event, the ESA regulations provide federal agencies with
an exception from the requirements of formal consultation if during the course of a biological
assessment or informal consultation the “[f]ederal agency determines, with the written
concurrence [of the relevant consultation agency (NOAA or the Fish and Wildlife Service)] that
the proposed action is not likely to adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat.” 50
C.F.R. § 402.14(b)(1) (2004). In other words, if NOAA believes that an action will be beneficial
to a listed species and determines that it is “not likely to adversely affect” the species or its
habitat, the consultation process comes to an end. Id. §§ 402.13(a), 402.14(b)(1). The
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Noting that other courts have rejected NOAA’s comparative approach,441
Judge Redden concluded that it was “insufficiently comprehensive” to
satisfy the statutory directive to “insure” that any action carried out by a
federal agency is “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of a
listed species.442 When combined with NOAA’s attempt to segregate
nondiscretionary actions from the scope of the jeopardy analysis, the 2004
BiOp’s new comparative approach to jeopardy allowed the agency to
conclude that the proposed operations would not jeopardize the continued
existence of listed salmon, even if the species were likely to become extinct
due to the agency’s new, expansive definition of environmental baseline
actions that are exempt from consultation. Since the 2004 BiOp’s
comparative approach represented a significant departure from NOAA’s
previous interpretations of the ESA consultation regulations—as reflected in
previous BiOps and in NOAA’s consultation handbook—the court was
unwilling to give great deference to NOAA’s novel interpretation of the
regulations.443

regulations also allow the agency to avoid formal consultation “if a preliminary biological
opinion, issued after early consultation under § 402.11, is confirmed as the final biological
opinion.” Id. § 402.14(b)(2).
441 For example, in Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D. Or. 2001),
Klamath Basin irrigators challenged a decision by the United States Bureau of Reclamation to
halt irrigation water deliveries to protect listed coho salmon in accordance with a biological
opinion for the Klamath Reclamation Project, arguing that the ESA required FWS and NOAA to
compare only the proposed action to the environmental baseline to determine the actual effects
of the project, but the court rejected that argument, holding that:
all human activities that impact the listed species must be considered in the
environmental baseline. . . . The effects of the proposed action are then addressed ‘in
conjunction with the impacts that constitute the baseline.’ The environmental baseline is
part of the entire ‘effects of the action’ on the listed species or habitat that must be
considered, rather than some concrete standard or condition to which other standards or
conditions are compared.

Id. at 1208 (emphasis added) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 12728 (D.D.C. 2001)). The Defenders court held that a BiOp “must also include an analysis of the
effects of the action on the species when added to the environmental baseline—in other words,
an analysis of the total impact on the species.” Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d
121, 128 (D.D.C. 2001). Although the issue in Defenders was the federal government’s treatment
of cumulative impacts, and the court in Kandra was not squarely presented with the issue of
whether an agency must aggregate rather than compare the effects of an action with the
environmental baseline, both decisions interpreted the same ESA regulation to require federal
agencies to address the effects of the action in conjunction with the impacts of the
environmental baseline in a BiOp. Id. at 127–28.
442 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *14 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000)).
443 Id. (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
n.30 (1987)). In 2005, NOAA and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) issued a biological
opinion addressing the effects of BOR's operation of twelve water projects above the Hells
Canyon Complex dams on the Upper Snake River on ESA-listed salmon that occupy habitat in
the Lower Snake and Columbia Rivers. See Am. Rivers, Inc. v. NOAA Fisheries, No. 04-00061,
2006 WL 1455629, at *1 (D. Or. May 23, 2006). Although BOR's Upper Snake projects are
operated primarily for irrigation purposes, the projects serve multiple purposes, including flood
control, limited hydroelectric power generation, recreation, and fish and wildlife conservation.
Id. at *2. BOR's Upper Snake projects deplete annual flows below the Hells Canyon dams by
approximately 2 million acre-feet, contributing to juvenile salmon mortality in the Lower Snake
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3. Flawed Critical Habitat Determinations
The court also concluded that the 2004 BiOp’s analysis failed to
adequately analyze whether the proposed action would destroy or adversely
modify critical habitat necessary for both salmon survival and recovery.444 In
and Columbia Rivers by increasing water temperatures, decreasing water quality, and
potentially disrupting the migration cycle of some species of juvenile salmon. Id. Despite the
biological relationship between water use in the Upper Snake River and water quality and
quantity in the Lower Snake and Columbia Rivers, NOAA decided to segment BOR's Upper
Snake River operations from the downstream FCRPS operations for ESA consultation purposes
and prepared two separate biological opinions—both of which concluded the actions would not
jeopardize listed species. Id. at *2–3.
In Am. Rivers, Inc. v. NOAA Fisheries, environmentalists and salmon fishermen
challenged that conclusion, arguing that—like the earlier 2004 FCRPS BiOp—the 2005 Upper
Snake River BiOp arbitrarily separated non-discretionary federal actions from discretionary
actions, focusing only on whether BOR's discretionary operations in the Upper Snake River
would jeopardize ESA listed salmon when compared to the environmental baseline, which
included effects of the FCRPS. Id. at *5–6. In addition, the environmentalists argued that NOAA
and BOR abused their discretion by segmenting BOR's operations in the Upper Snake River
from the downstream FCRPS operations. Id. at *3. In May 2006, Judge Redden struck down the
Upper Snake River BiOp, concluding that NOAA's jeopardy analysis violated the ESA because it
was based on the same flawed comparative analysis that NOAA used in the 2004 FCRPS BiOp.
Id. at *5–6. NOAA's decision to segment BOR's Upper Snake River operations from the
downstream FCRPS operations
crystalize[d] the need for a comprehensive approach to the jeopardy analysis. If NOAA
segments the Columbia and Snake River Basin into two separate actions . . . and uses a
comparative analysis, the agencies effectively preclude any jeopardy conclusion, as each
agency will be able to conclude that its action is not jeopardizing listed species when
compared to the environmental baseline, which of course includes the operations of the
other agency and vice versa. In essence, each agency ends up pointing their finger at the
other, while ignoring the needs of listed Columbia and Snake River salmon and
steelhead.

Id. at *5.
Although the court invalidated the Upper Snake River BiOp because it improperly
compared the effects of BOR's proposed action to the environmental baseline rather than
aggregating those effects, Judge Redden concluded that neither the ESA nor its regulations
required NOAA to prepare a single biological opinion encompassing both BOR's Upper Snake
River operations and the FCRPS operations, id. at *11, since BOR's Upper Snake River
operations and the FCRPS dams were not a single agency action. Id. at *7–8. In addition, the
federal actions were not "interrelated or interdependent" within the meaning of ESA regulations
or the Ninth Circuit case law interpreting those regulations. Id. at *8–9. The court noted that
although a single comprehensive biological opinion would be "more likely to achieve the
comprehensive analysis required by the ESA," the court could not conclude that NOAA's
decision to conduct two biological opinions was an abuse of discretion, so long as the separate
biological opinions considered the effects of the respective federal actions and the
environmental baseline in the aggregate, the agencies could produce the kind of comprehensive
analysis required by the ESA. Id. at *10. To help ensure such a result, Judge Redden combined
FCRPS and Upper Snake River BiOp remands. Id. at *11.
444 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *15. Under the ESA, federal agencies must ensure
that any actions authorized, funded, or carried out by the agency are not likely to result in the
“destruction or adverse modification” of a listed species’ critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(2000). The statute defines “critical habitat” to include “the specific areas within the
geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . on which are found those
physical or biological features . . . essential to the conservation of the species.” Id.
§ 1532(5)(A)(i).
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the 2004 BiOp, NOAA simply evaluated the effects of the proposed FCRPS
operations on critical habitat necessary for survival.445 According to Judge
Redden, this interpretation was inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 2004
decision in Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife
Service,446 requiring federal agencies to consider the effect of the proposed
actions on critical habitat necessary for salmon recovery as well as
survival.447 Although Judge Redden could have interpreted the Gifford
Pinchot decision narrowly—that is, as limited to the regulatory definition of
“destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat”448—he concluded
that Gifford Pinchot required recovery consideration in all section 7
consultations.449
NOAA also failed to provide a reasonable rationale for concluding that
the proposed action would not “appreciably reduce” the value of the listed
species’ already degraded critical habitat.450 Despite evidence of the
desperate current condition of the species and its critical habitat,451 NOAA
445 See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 1-12 (“If . . . NOAA Fisheries determines that the
proposed action would either not affect or would result in a net improvement in survival or
[critical] habitat condition for a given ESU, NOAA Fisheries would then conclude that the
action is not likely to jeopardize that ESU or adversely modify critical habitat.”).
446 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004).
447 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *15. In Gifford Pinchot, the court struck down the
Fish and Wildlife’s regulatory definition of “destruction of adverse modification” because it
effectively read the ESA’s recovery goal out of the “adverse modification” inquiry. Gifford
Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069–70. The Ninth Circuit observed that under the agency’s interpretation
of the regulation,

FWS could authorize the complete elimination of critical habitat necessary only for
recovery, and so long as the smaller amount of critical habitat necessary for survival is
not appreciably diminished, then no “destruction or adverse modification,” as defined by
the regulation, has taken place. This cannot be right. If the FWS follows its own
regulation, then it is obligated to be indifferent to, if not to ignore, the recovery goal of
critical habitat.

Id. at 1069–70. Judge Redden noted that Gifford Pinchot “requires NOAA to determine
separately whether the proposed action would destroy or adversely modify critical habitat
necessary for the recovery, as well as the survival, of the listed species.” NWF v. NMFS III, 2005
WL 1278878, at *15.
448 The ESA regulations define “destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat as “a
direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the
survival and recovery of a listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
449 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *15.
450 The 2004 BiOp stated that “[s]afe passage and other essential features of critical habitat
in the juvenile migration corridor under the environmental baseline are poor” for all three listed
salmon species with designated critical habitat. 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 8-8 (Snake River
spring/summer chinook); id. at 8-13 (Snake River fall chinook); id. at 8-36 (Snake River
sockeye).
451 In 2003, NOAA’s Biological Review Team (BRT) concluded that Snake River sockeye are
in danger of extinction and that the fall and spring/summer chinook are likely to become
endangered. See W. COAST BIOLOGICAL REV. TEAM, UPDATED STATUS OF FEDERALLY LISTED ESUS
WEST
COAST
SALMON
AND
STEELHEAD
5
(July
2003),
available
at
OF
http://santacruz.nmfs.noaa.gov/files/pubs/oo748.pdf [hereinafter BIOLOGICAL REVIEW TEAM]
(“The BRT was unanimous in their assessment of [the Snake River sockeye]: 100% of the
likelihood votes were in the ‘danger of extinction’ category.”); id. at 143 (“About two-thirds
(68%) of the BRT votes for [the Snake River spring/summer chinook] fell in the ‘likely to
become endangered’ category.”); id. (“A majority (60%) of the BRT votes for [the Snake River
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asserted that the proposed FCRPS operations would not adversely modify or
destroy any designated critical habitat.452 Although the agency acknowledged
that the proposed operations would produce a “significant” reduction in safe
passage—an “essential feature” of critical habitat453—the 2004 BiOp
maintained that proposed fish passage improvements, such as the
installation of removable spillway weirs,454 predatory control measures, and
improved estuarine shelter and hatchery operations, would eventually result
in net improvements to the listed species’ critical habitat by 2014.455
NOAA’s outlook was unrealistically optimistic. The agency failed to
analyze the significant degradation of the listed species’ already poor habitat
in the context of the life cycles and migration patterns of the three species
with designated critical habitat.456 Judge Redden concluded that this failure
was inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pacific Coast

Federation of Fishermen’s Associations v. National Marine Fisheries Service
(PCFFA),457 which struck down a NMFS BiOp that assumed the adverse
effects of a proposed logging operation on critical habitat would be
inconsequential unless those impacts persisted for more than a decade
because the agency failed to consider the likelihood of species survival and
recovery during the short-term.458 In NWF v. NMFS III, Judge Redden
confirmed that agencies cannot simply ignore a proposed action’s short-term
adverse effects while awaiting uncertain and speculative long-term
improvements to critical habitat.459

fall chinook] fell in the ‘likely to become endangered’ category.”).
452 See 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 8-8 (Snake River spring/summer chinook); id. at 8-14
(Snake River fall chinook); id. at 8-36 (Snake River sockeye).
453 Id. at 6-76, 8-12, 8-35. NOAA concluded that “[t]he magnitude of the reduction in safe
passage [for Snake River spring/summer chinook] (relative to the reference operation) during
the first five years is significant.” Id. at 8-7; see also id. at 8-12 (“[T]he ‘safe passage’ essential
feature in the [Snake River fall chinook] juvenile migration corridor . . . would be negatively
altered, compared to the reference operation . . . .”); id. at 8-35 (“[T]he proposed action would
negatively impact the essential feature of safe passage in critical habitat [for Snake River
sockeye] . . . between 2005 and 2009 . . . .”). Remarkably, although NOAA acknowledged that
safe juvenile salmon passage at the dams was an “essential feature” of critical habitat, and that
spill provides a “safer route of passage than other routes,” spill rates in the proposed action
were lower than those in the reference operation. Id. at 6-61, 6-76; see NWF v. NMFS III, 2005
WL 1278878, at *15.
454 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *15; 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-11, 6-16, 6-59, 660 to 6-62. For a discussion of removable spillway weirs, see supra note 256.
455 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *16; see also 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 6-62 to 676, 6-84 to 6-88, 6-134 to 6-136 (calling for predator control measures, improvements in access to
rearing habitat, installation of removable spillway weirs, purchasing and leasing in-stream
flows, and hatchery improvements for Snake River spring/summer chinook, Snake River fall
chinook, and Snake River sockeye critical habitat).
456 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *16.
457 265 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2001).
458 Id. at 1037–38.
459 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *16. Echoing his 2003 opinion invalidating the 2000
BiOp because it improperly relied on uncertain future actions, see supra note 339 and
accompanying text, Judge Redden observed that NOAA improperly relied on uncertain longterm improvements to critical habitat to offset the short-term degradation that NOAA
acknowledged would occur as a result of the proposed action. The action agencies had made no
commitments to installing expensive removable spillway weirs, and NOAA was, at best,
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4. NOAA’s Omission of Recovery from the Jeopardy Analysis
Like the 2004 BiOp’s critical habitat determinations, NOAA’s jeopardy
analysis was inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Gifford
Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service460 because it
failed to address the prospects for recovery of the listed species.461 As
previously noted,462 in Gifford Pinchot, the court struck down the regulatory
definition of “destruction or adverse modification”463 of critical habitat
because that definition would allow FWS to completely eliminate critical
habitat necessary for recovery, so long as the amount of critical habitat
necessary for survival was not appreciably diminished.464 Similarly, the 2004
BiOp’s revised interpretation of the jeopardy regulations465 impermissibly
permitted NOAA to ignore the ESA’s goal of recovery, on the ground that the
proposed action was not reasonably expected to appreciably reduce the
reproduction, number, or distribution of listed salmon.466
The Gifford Pinchot court observed that “[b]ecause it is logical and
inevitable that a species requires more critical habitat for recovery than is
necessary for the species survival, the [FWS] regulation’s singular focus
becomes ‘survival.’”467 The same was true of NOAA’s interpretation of the
jeopardy regulation. A species requires more productivity, greater
abundance, and a wider distribution for recovery than for survival. Thus,
NOAA’s narrow focus on whether the proposed operations would result in a
net loss of productivity, numbers, or distribution ignored the more relevant
question: whether the proposed action reduced the likelihood of salmon
recovery in the Columbia Basin. Consistent with the Gifford Pinchot court’s
observation that Congress intended for survival and conservation to be two
distinct, yet complementary, goals of the ESA,468 Judge Redden ruled that

uncertain as to whether the long-term habitat improvements it proposed would in fact mitigate
the short-term adverse effects on critical habitat. Id. Judge Redden also concluded that NOAA’s
assertion that the species’ critical habitat was sufficient to support recovery was inadequate,
since the agency conceded that it did not have sufficient information to make that
determination. Id. at *15.
460 378 F.3d 1059, 1069–77 (9th Cir. 2004).
461 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *17; see also supra notes 446–49, and
accompanying text.
462 See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
463 The ESA regulations defined “destruction or adverse modification” a “direct or indirect
alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival and
recovery of a listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2003).
464 Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069–70.
465 The ESA regulations define the statutory term “jeopardize the continued existence of” to
include “engage[ing] in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species.” 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
466 The 2004 BiOp essentially concluded that a proposed federal action could not, by
definition, produce jeopardy unless there was a net reduction in survival. See, e.g., 2004 BIOP,
supra note 45, at 1-12 (“Because there would be no net reduction in the productivity, abundance
or distribution of the ESU, there could not be an appreciable reduction in the likelihood of both
survival and recovery . . . .”).
467 Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069.
468 See id. at 1070.
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NOAA must consider recovery and survival separately in its jeopardy
analysis because the likelihood that both recovery and survival will occur is
reduced when the likelihood of either is reduced.469
The court observed that the ESA regulations defining jeopardy
implicitly required NOAA to analyze whether an action would “appreciably
[reduce] the species’ prospects of recovery as well as survival.”470 Moreover,
NOAA’s new interpretation of jeopardy conflicted with its ESA consultation
handbook,471 as well as the jeopardy analyses in both the 1995 and 2000
BiOps. 472 Yet the agency offered no real rationale for the departure from its
prior approach. Thus, NOAA’s new interpretation lacked persuasiveness,
and thus was entitled to “considerably less deference” than the agency’s
earlier, consistently-held view, which included separate analyses of recovery
and survival.473 By refusing to defer to NOAA’s interpretation of the ESA
469

NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 W.L. 1278878, at *17 (D. Or. May

26, 2005).
470
471

Id. at *17; see supra note 465 and accompanying text.

The consultation handbook, designed to “ensure consistent implementation of [the
ESA’s] consultation procedures,” made it clear that the jeopardy analysis “looks at whether . . .
the species can be expected to both survive and recover.” CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note
139, at xx, 4-35 (emphasis added). The handbook further defined survival to include the goal of
“retaining the potential for recovery.” Id. Although the consultation handbook is not a
regulation, and therefore not legally binding, Judge Redden seemed to treat it as the functional
equivalent of a regulation, noting that “[b]oth regulation § 402.02 and NOAA’s own Consultation
Handbook require that species be protected from any appreciable reduction in their likelihood
of recovery.” NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *17 (emphasis added). Judge Redden’s
reliance on the handbook seems entirely consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions. See
supra note 388; see also supra notes 387, 418, infra note 473 (reliance on handbook consistent
with other lower court decisions).
472 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *17. NOAA interpreted the jeopardy regulation to
require separate consideration of survival and recovery in both the 1995 and 2000 BiOps. 1995
BIOP, supra note 114, at 13 (noting that the jeopardy process involves a determination of
“whether the species can be expected to survive with an adequate potential for recovery”); 2000
BIOP, supra note 8, at 1-8.
473 NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at *17 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cadoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)). When an agency’s interpretation of a regulation
conflicts with its earlier interpretation, “[t]he agency will be required to show not only that its
new policy is reasonable, but also to provide a reasonable rationale supporting its departure
from previous practice.” Seldovia Native Ass’n v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990). This
standard suggests that an agency’s abrupt departure from a previous and consistently-held view
should be entitled to deference only to the extent that the agency’s new interpretation has the
“power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); cf. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983) (“While an agency is entitled to
change its view . . . it is obligated to explain its reasons for doing so.”).
While environmentalists sought to invalidate the 2004 BiOp because it did too little to
protect listed Columbia Basin salmon, a group of Columbia River irrigators—the Columbia
Snake River Irrigators Association and the Eastern Irrigators Association—sought to invalidate
the 2004 BiOp because it did too much. For example, when the “minimum irrigation pool” on
the Columbia River is reduced in accordance with the 2004 BiOp for the benefit of salmon,
irrigators are unable to draw water from the river. See NWF v. NMFS III, 2005 WL 1278878, at
*18. The irrigators argued that the 2004 BiOp improperly 1) excluded tribal in-river fishing rights
from its jeopardy analysis, 2) included the effects of state-managed harvests as cumulative
effects in the jeopardy analysis, and 3) included recovery planning in the 2004 BiOp. Id. Judge
Redden rejected each of the irrigators’ claims in turn. First, because NOAA had already engaged
in section 7 consultation for tribal harvests, he concluded that NOAA properly included the
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regulations, Judge Redden effectively reestablished recovery as a core
element of the jeopardy analysis.
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF NWF V. NMFS III: JUDGE REDDEN “RUNS THE RIVER”?
Within days of Judge Redden’s May 2005 decision concluding that the
2004 BiOp was arbitrary and capricious, environmentalists urged the court
to issue an injunction requiring the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA )to withdraw the 2004 BiOp and ordering federal dam
operators to increase river flows and spill levels in the Federal Columbia
River Power System (FCRPS) to protect listed juvenile salmon migrating
through the Columbia Basin during summer 2005.474 In June 2005, Judge
Redden granted the environmentalists’ spill request, but he refused to vacate
the 2004 BiOp or order increased river flows through the FCRPS.475 In
September 2005, a Northwest Power Act-created agency, the Fish Passage
Center,476 released a preliminary study assessing the effects of the courtordered spill on juvenile salmon survival in the Columbia Basin and
concluding that the court-ordered spill resulted in the highest levels of
salmon survival recorded in recent years.477 Despite this positive salmon
effects of future tribal harvests in the environmental baseline. Id at *19. Second, since the
effects of future state-managed harvests were reasonably certain to occur and undoubtedly
affected the status of the listed species, the court concluded that NOAA appropriately
considered those effects in its cumulative effects analysis, at least until NOAA completed the
section 10 permit process required by the ESA. Id. at *20. Third, since Judge Redden found that
“NOAA did not adequately address the likelihood of species recovery in the 2004 BiOp,” he
concluded that the agency clearly “did not engage in the far more detailed process of recovery
planning in the 2004 BiOp, as charged by the Irrigators.” Id. at *22.
474 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS III Injunction Order),
No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1398223, at *1–2 (D. Or. June 10, 2005).
475 Id. at *5.
476 The Fish Passage Center (FPC) was established by the Northwest Power and
Conservation Planning Council in 1984 to monitor salmon migration through the FCPRS,
oversee dissolved gas programs, and report on comparative fish survival. The FPC reported its
findings to the council and the public. The agency also provided data and analysis to federal
hydrosystem operators, state agencies, and tribes, and assists in formulating flow and spill
recommendations. Bill Crampton & Barry Espenon, Senate Panel Orders BPA to Cease Fish
Passage Center Funding, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., June 24, 2005; Blaine Harden, Zeroing out the
Messenger, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2005, at A21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/
article/2005/11/29/AR2005112901288.html; see also NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, DOC.
NO. 94-55, 1994 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5–18 (1994), available at
http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/1994/sec5.pdf (calling for the funding and establishment of a
fish passage center to: 1) plan and implement the annual smolt monitoring program, 2) develop
and implement flow and spill requests, and 3) monitor and analyze research results to assist in
implementing the water budget and spill planning). For more information on the Fish Passage
Center, see http://www.fpc.org/fpc_homepage.html (last visited July 15, 2006); see also William
McCall, Witnesses Stand Up for Fish Count, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Dec. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.registerguard.com/news/2005/12/08/c2.or.fishcenter.1208.p1.php?section=nation_wo
rld (describing the history of the Fish Passage Center and Sen. Craig’s (R-Idaho) proposal to cut
funding for the program).
477 Bill Crampton & Barry Espensen, Fish Passage Center Offers Preliminary Analysis on
Spill, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Sept. 16, 2005 (on file with author). The study was conducted at
the request of the Fish Passage Center Oversight Board, which the Northwest Power and

2006]

PRACTICED AT THE ART OF DECEPTION

795

survival data—actually, because of it—in November 2005, Sen. Larry Craig
(R-Idaho) inserted language into a Senate committee report accompanying
an energy appropriations bill that aimed to eliminate funding for the Fish
Passage Center.478
This Part examines Judge Redden’s 2005 injunction order, the summer
2005 Fish Passage Center studies assessing the effect of Judge Redden’s spill
order, and Sen. Craig’s subsequent efforts to dismantle the Fish Passage
Center. This Part then describes Judge Redden’s October 2005 remand order
and suggests that his decision to assume limited control over FCRPS
operations and his inclusion of recovery in the ESA’s jeopardy inquiry may
be one of the most important legacies of the FCRPS BiOp litigation.

A. Injunctive Relief: “Splitting the Baby”
Shortly after Judge Redden declared the 2004 BiOp illegal,
environmentalists asked the court to order NOAA and the action agencies to
1) withdraw the 2004 BiOp and comply with and implement all of the
mitigation actions described in the 2000 BiOp, 2) increase river flows to
decrease water particle travel time in the Snake and Columbia Rivers by at
least ten percent through a combination of reservoir drawdown, flow
augmentation, and other measures, and 3) provide twenty-four-hour spill at
five Columbia Basin dams—McNary Dam on the Columbia River, and Lower
Granite, Little Goose, Lower Monumental, and Ice Harbor dams on the
Lower Snake River—to assist juvenile salmon migrating downstream during
the summer of 2005.479 In June 2005, Judge Redden rejected NOAA’s
assertions of agency expertise in the operation of the FCRPS480 and required
federal dam operators to spill water over five Columbia Basin dams in order
to avoid irreparable harm to juvenile fall chinook and other listed species.481
Conservation Council established as part of its 2000 Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program to oversee the operations of the Fish Passage Center. Id.; see also Northwest Power
and Conservation Council, http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/fpcob/Default.htm (last visited July 16,
2006).
478 See Harden, supra note 476, at A21.
479 NWF v. NMFS III Injunction Order, 2005 WL 1398223, at *1–2. The 2004 BiOp made no
allowance for voluntary spill at the Lower Snake River or McNary dams during the summer
transport period. Id. at *4.
480 Generally, “[d]eference to an agency’s technical expertise and experience is particularly
warranted with respect to questions involving . . . scientific matters.” United States v. Alpine
Land & Reservoir Co., 887 F.2d 207, 213 (9th Cir. 1989). However, “[t]he presumption of agency
expertise may be rebutted if its decisions, even though based on agency expertise, are not
reasoned.” Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1147 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
481 NWF v. NMFS III Injunction Order, 2005 WL 1398223, at *5. Environmentalists also
argued that decreasing water particle travel time would provide the most favorable migration
conditions for listed salmon and avoid irreparable harm to juvenile fall chinook migrating
through the FCRPS that summer. Id. at *1–2, *5. Judge Redden was not convinced, however,
and denied the environmentalists’ request. Id. at *5. While there was ample evidence in the
record that suggested spill provided effective and safe dam passage for juvenile salmon,
decreasing water particle travel time was not supported by such convincing evidence. Id. Thus,
the court ordered the parties to engage in further study collaboration concerning whether flow
augmentation effectively promoted salmon survival. Id. Those conversations would
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Evincing a reluctance to “run the river,” however, the court stopped short of
granting the full injunctive relief that environmentalists had requested,
declining to order NOAA to withdraw the 2004 BiOp and increase river flows
to decrease the water particle travel time in both the Columbia and Snake
rivers.482
Judge Redden concluded that unless the action agencies modified
FCRPS operations, the federal dam operators could not ensure that their
operation of the FCRPS would satisfy their ESA requirement of not
jeopardizing listed Columbia Basin salmon.483 Indeed, there was “ample
evidence” that FCRPS operations adversely affected salmon mortality and
were contributing to the endangerment of the listed species.484 Clearly
constrained in fashioning injunctive relief concerning ongoing federal
actions, Judge Redden admitted “in a sense I guess I’m cutting the baby in
half,”485 which seemed to acknowledge both his reluctance to dictate federal
dam operations and the overwhelming evidence in the record supporting the
need for spill to protect juvenile salmon.486 Even NOAA admitted that spill
was generally safer than other routes of juvenile salmon passage.487 Echoing
Judge Marsh’s sentiments of nearly a decade before,488 Judge Redden urged

undoubtedly founder on the definition of what was “effective.”
482 Id. at *1–2, *5.
483 Id. at *4 (citing Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985)).
484 Id. In its 2004 BiOp, NOAA conceded that “the existence and operations of the dams and
reservoirs . . . account for most of the mortality of juvenile [salmon] migrating through the
FCRPS.” 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 5-29.
485 Natalie M. Henry, Judge Orders Feds to Spill More Water Over Lower Snake Dams, E&E
NEWS PM, June 10, 2005 (quoting Judge James Redden), available at http://www.eenews.net/
eenewspm/print/2005/06/10/1.
486 In October 2005, the environmentalists returned to the Oregon District Court, asking
Judge Redden to increase flows and spill for FCRPS operations during spring and summer 2006
while NOAA revised the 2004 BiOp. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV
01-640-RE, 2005 WL 3576843 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005). Although NOAA had concluded that flow
augmentation measures were “‘feasible and implementable’ as a reasonable and prudent
alternative measure to avoid jeopardy” in its 2000 BiOp, Judge Redden denied the
environmentalists’ requests for flow augmentation during spring and summer 2006, citing
uncertainty regarding the efficacy of flow augmentation on salmon survival through the FCRPS,
and the court’s inability to dictate treaty obligations between the United States and Canada
(with which the action agencies would be required to negotiate in order to secure water
releases). Id. at *6–7. The court did, however, grant the environmentalists’ requests for
increased spill during the late spring and summer months of 2006. Id. at *3, *5. The court noted
that the Corps’ 2006 FCPRS proposal consisted of eliminating spill and relying exclusively on
juvenile salmon transportation at the Lower Snake River dams in late spring. Id. at *3.
According to Judge Redden, this amounted to a “radical departure” from the agency’s
longstanding “spread-the-risk philosophy,” and he therefore refused to defer to the Corps’ 2006
operating proposal. Id. at *2–4. Similarly, Judge Redden rebuffed the Corps’ proposal to cease
spill in favor of full transportation on August 15, 2006, and he ordered the Corps to continue
spill until August 31, 2006. Id. at *5.
487 2004 BIOP, supra note 45, at 6-16, 6-61. In the 2000 BiOp, NOAA acknowledged that spill
was the preferred method of passage for juvenile salmon, and that “[t]he body of research
evidence indicates that juvenile survival is generally highest through [spill].” 2000 BIOP, supra
note 8, at 9-82.
488 In the 1994 case striking down the 1993 BiOp, Judge Marsh wrote:
As is true in so many of these cases, the merits of the dispute are only a portion of the
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the parties to “take advantage of this moment to get together and start
talking” about the operation of the FCRPS,489 exhorting them to try to “reach
a consensus” on the spill issue; otherwise, spill would proceed in accordance
with his order.490

problem. What compels a party to file an action against the federal government in an
environmental case generally is the sense that having been called upon to contribute
resources to aid the federal agencies in problem solving and having expended time,
energy and money coming up with analyses and recommended solutions it should not be
ignored or, as in this case, ultimately have its views discredited. Thus, the underlying
root of the litigation problem is the feeling of these parties that the federal government is
simply not listening to them. . . . “[E]verybody has got a plan to save the salmon,” but
many of these recommendations have fallen on deaf ears.
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 899–900 (D. Or.
1994) (quoting IDFG Director Steven Huffaker). While NOAA was “under no legal obligation to
listen and respond to salmon plans from every corner of the Northwest,” Judge Marsh observed
that “the ESA does impose substantive obligations with respect to an agency’s consideration of
significant information and data from well-qualified scientists such as the fisheries biologists
from the states and tribes.” Id. at 900. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000)
(each agency “shall use the best scientific and commercial data available”); 50 C.F.R. §
402.14(d) (2005) (agencies requesting consultation must submit best scientific and commercial
data available). Three years later, while upholding the 1995 BiOp in American Rivers, Judge
Marsh again “encourage[d] the [parties] to continue in their settlement efforts and efforts
towards process improvements” and implored the parties to engage in “settlement discussions”
to help resolve conflicts in defining best science. Am. Rivers, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
No. CV 96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *13 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997).
489 Paul Vandevelder, Salmon Find Judge Who Listens, TIDEPOOL NEWS FOR SALMON, June 28,
2005, http://www.tidepool.org/original_content.cfm?articleid=164862 (last visited July 16, 2006).
490 NWF v. NMFS III Injunction Order, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1398223, at
*5 (D. Or. June 10, 2005). The federal government immediately appealed Judge Redden’s order
to the Ninth Circuit, claiming it was an “abuse of discretion” and that maintaining the injunction
was not in the public interest because it would cost the Northwest approximately $67 million—
about a million dollars a day—in lost hydropower revenue. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS, 9th Circuit), 422 F.3d 782, 793 (9th Cir. 2005), remanded to No.
CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 2488447 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005); Press Release, Statement of
Federal Executives, Federal Agencies Disappointed with Judge’s Ruling (June 10, 2005),
available at http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/BPAnews/2005/NewsRelease.cfm?ReleaseNo=646.
NOAA also argued that the district court’s injunction should be vacated because it was too
broad and required the parties to consult and try to build a consensus regarding spill. NWF v.
NMFS, 9th Circuit, 422 F.3d at 799.
While declining to reach the merits of the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed Judge Redden’s injunction order in part and remanded it in part, concluding that the
district court’s order was not an abuse of discretion, and that the traditional preliminary
injunction analysis does not apply to injunctions issued pursuant to the ESA. Id. at 793–94
(citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994)). In
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the Supreme Court found that “Congress
has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck
in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities.” Id. at 194. Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that courts “may not use equity’s scales to strike a different balance,”
and courts need not consider the economic harm to the public when fashioning injunctive relief.
NWF v. NMFS, 9th Circuit, 422 F.3d at 793–94 (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F. 2d 1376,
1383 (9th Cir. 1987)). Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, it remanded the order to the district court
to determine whether recent developments in the parties’ attempts to reach a consensus on the
issue of spill required the court to modify the order. NWF v. NMFS, 9th Circuit, 422 F.3d at 800.
For the average electricity customer whose utility company buys all of its power from
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B. Shooting the Messenger: The Dismantling of the Fish Passage Center
Angered by Judge Redden’s order requiring federal hydrosystem
operators to spill water over the Lower Snake River and McNary dams, and
apparently angrier still at a Fish Passage Center (FPC) study concluding that
the court-ordered summer 2005 spill was effective in reducing salmon
mortalities,491 Senator Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho)—the National Hydropower
Association’s 2002 legislator of the year492 and a member of the Senate
Appropriations Committee—inserted language into a House of
Representatives Conference Report accompanying the 2006 Senate Energy
and Water Appropriations bill directing the BPA to eliminate funding for the
FPC.493 Although BPA has maintained that the language in the House
conference report requires the agency to cease funding the FPC,494 a group of
environmentalists and sport-fishery advocates, led by the Northwest
Environmental Defense Center, successfully challenged that assumption,
arguing that the conference report, as mere legislative history, did not carry
the force of law.495 The environmentalists claimed that BPA’s unilateral

BPA, implementation of the spill order increased an average consumer’s monthly bill about
1.2%, or approximately 87 cents per month. Blaine Harden, Future of Salmon Leads to Dispute
Over Federal Dams, WASH. POST, July 2, 2005, at A03 (citing Ed Sheets, a private consultant with
expertise in the Northwest hydro system), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070101808.html.
491 See infra note 505 and accompanying text.
492 Press Release, National Hydropower Association, Craig Receives Legislator of the Year
Award (Apr. 23, 2002). See Harden, supra note 476. The National Hydropower Association is a
non-profit organization dedicated to advancing the interests of the U.S. hydropower industry.
For more information, see the National Hydropower Association website, http://www.hydro.org
(last visited July 15, 2006).
493 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-275, at 174 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1065, 1125 (“The
Bonneville Power Administration may make no new obligations in support of the Fish Passage
Center.”).
494 See Bonneville Power Administration, Integrated Fish and Wildlife Program,
http://www.efw.bpa.gov/Integrated_Fish_and_Wildlife_Program/programsolicitation.aspx (last
visited July 16, 2006) (“Congress passed legislation (House Report 109-275), which forbids BPA
from making additional obligations in support of the Fish Passage Center.”); Peter Sleeth,
Groups Seek Aid for Fish Center, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 24, 2006, at B05 (quoting BPA
spokesperson Mike Hansen as saying, “[w]e have basically been instructed by Congress to stop
funding the Fish Passage Center.”).
495 Petition for Review, Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin. (NEDC v.
BPA Petition), No. 06-70430 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2006), available at http://www.peaclaw.org/
objects/BPA_final_petition.pdf. NEDC was joined by co-petitioner groups Public Employees for
Environmental Responsibility and Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association. Id. While
Congress could certainly mandate the elimination of FPC by direct legislation, Northwest
Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) maintains that the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act for 2006, which BPA interpreted to require the elimination of the FPC, does
not order BPA to alter funding to the FPC. Indeed, the Act itself does not mention the Fish
Passage Center. The only reference to BPA in the Act states: “[e]xpeditures from the Bonneville
Power Administration Fund, established pursuant to Public Law 93-454, are approved for
official reception and representation expenses in an amount not to exceed $1,500. During fiscal
year 2006, no new direct loan obligations may be made.” Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-103, 119 Stat. 2245, 2276 (2005).
The language on which BPA has relied in eliminating funding for FPC is found, not in the
legislation passed by Congress, but in the House Conference Report accompanying the Act. See
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decision to cut funding to the FPC was inconsistent with the current
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, which expressly calls for
the continued operation of the FPC.496 Because BPA is required under the
Northwest Power Act to use its funding to protect, mitigate and enhance fish
and wildlife “in a manner consistent with . . . the [Fish and Wildlife]
program,”497 the environmentalists maintained that BPA’s withdrawal of
funding for the FPC also violated the Northwest Power Act.498 According to
the petition, BPA may not dissolve the FPC until the Northwest Power and
Conservation Planning Council amends the Columbia River Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program—a process that requires public notice and comment.499 The
Ninth Circuit granted the environmentalists temporary injunctive relief in
March 2006.500

H.R. REP. NO. 109-275 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1065, 1125 (“The Bonneville Power
Administration may make no new obligations in support of the Fish Passage Center.”). NEDC
and the relevant case law suggest that a House conference report is merely legislative history—
not binding law. Indeed, while the Supreme Court has stated that “the legislative history of a
statute is a useful guide to the intent of Congress,” the Court has held that its use becomes
improper when the line is crossed from using legislative history to resolve things that are not
clear in the statutory language to using it to rewrite the statute. See also Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (declining to “resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear”). Compare County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoted above), with Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994) (declining to
give effect to “a single passage of legislative history that is in no way anchored in the text of the
statute”). In the 1975 decision In re LTV Aerospace Corp., the Comptroller General had this to
say: “[A]s a general proposition, there is a distinction to be made between utilizing legislative
history for the purpose of illuminating the intent underlying language used in a statute and
resorting to that history for the purpose of writing into the law that which is not there.” 55
Comp. Gen. 307, 325 (1975).
496 The 2003 Mainstem Amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Program—currently in force—
expressly call for “the continued operation of the Fish Passage Center,” and specify that “the
Center shall” conduct smolt monitoring as well as gather and analyze research data related to
fish passage. See NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, MAINSTEM AMENDMENTS TO THE
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, Doc. No. 2003-11, at 27–28 (2003), available
at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2003/2003-11.pdf.
497 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (2000).
498 NEDC v. BPA Petition, No. 06-70430, at *7. Under the Northwest Power Act, the
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council (the Council) is required to adopt
a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife (the Fish and Wildlife Program). 16
U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A) (2000). BPA is required under the Act to use its funding to protect,
mitigate and enhance fish and wildlife “in a manner consistent with . . . the program adopted by
the Council.” Id. § 839b(h)(10)(A).
499 Petition for Review, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. 06-70430, at *6
(9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2006); see 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(4)(A)–(B) (2000) (requiring public notice and
comment). Despite serious questions as to the legality of BPA’s decision to eliminate the FPC,
in late January 2006, the agency announced that it had selected two entities—the Pacific States
Marine Fisheries Commission and the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory—to replace the
FPC. Press Release, Bonneville Power Admin., BPA Selects Successors to Fish Passage Center
(Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/BPAnews/2005/NewsRelease.cfm?ReleaseNo=695
(last visited July 16, 2006). See infra note 515 and accompanying text. Under agreement with the
Bonneville Power Administration, the Fish Passage Center was scheduled to close in March,
2006. Bill Crampton & Barry Espensen, Parties Petition Appeals Court on Fish Passage Center,
COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://www.cbbulletin.com/Free/130110.aspx.
500 The Ninth Circuit granted the environmentalists’ motion for an emergency stay of BPA’s
decision to eliminate the FPC on March 17, 2006. Order (preventing the closure of the FPC at
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Although Sen. Craig (R-Idaho) introduced the conference report
language with the ostensible purpose of protecting the Pacific Northwest’s
economy,501 that justification hardly seems persuasive, considering that FPC
had only twelve employees and an annual budget of $1.3 million, less than
one percent of BPA’s annual budget for all fish and wildlife mitigation
programs.502 While it is important for the public to know how much it costs
to save salmon,503 the reason behind the proposed cut appears to be
dissatisfaction with the data collected by FPC and what it suggested, not a
genuine concern for saving money. According to the FPC, the collected data
suggested that “the federal hydro system kills fish”— a lot of them504—and
that spill is an effective method of improving salmon survival through the
FCRPS.505 Indeed, in September 2005, an FPC preliminary analysis concluded
that during summer 2005, with the aid of the court-ordered spill, survival
levels of juvenile salmon migrating “in-river” through the Lower Snake River
were “the highest recorded in recent years.”506
Despite these results suggesting that Judge Redden’s order materially
improved juvenile salmon survival in the Columbia Basin during summer
2005, the FPC’s conclusions were quickly downplayed by federal dam
operators,507 and critics claimed that the study was an example of FPC

the end of March), Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., Civ. No. 06-70430
(9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2006). The Ninth Circuit ordered BPA to continue its existing contractual
arrangement to fund and support the FPC under the existing terms and conditions of the
contract. Id. The injunction effectively stayed BPA’s decision to replace the FPC until the Ninth
Circuit hears the merits of NEDC’s claim in September 2006. Bill Rudolph, Fish Passage Center
Gets Contract Extension Through November, NW. FISHLETTER NO. 213, Apr. 18, 2006, available
at http://www.newsdata.com/fishletter/213/7story.html. In April 2006, BPA announced that it
was extending its existing funding agreement for the FPC until November 2006. Press Release,
Bonneville Power Administration, Fish Passage Center Contract Extended (July 15, 2006),
available at http://efw.bpa.gov/FPCExtensionPressRelease(2)(2)(2).doc.
501 See Blaine Harden, Senator Aims to Kill Agency That Tracks Salmon, WASH. POST, June
23, 2005, at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/
23/AR2005062301915.html (quoting Sid Smith, a spokesperson for Sen. Larry Craig (R-Idaho);
“[p]ower rates are going up [and] we think ratepayers ought to have some answers for how their
money is being spent.”).
502 “BPA spends about $139 million a year to fund more than 300 fish and wildlife mitigation
projects. The [Fish Passage Center’s] budget for FY 2005 was $1.3 million . . . .” Crampton &
Espenson, supra note 477. A number of regional experts on salmon recovery have argued that
“[e]liminating or reducing funding for the Fish Passage Center will actually increase salmon
recovery costs, as the states and tribes will need additional staff to replace the lost function.”
Harden, supra note 476, at A21 (quoting Jeffrey P. Koenings, Director of the Washington Fish
and Wildlife Department).
503 BiOp Judge Gives Feds One Year to Produce New Hydro BiOp, NW. FISHLETTER No. 203,
Oct. 3, 2005 (quoting Judge Redden on the public’s right to know the cost of saving salmon),
available at http://www.newsdata.com/fishletter/203/1story.html.
504 Harden, supra note 501 (quoting Michele DeHart, the Manager of the Fish Passage
Center).
505 Harden, supra note 476, at A21.
506 Crampton & Espenson, supra note 477.
507 Bob Lohn, NOAA Fisheries’ Northwest regional administrator, stated:
Although I’m happy to hear about better in-river survival numbers through the first four
dams than we might of expected, nothing I’ve heard in this [FPC] report causes me to
change our original outlook. Unless the in-river survival exceeds the survival of
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resources “being used to advocate for specific positions.”508 For several
years, hydropower interests have accused the FPC of releasing distorted and
inaccurate information.509 In fact, quoting from an independent scientific
advisory board that reviewed the FPC’s work in 2003, Sen. Craig (R-Idaho)
justified the elimination of the FPC by arguing on the Senate floor that
“many questions have arisen regarding the reliability of the technical data”
the agency publishes.510 The senator neglected to mention, however, that the
scientific report he cited concluded that the agency’s work was of “high
technical quality,” and that the questions regarding the technical reliability of
agency’s work were unfounded.511 Sen. Craig’s (R-Idaho) selective quotation
of the advisory board’s report exemplifies attempts by critics of the FPC to
create the misleading impression that the agency was a biased advocate for
salmon and to deflect attention from data demonstrating that spill improves
juvenile salmon survival through the FCRPS.
Some entity clearly needs to collect salmon survival data through the
FCRPS.512 Sen. Craig (R-Idaho) has claimed that “other institutions” in the
Northwest are capable of doing most of the work that FPC does now,
maintaining that dismantling the agency would reduce duplicative work and
increase efficiency.513 But in 2000, the Independent Scientific Review Panel
for the Northwest Power and Conservation Planning Council concluded that
there was little duplication between the FPC and other organizations. 514
transported fish, then the whole exercise was an interesting and expensive experiment
that did not increase the number of returning adult fish.
Crampton & Espenson, supra note 477. Others noted that the results were incomplete. In
particular, the report only focused on the Snake River, ignoring the Columbia River. The report
also only examined the first four weeks of summer spill, leaving out the last 10 weeks, and it did
not compare in-river migration survival rates to transported survival rates. Id.
In January 2006, an independent scientific panel—funded by the Northwest Power and
Conservation Council—concluded that, while the results were encouraging, the Fish Passage
Center’s preliminary conclusions had “limited utility for direct estimation of spill effects, given
major variations in the river hydrosystem’s spill operations among years and considerable
interannual variation in migration timing and passage behavior” of juvenile salmon. ISAB
Evaluates Research, Results Related to 2005 Summer Spill, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Jan. 20, 2006.
The independent scientific review panel suggested that it would take several years—until the
juvenile salmon migrating in summer 2005 returned as adults—to determine whether the court’s
2005 spill order succeeded in improving salmon survival through the FCRPS. Id. The complete
report of the independent scientific panel can be found at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/
isab/isab2006-1.htm (last visited July 16, 2006).
508 Crampton & Espenon, supra note 477 (quoting Shauna McReynolds, a spokesperson for
the Coalition for Smart Salmon Recovery, a partnership of agricultural employers, utility
customers, and businesses).
509 Id.
510 Harden, supra note 476.
511 Id. Ironically, Sen. Craig (R-Idaho) admonished the FPC on the Senate floor for
manipulating salmon science, claiming “[d]ata cloaked in advocacy create confusion . . . . False
science leads people to false choices.” Id. (quoting Sen. Craig (R-Idaho)).
512 Defending the FPC, Judge Redden has said that its data and analysis has been vital,
noting that “we all need it” in order to make reasoned decisions regarding FCRPS operations.
Bill Crampton & Barry Espenson, Redden Says Will Order Remand While 2004 BiOp Stays in
Place, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Sept. 30, 2005.
513
514

Id.
Id.; see also Independent Scientific Review Panel for the Nw. Power Planning Council,
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Nevertheless, in January 2006, amid questions as to the legality of BPA’s
decision to eliminate the FPC, BPA announced that it had selected two
entities—the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission and the Battelle
Pacific Northwest Laboratory—to replace FPC,515 a decision the Ninth
Circuit enjoined, at least temporarily.516
Regardless of which entity is counting salmon, the fish counts
demonstrate that FCRPS operations are taking a significant toll on listed
salmon.517 Rather than addressing the deleterious effects that FCRPS
operations have on salmon, or taking on the difficult policy issues that
federal dam operators must address in order to save Columbia Basin
salmon, Sen. Craig (R-Idaho) apparently decided that “when you don’t like
the message, you kill the messenger”518—a blatant example of politics
trumping science.

C. Judge Redden’s Remand: Must the Court Run the River?
Characterizing the 2004 BiOp as a “shameless assault on the
Endangered Species Act,”519 and an exercise “more in cynicism than
sincerity,”520 in October 2005, Judge Redden remanded the 2004 BiOp to

Review of Databases Funded through the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, Doc.
No. 2000-3, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/isrp/isrp2000-3.pdf (noting
the potential for duplication but stating that “multiple data centers do not necessarily represent
either duplication or inefficiency”).
515 Press Release, Bonneville Power Admin., BPA Selects Successors to Fish Passage Center
(Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/BPAnews/2005/NewsRelease.cfm?ReleaseNo=695
(last visited July 16, 2006). Under BPA’s plan, the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission
would manage the smolt monitoring program, perform functions associated with related data
collection and management, and conduct routine analysis and reporting of that data, while
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory would oversee, coordinate, and facilitate broader, nonroutine scientific analysis of that data, including independent peer review. Id.
516 See supra note 500.
517 For example, data collected by a University of Washington research program, which Sen.
Craig (R-Idaho) cited as a possible successor to FPC, showed that as of mid-November 2005,
approximately 43,271 chinook salmon had passed Lower Granite Dam, the uppermost dam on
the Snake River. By comparison, data collected by the same research program showed that
approximately 194,541 chinook salmon had passed Lower Granite Dam by mid-November 2001,
meaning that the 2005 numbers were about 22% of the 2001 numbers. Editorial, Our View:
Debate Over Who Counts Salmon is Only a Distraction, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 16, 2005,
available at http://www.idahostatesman.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051116/NEWS0501/
511160317/1052/NEWS05.
518 Harden, supra note 501 (quoting Michele DeHart). Ironically, in early September 2005, the
Fish Passage Center released a preliminary analysis concluding that the survival rate of juvenile
salmon migrating in-river through the Lower Snake River in summer 2005 was “the highest
recorded in recent years,” suggesting that the court-ordered spill at the Snake River dams
greatly improved the survival of migrating salmon. Crampton & Espenon, supra note 477; Joe
Rojas-Burke, Salmon Advocates Say Spills Succeeded, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 13, 2005, available
at
http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/news/112660920057800.xml&
coll=7.
519 Vandevelder, supra note 489.
520 See Blaine Harden, Future of Salmon Leads to Dispute Over Federal Dams, WASH. POST,
July 2, 2005, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
07/01/AR2005070101808.html.
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NOAA, admonishing the action agencies, Congress, and the Bush
Administration for their collective failure to develop and implement an ESAcompliant plan for operating the FCRPS.521 Directing NOAA to collaborate
with nonfederal sovereigns—including the states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
and Washington, as well as various tribes522 (who were parties or amici in the
case)—the judge mapped out a detailed strategy for preparing a new BiOp.523
He ordered NOAA to correct 1) the 2004 BiOp’s improper segmentation of
the elements of the proposed action, which the agency deemed
nondiscretionary, 2) its improper comparison, rather than aggregation, of
the effects of the proposed action, 3) its flawed critical habitat
determinations, 4) the 2004 BiOp’s failure to consider the effects of the
proposed action on both survival and recovery, and 5) NOAA’s past reliance
on mitigation measures that were not reasonably certain to occur, or which
have not undergone section 7 consultation.524 The judge also ordered NOAA
to prepare detailed quarterly status reports for the court and the parties
concerning the progress of the revised BiOp.525
NOAA had one year—half the time it requested—to comply with the
terms of Judge Redden’s order and develop an ESA-compliant BiOp.526
Although the 2004 BiOp will remain in place during the remand, Judge
Redden warned that if NOAA failed to follow the terms of his order, he
would vacate the BiOp, step in, and “run the river” from the bench.527 If

521 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS Remand Order), No. CV
01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 2488447, at *1 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005); Michael Milstein, Judge
Demands Agencies Help Salmon at Dams, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 8, 2005, at A01, available at 2005
WLNR 23953911; Redden: Make BiOp Compliant or Courts Will “Run the River,” COLUMBIA
BASIN BULL., Oct. 7, 2005.
522 The involved tribes are the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Yakama, Warm Springs, and Kootenai
Tribes. NWF v. NMFS Remand Order, 2005 WL 2488447, at *5.
523 Id. at *5–6. Judge Redden ordered NOAA and the action agencies to collaborate with
nonfederal sovereigns concerning the elements the agency should include in the proposed
action, as well as policy, scientific, and technical issues. Id.
524 Id. at *5.
525 Id. The first report had to include: 1) preliminary information concerning the legal
framework NOAA intends to use in its jeopardy analysis, 2) information concerning the nature
and the scope of the proposed action, and 3) NOAA’s plan for collaboration with the sovereign
entities. Id. at *6. Any party or amici had five days to comment on the status reports, and the
court promised to hold status conferences approximately every 90 days to monitor the progress
of the remand. Id. at *5. On January 3, 2006, NOAA submitted its first quarterly status report
required by Judge Redden’s remand order. The agency indicated that it intended to adopt a
jeopardy framework that was similar to the one used for recovery planning, using an approach
to the jeopardy analysis that determines whether the action “when aggregated with the effects
of the actions and activities in the environmental baseline” will appreciably reduce the
likelihood of survival and recovery of each listed species. NOAA FISHERIES, 2006 FCRPS BIOP:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REMAND PROCESS INCLUDING THE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS 6–7 (Dec.
22, 2005), available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/reports_and_papers/biop_remand_
2004/Docs/2006/010306/Hydro_Ex_3_Conceptual_Framework.pdf.
526 NWF v. NMFS Remand Order, 2005 WL 2488447, at *1; Milstein, supra note 521. On April
21, 2006, Judge Redden granted NOAA an extension, giving the agency until February 1, 2007 to
issue a revised biological opinion. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Minute
Order, Civ. No. 01-00640-RE (Apr. 21, 2004).
527 NWF v. NMFS Remand Order, 2005 WL 2488447, at *3.
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forced to step in, the agencies would be exposed to “takings” liability under
section 9 of the ESA.528
NOAA objected to Judge Redden’s step-by-step remand instructions,
claiming that the court’s detailed reporting plan amounted to judicial
overreaching.529 The judge acknowledged that, “in the absence of ‘substantial
justification,’ a court should not dictate to an administrative agency ‘the
methods, procedures, and time dimension’ of [a] remand.’”530 But he
maintained that, given the loss of valuable time due to NOAA’s flawed
revision of the 2000 BiOp and the agency’s history of failures to comply with
ESA, a detailed and judicially monitored remand process was “substantially
justified.”531 Judge Redden decried NOAA’s pattern of failing to comply with
the ESA, noting that those failures
have taught us that the preparation or revision of NOAA’s biological opinion on
remand must not be a secret process with a disastrous surprise ending . . .
[w]ithout real action . . . the result will be the loss of the wild salmon. Based on
prior history and the experience of the last remand, it is clear that progress can
532
only be made if the agencies understand exactly what is required of them.

The court’s decision was remarkable not just because it reflected Judge
Redden’s frustration with NOAA’s regulatory interpretations and the
agency’s failure to follow the court’s 2000 remand order, but because it
suggested that the court was unwilling to allow the government to delay
meaningful restoration efforts while jeopardizing the continued existence of
listed salmon.
The remand order also directed NOAA to consider seriously the
possibility of breaching the four dams on the Lower Snake River if Congress
and the president failed to grant the money required to avoid jeopardizing
listed salmon.533 In an apparent reference to President Bush’s 2003 speech at
Ice Harbor Dam pledging not to breach the dams,534 Judge Redden wrote that
“‘[s]peeching’ on the dams will not avoid breaching the dams . . .

528
529

Id.
Redden: Make BiOp Compliant or Courts Will “Run the River,” supra note 521 (citing a

Justice Department statement). NOAA argued that it would be inappropriate for the court to
“inject [itself] into the deliberative process of the administrative agencies” by issuing an order
that identified steps the agency must take on remand. NWF v. NMFS Remand Order, 2005 WL
2488447, at *3. Although the agency objected to the court’s strict quarterly briefing schedule,
NOAA has stated that it “‘fully intended’ to collaborate with the sovereign states and tribes, but
objected to the court’s order making it mandatory.” Redden: Make BiOp Compliant or Courts
Will “Run the River,” supra note 521. NOAA had 60 days to appeal Redden’s order and the
agency considered that option. In the meantime, a spokesperson for NOAA has said, “we’ll roll
up our sleeves and do our very best” to comply with Judge Redden’s order. Milstein, supra note
521.
530 NWF v. NMFS Remand Order, 2005 WL 2488447, at *4 (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976)).
531 Id. at *4.
532 Id. at *3.
533 Id.
534 Robert McClure & Lisa Stiffler, Bush Touts Salmon Plan, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 23, 2003, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/136401_bush23.html.
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[c]ooperation and assistance may.”535 The order also made clear that leaders
at all levels of government have an obligation to comply with the ESA and do
what is necessary to ensure that listed species survive and recover.536 The
judge noted that the specter of dam-breaching should be incentive to all
those who oppose such measures to make sure the remand succeeds.537
While the renewed prospect of breaching the four Lower Snake River
dams might be a legacy of Judge Redden’s remand order, the judge’s
unprecedented assumption of a role in running the river is also remarkable
because it reflects a judicial reticence to defer to changes in NOAA’s ESA
interpretations which seemed driven by policy concerns rather than
scientific data. The court’s interpretation of the ESA jeopardy regulations to
require federal agencies to consider both survival and recovery is also
potentially quite significant.538
Despite the significance of the remand order, the outcome of the NWF
v. NMFS litigation is far from certain. Judge Redden’s injunctions have
sparked a political firestorm, as both hydropower interests and the Bush
Administration responded to the court’s decisions by targeting the agency
responsible for collecting salmon survival data in the FCRPS,539 threatening
to invoke the “God Squad” exemption for FCRPS operations,540 and
attempting to amend the ESA to eliminate critical habitat designations and
several of the ESA’s recovery provisions.541 In addition, in late December

535
536
537
538
539
540

NWF v. NMFS Remand Order, 2005 WL 2488447, at *3; Milstein, supra note 521.
Milstein, supra note 521.
NWF v. NMFS Remand Order, 2005 WL 2488447, at *3.
See supra note 472 and accompanying text.
See supra note 494 and accompanying text.
See Harden, supra note 520 (quoting Fred Disheroon, special litigation council for the

Justice Department, who noted, “it may not be possible to come up with a way to avoid
jeopardy for these fish,” and if that happens the government may petition the Endangered
Species Committee for an exemption for FCRPS operations).
541 Indeed, the most serious threat to salmon recovery in the Columbia River Basin could
come, not from seemingly retributive proposals to slash funding, but from a congressional bill
introduced by Rep. Richard Pombo (R-Cal.) in September 2005 that would dramatically weaken
the ESA’s protections for endangered and threatened species. Deceptively entitled “The
Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act,” Pombo’s amendments would eliminate the
ESA’s critical habitat provisions along with many of the ESA’s enforceable recovery planning
provisions. H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. § 5 (1st Sess. 2005). For example, the Pombo amendment
would authorize the Secretary to forego recovery planning for threatened and endangered
species if the Secretary finds that a recovery plan will not promote conservation and survival of
the species. Id. § 9(a). In addition, the ESA’s recovery plans would not be required to be based
on the best available scientific data. Id. § 9(b)(3)(E). The bill would also require the Secretary of
the Interior to consider the impact of listing decisions on the economy as well as national
security. Id. § 4(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). The proposed amendments would significantly alter section 7
consultation by requiring federal agencies to “consider only the effects of any agency action
that are distinct from a baseline of all effects upon the relevant species that have occurred or
are occurring prior to the action.” Id. § 11(a)(4).
In other words, the Pombo amendments would effectively overrule Judge Redden’s
interpretation of the ESA regulations, requiring federal agencies to segregate the effects of an
action from the environmental baseline, and focus their jeopardy analysis on the effects of the
action. Pombo’s amendments would also repeal pesticide restrictions, and they contain broad
new protections and compensation provisions for property owners seeking to develop private
lands on which threatened or endangered species may be found. Id. §§ 14, 16, 20.
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2005, NOAA filed notice of its intent to appeal Judge Redden’s October 2005
remand order, as well as his May 2005 summary judgment opinion, to the
Ninth Circuit.542 Any of these measures, if successful, could effectively
override all or part of Judge Redden’s decision.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The saga of Columbia Basin salmon restoration is unfortunately long
and complex, with very few success stories, despite considerable public
expenditures.543 The complexity has inhibited effective public involvement.
And the expenditures are quite misleading, since so much money has been
spent on ineffective hatchery and artificial transportation programs that
both mask the hydropower system’s operational insensitivity to salmon
migration and deceive the public into believing that there exists a functional
plan to protect, let alone restore, the salmon runs.544 It is hardly surprising
that the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) operators would
engage in this deception, given their long history of strenuous opposition to
any changes in the hydrosystem status quo that would threaten the
dominance of hydropower generation and navigation.545 What is more
On September 29, 2005, the House of Representatives approved Rep. Pombo’s (R-Cal.)
amendments
by
a
229-193
vote.
Thomas,
Library
of
Congress
website,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll506.xml (last visited July 15, 2006). As of July 2006, the
Senate had not yet addressed the proposed ESA Amendments.
542 Federal Defendant’s Notice of Appeal from Grant of Summary Judgment and Order of
Remand, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 01-640-RE (D. Or. Dec. 21,
2005), available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/reports_and_papers/biop_remand_2004/
Docs/Notice_of_Appeal_122105.pdf. While asserting that it remains “committed to developing a
long-term program for strengthening endangered . . . salmon,” NOAA has indicated that, on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, it intends to contest each of the four flaws identified by Judge
Redden in his May 26, 2005 summary judgment opinion, including his conclusion that
“[r]ecovery must be considered separately” in the ESA consultation process. Federal Agencies
to Appeal Redden’s BiOp Remand Order, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL. (Dec. 30, 2005) (on file with
author).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument on June 1, 2006. Press Release,
Save Our Wild Salmon, Salmon Advocates Urge Federal Appeals Court to Safeguard Columbia
Basin Salmon Recovery Plan (June 2, 2006), available at http://www.wildslamon.org/
pressroom/press-detail.cfm?docid=480. As of July 2006, the Ninth Circuit had not yet issued an
opinion.
543 Between 1982 and 2003 BPA claims to have invested approximately $6.42 billion in fish
and wildlife conservation measures in the Columbia Basin, including direct funding for the Fish
and Wildlife Program, federal hatcheries, as well as power purchases and foregone revenue due
to operational changes designed to benefit salmon. Nw. Power & Conservation Council,
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, Twenty Years of Progress 3 (2003), available
at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2003/2003-20/report.pdf. That figure does not include the
costs of installing fish passage improvement facilities, such as removable spillway weirs, see
supra note 256, at mainstem dams. Id. According to BPA—always willing to inflate salmon
protection costs—that agency invested over $501 million in fish and wildlife protection and
conservation through investments in the Council’s Fish and Wildlife Program, lost opportunity
costs, and power purchases in 2004 alone. Bonneville Power Admin., BPA Fast Facts, available
at http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/about_BPA/Facts/FactDocs/BPA_Facts_2004.pdf.
544 See supra notes 88–92 (ineffective hatcheries), 95–111 (ineffective transportation
program) and accompanying text.
545 See supra notes 147, 187, 269–82, 397–407 and accompanying text (opposition to changes
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surprising is that the agency entrusted with Endangered Species Act (ESA)
compliance, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
should evolve into such a willing co-conspirator in the deception.
In the 1980s, NOAA (then called the National Marine Fisheries Service)
was an active participant in a coalition of federal and state fishery agencies
that advocated higher river flows and spills at FCRPS dams to improve
conditions for salmon.546 But in the 1990s, after the agency obtained decisionmaking authority under the ESA, it proceeded to approve BiOps that
countenanced status quo operations,547 ignoring a judicial call for a “major
overhaul” of system operations.548 Unwillingness to undertake such an
overhaul led to the 2000 BiOp, characterized by reliance on offsite measures
over which NOAA had little or no control,549 which led to the BiOp’s failure
to survive judicial scrutiny.550
In the twenty-first century, NOAA morphed into an agency that
resembled an appendage of the most prominent federal power system
operator, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). During the 2001 West
Coast electricity crisis, NOAA allowed BPA to invoke an emergency
exemption it had approved in the 2000 BiOp to terminate salmon flows and
spills,551 thereby confirming hydropower dominance in the Columbia Basin,
contrary to congressional intent.552 Then, in 2004—with no electricity
in the status quo). See generally SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 129–60 (discussing
resistance to the 1980 Northwest Power Act’s co-equal partnership between restoration and
hydropower generation).
546 NOAA first considered listing salmon under the ESA in 1978. See F. Lorraine Bodi,
Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 ENVTL. L. 349, 349
(1980). It then was an important part of the “fishery coalition,” comprised of federal and state
agencies and Indian tribes, which in the early 1980s put together a massive set of recommended
mitigation measures from which the Northwest Power Planning Council formulated the
Northwest Power Act’s Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. See Michael C. Blumm,

Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277, 286–87 (1984). Subsequently, NOAA helped negotiate a settlement
agreement with mid-Columbia public utility districts, which has produced river conditions that
now support the basin’s only self-sustaining salmon populations. See F. Lorraine Bodi, FERC’s
Mid-Columbia Proceeding: Ten Years and Still Counting, 16 ENVTL. L. 555, 564, 572 (1986).
547 See supra notes 147–48, 158, 188, 238–41, 375 and accompanying text (describing each of
the FCRPS BiOps and their commitment to the status quo).
548 IDFG v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), discussed supra notes 152–58 and
accompanying text.
549 See supra notes 283–93 and accompanying text.
550 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1213–16 (D. Or.
2003) (discussed supra notes 294–313 and accompanying text).
551 See BPA Salmon Crisis, supra note 9, at 10,726 (describing BPA’s decision).
552 See supra notes 396–412 and accompanying text. Congress intended that FCRPS
operators treat hydropower and salmon as “coequals” under the Northwest Power Act. See
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring FERC to give fish “equal consideration”). Despite the
Northwest Power Act’s promise of parity, BPA has never embraced that balance, and the
agency has consistently sacrificed salmon protections to subsidize hydropower generation. See
BPA Salmon Crisis, supra note 9, at 10,729. During the electricity crisis of 2001, for example,
BPA declared a series of power “emergencies,” which allowed the agency to increase
hydropower production at Columbia and Snake river dams by routing all spring river flows
through the dams’ power turbines—significantly increasing the mortality of juvenile salmon—
rather than allowing some of the water to pass through spillways. These power “emergencies”
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crisis553 — BPA, along with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps),
proposed to eliminate the spill program in order to generate more
electricity.554 Shockingly, NOAA approved the proposal as consistent with its
BiOp—even though the BiOp had described the spill program as central to
avoiding jeopardy to listed salmon.555 This abrupt about-face was not
convincing to the reviewing court, and consequently Judge Redden rejected
the attempt to terminate spills.556
Undaunted, NOAA used the opportunity to revise the failed 2000 BiOp
to substantially dilute salmon protections in its 2004 BiOp. It did so not on
the basis of any new information suggesting that listed salmon no longer
needed remedial hydrosystem operations; instead, NOAA acted on the basis
of new legal interpretations of which actions must undergo federal
consultation under the ESA. Through a completely revised jeopardy
framework and an unprecedented definition of the “environmental baseline,”
NOAA employed legal legerdemain in an effort to dismantle FCRPS

were the result of increased power prices on the wholesale market during spring and summer
2001 and poor agency management decisions. Because BPA was unwilling to purchase power
on wholesale markets at soaring prices in order to meet its obligations, the agency chose to
increase hydropower generation and increase salmon mortalities, despite the Northwest Power
Act’s directive that BPA set its power rates to recover all the agency’s costs, including salmon
restoration costs. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(8)–(10), 839e(a)(1) (2000); BPA Salmon Crisis, supra
note 9, at 10,726.
BPA’s reaction to the electricity crisis of 2001 was not surprising given its history of
“trad[ing] economics for fish.” Id. at 10,728 (quoting Idaho Fish and Game Manager Steve
Pettit). For example, in the 1970s, the agency claimed it lacked authority to alter FCRPS
operations to protect fish, but found “implied” authority to implement a seven billion dollar
nuclear power plant program. Id. That program ultimately failed, leaving behind defunct power
plants, for which ratepayers continue to pay. Id. In the 1980s, BPA tried to undermine the
process of developing a salmon restoration program by claiming that the plan was inconsistent
with sound business practices. Id. And in the 1990s, the agency’s inflated estimates of fish and
wildlife costs led the agency to implement a “cost cap” that limited its obligations to fund fish
and wildlife restoration. Id. More recently, the agency has repeatedly attempted to curtail fish
flow and spill measures, claiming that they were too expensive. Id.
BPA has consistently sacrificed the needs of Columbia Basin salmon in favor of the
financial stability of its customers—primarily industrial power users. Indeed, during the early
part of the decade, large industrial power users (primarily aluminum plants) reaped enormous
economic benefits from BPA’s cheap power. The agency not only provided these users with
below-market power, during the 2001 electricity crisis industrial customers took advantage of a
provision in BPA’s power sales contracts allowing them to sell the low-cost BPA power on the
open market. Id. In 2001, for example, the Kaiser Aluminum smelter near Spokane sold power it
purchased from BPA for $22.50 per megawatt hour for up to $555 per megawatt hour—a 2400%
markup. Id. BPA industrial customers made a total of $1.2 billion from reselling cheap BPA
power in just over four months between October 2000 and February 2001. Id.
BPA’s contracting blunders thus allowed its industrial power customers to become power
brokers at the same time the agency teetered on the brink of insolvency during the 2001
California energy fiasco. Id. Columbia Basin salmon suffered as a result, as BPA tried to rectify
its poor financial planning by declaring a series of power “emergencies” during 2001, increasing
power production with water that should have been managed to benefit fish. Id. at 10,726.
553 Cf. supra note 322.
554 See supra notes 318–30 and accompanying text.
555 See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
556 NWF v. NMFS II, No. CV 01-6940-RE, 2004 WL 1698050, at *6 (D. Or. July 29, 2004),
discussed supra notes 332–38 and accompanying text.
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operations aimed at benefiting salmon.557 Judge Redden was unpersuaded by
the deception, however, and he rejected the 2004 BiOp.558
Thus, the Endangered Species Act era of Columbia Basin salmon
restoration efforts has been no more successful, although quite a bit more
duplicitous, than the preceding Northwest Power Act era.559 One significant
difference between the eras, however, is the recent advent of active and
skeptical judicial review.
Judicial review played an important and lasting role in the
reallocation of salmon harvests in the 1970s and 1980s, as Judge Belloni
and Judge Boldt upheld the claims of Indian tribes concerning their
rights to a harvest share under their treaties.560 In 1994, the Ninth Circuit
issued what seemed to be a path-breaking opinion concluding that the
Northwest Power Act demanded deference to the views of fishery
agencies and Indian tribes in salmon restoration efforts.561 That decision
proved to be an isolated one, however, and the ESA listings soon
dominated salmon restoration efforts.562 The same year as the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, Judge Marsh announced that the Columbia Basin
hydrosystem needed a complete overhaul.563 But he later was unwilling to
press forward in the face of FCRPS agency intransigence, upholding the
1995 BiOp564 before retiring from the Columbia Basin salmon battles.
Whether his successor, Judge Redden, possesses the fortitude to oversee
agency implementation of the ESA in the face of massive agency
resistance to changes in the hydrosystem status quo remains to be seen.
Surely the forces supporting the status quo are counting on the limits of
judicial review to allow them to make as few changes as possible.565
Over a quarter-century ago, Congress made it national policy to put
salmon restoration on an equal footing with hydropower generation. The
operators of the FCRPS—especially BPA and the Corps—managed to
defeat congressional intent mostly by ignoring it. That brought on the
ESA listings a decade later. Defending the hydrosystem status quo
against the ESA required transforming NOAA from a salmon advocate to

557

See supra notes 358–62 and accompanying text.
NWF v. NMFS III, No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878 (D. Or. May 26, 2005),
discussed supra notes 377–474 and accompanying text.
559 See Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 80–83 (explaining the restoration programs under
558

the two statutes).
560 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 78–86 (discussing the “Belloni” and “Boldt”
decisions and their aftermath).
561 Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1389 (9th Cir. 1994),
discussed in Beyond Parity, supra note 112, at 44–49.
562 See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 525–48 (providing an overview of the salmon
listings).
563 IDFG v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), discussed in Beyond Parity, supra
note 112, at 42–44.
564 See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 556–57 (discussing Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., No. 96-00384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997)).
565 For example, the Bush Administration’s appeal of Judge Redden’s decisions argues that
the district court overstepped the limits of judicial review, and that his ordering of spills at
FCRPS dams impermissibly interjected himself in the day-to-day operations of the system. See
supra note 529 and accompanying text.
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a part of the hydrosystem status quo, a task accomplished with surprising
ease. Anyone in Congress who thinks the ESA is a draconian measure
favoring listed species over competing economic concerns has not
studied the lessons of the ESA and Columbia Basin salmon, where NOAA
has discovered enormous ESA flexibility to accommodate economic
concerns.566 This history reveals that the status quo is a much more
powerful influence than whatever pressure the ESA can bring to bear on
a species restoration problem.567 Columbia Basin salmon are
demonstrably the worse for this reality.

566 See Salmon and the ESA, supra note 22, at 598–99 (describing the ESA’s economic
insensitivity as a “myth”).
567 The Columbia Basin saga thus resembles the situation of western water generally, where
the status quo prevails over all other considerations. See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the

Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of
Prior Appropriation, 28 ENVTL. L. 881, 888 (1998) (discussing how western states maintain status
quo policies for water rights); Denise Lach, Helen Ingram & Steve Rayner, Maintaining the
Status Quo: How Institutional Norms and Practices Create Conservative Water Organizations,
83 TEX. L. REV. 2027 (2005) (discussing agency responses to water problems).

